nannimoretti

The shareholder's conflict of interest in shareholders' meeting resolutions.

[:it]Conflict of interest could be defined as the limitation that the shareholder encounters in his right to vote.

It is important to remember that two prerequisites are necessary for this to be effectively configured:

  1. that the partner pursues its own end
  2. that said end contrasts concretely with the general interest of society[1]

The question therefore arises as to what happens if a shareholder with a conflict of interest votes on a resolution of the shareholders' meeting of a public limited liability company to bring a corporate liability action against the director.

While theArticle 2373 of the Civil Code prior to reform expressly sanctioned a ban on voting by the shareholder in conflict of interest, the current layoutInstead, it gives the shareholder the choice between voting by renouncing his potentially conflicting personal interest or abstaining from voting.

Should the latter opt for abstention, Art. 2368 para. 3 provides that the shares are counted towards the attainment of the quorum constitutivebut not for the purpose of calculating that deliberative. It is important to note that the contestability of the resolution is rightly subject to the fact that the vote of the shareholder in conflict of interest was decisive in reaching a quorum.

Therefore, the shareholder's voting right is remitted ex Article 2373 (1) to its appreciation of the consequences that may ensue. The resolution of the shareholders' meeting therefore retains its validity intact unless it was passed with the casting vote of the conflicting shareholder. The latter will then be free to choose whether or not to abstain from voting.[2]

Another question is whether the shareholder-directors may vote on resolutions concerning their respective liabilities. In fact, although Art. 2373 para. 2 expressly states a prohibition for such a hypothesis, the question arises as to whether the shareholders' meeting is called upon to resolve on a liability action of director Caius, Tizio (also a shareholder-director), may exercise his voting right.

An important arbitration award recently expressed itself on this point, stating that: "at in accordance with the principle of vicarious liability, the shareholder's vote on the liability of the other directors is admissible and must therefore be counted towards the quorum for passing a resolution, the prohibition under Article 2373(2) of the Civil Code applying only when the resolution concerns the liability of the voting shareholder himself and not when the resolution concerns the liability of another director"[3].

ABSTRACT

  • for the conflict of interest to exist, it is necessary that the shareholder pursues its own end and that this end is in concrete conflict with the general interest of the company
  • the current provision of Article 2373 gives the shareholder the choice between voting by renouncing his potentially conflicting personal interest or abstaining from voting
  • in the event of abstention, Art. 2368 para. 3 provides that the shares are counted for the purposes of reaching the constitutive quorum, but not for the purposes of calculating the deliberative quorum
  • the appealability of the resolution is subject to the fact that the vote of the shareholder in conflict of interest was decisive for the attainment of the quorum
  • Although Art. 2373 para. 2 prohibits member-directors from voting on resolutions concerning their respective liabilities, in accordance with the principle of vicarious liability, the vote of the member-director on the liability of the other directors is permissible

[1] It must be borne in mind that the interest must be objectively in conflict with the corporate interest. If this is not demonstrated, the resolution cannot be annulled, even if it turns out that the vote was cast e.g. out of personal spite against the directors or to gain an advantage over the other shareholders (Commented Code of S.p.A., Fauceglia - Schiano di Pepe, 2007, UTET)

[2] Corporate Law, Gastone Cottino, pg. 346 ff., 2006 CEDAM

[3] Arbitration Board, 2 July 2009, Jur. comm. 2010, 5, 911, note De Pra

 

 

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departures

Thanatological damage or immediate death.

[:it]The 'tanatological damage' must be brought within the sphere of moral damage, in its broadest exception, i.e. as the suffering of the subject who consciously witnesses his or her own death.

On this point, the most authoritative jurisprudence teaches that the so-called "Thanatological damage"or immediate death must be brought within the dimension of non-pecuniary damage, understood in its widest exception, as the suffering of the victim who lucidly witnesses the extinguishing of his or her life and, therefore, can only be such that of the victim surviving at least for an appreciable length of time after the accident and before the final outcome.

Hence, the claim for damages from "loss of the right to life"or 'tanatological damage', brought jure hereditatis by the heirs of the deceased, is not admissible when the occurrence of the fatal event takes place immediately or a short time after the harmful event, since this entails the loss of the legal asset of life in the person's hands, which cannot result in the simultaneous acquisition in the victim's estate of a corresponding right to compensation, then transferable to the heirs.

There have also been quite recent rulings on this point, and among these we can mention, in particular, the Court of Rovigo which verbatim reads '... the non-pecuniary damage jure ereditaria cannot be recognised ... because A.R. suffered intensely for less than an hour ... circumstance that, although touching from a 'moral' point of view, does not fulfil the prerequisites required by the Supreme College to consider that the right to claim has entered the legal sphere of the injured party: an appreciable period of time ...".[1]

To conclude, in hypotheses such as the one above, only one damage could be identified, namely that consisting in the suffering endured by the victim's relatives over the death of their relative.

The Supreme Court recently pronounced on this issue, confirming a well-established jurisprudential direction.

"Injury to the right to health occurs when the person remains alive with an impairment and only when there is a time lapse between the harmful event and death that makes the right to compensation accrue, which is consequently transmissible to the heirs. Consequently, compensation for tanatological damage "iure hereditatis" does not arise when death occurs immediately as a consequence of the injury, since in this case there is no injury to the legal right to health.".[2]

ABSTRACT

  • the 'tanatological damage' or 'immediate death damage' must be brought within the dimension of moral damage, understood in its broadest exception, as the suffering of the victim who lucidly witnesses the extinguishing of his or her life
  • the claim for damages for 'loss of the right to life' or 'tanatological damage' brought by the heirs of the de cuiusis not permissible when, the occurrence of the fatal event takes place immediately or a short time after the harmful event
  • in the event of immediate or near-immediate death, damage that could be identified in the relatives of the victim would consist of the damage resulting from the suffering suffered by them due to the death of their relative

[1] Court of Rovigo - Sez. Dist. Di Adria - 02.03.2010

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Clint Eastwood

Burden of proof in the event of a claim for non-performance. United Sections and minority orientations.

[:it]On the subject of civil liability, the question of the burden of proof of the creditor acting in order to claim the non-performance of an obligation has seen the jurisprudence and doctrine heavily engaged, especially before the advent of the judgment of the S.ections of the Supreme Courtwhich intervened in order to
define a jurisprudential contrast.

The two guidelines are briefly recalled:

The majority one  held that the aggrieved party also has the burden of proving the fact giving rise to the termination, i.e. the non-performance and the circumstances pertaining thereto, according to which it takes on legal significance, it therefore remaining for the defendant to prove the absence of fault only if the plaintiff has actually proved the fact constituting the non-performance.[1]

This orientation was mainly based on the distinction between the remedies provided for in Art. 1453 of the Civil Code (performance, termination, damages). It was observed that while in an action for performance the constitutive fact is the title, in an action for termination there are two constitutive facts: the title and the non-performance. Therefore, the evidence required under Art. 2697 of the Civil Code is different because the constitutive facts are themselves different. In the first case, therefore, proof of the negotiated or legal source of the right of claim will be sufficient, in the second case proof of both the title and the debtor's actual non-performance will be required.

The minority view, on the other hand, held that the burden of proof on the creditor is the same regardless of the action brought by the latter. Specifically, the creditor under Art. 2697 of the Civil Code must simply prove the negotiated or legal source of its right, whereas it is the creditor that will be burdened with proving the extinguishing fact of that right, constituted by the fact of performance.

This argument was based on the fact that the claims for performance, termination for non-performance and damages for non-performance are all linked to the same assumption, namely non-performance. This homogeneity implies that the principle of the presumption of the persistence of the right under Art. 2697 of the Civil Code, according to which once the creditor has proved the existence of a right, the burden of proving the existence of the extinction event is on the debtor, should apply to each of the cases listed in Art. 1453 of the Civil Code.

Le United Sections in 2001 Judgment No. 13533 adhered to the minority orientation, also stating that "is in conformity with the need not to make excessively difficult the exercise of the creditor's right to react to the non-performance, without, however, penalising the right of defence of the non-performing debtor, to apply the principle of traceability or proximity of proof, placing the burden of proof on the party in whose sphere the non-performance occurred".[2]

It should be noted, however, that there have recently been a number of court rulings which, in contrast to the now rather dated ruling of the Unified Sections, go on to state that "whatever the basis of the plaintiff's claim for damages, it is undoubtedly incumbent on the party claiming damages to prove not only the harmful event, but above all its causal traceability to the wrongful act of others."[3]

ABSTRACT

  • According to the Unified Sections of the Supreme Court of Cassation On the subject of proof of non-performance of an obligation, a creditor suing for contractual termination, damages or performance only has to prove the source (negotiated or legal) of its right and the relevant time limit, limiting itself to the mere allegation of the non-performance of the other party, whereas the defendant debtor bears the burden of proof of the extinguishing fact of the other party's claim, which is the fact of performance.
  • there are some judgments that have recently stated that On the subject of the burden of proof, on the creditor acting for performance, termination or compensation for damages, there is not only the proof of the performance of his obligation, but also the proof of the exact performance and, therefore, it would seem to be applicable also to the hypotheses of defects or non-conformity of the work, as they fall within the category of inexact performance

[1] See for example, Cass. Civ. 4285-94; 8336-90; 8435-96;124-70

[3] Court of Novara, 27/04/2010, no. 435 (in the present case, the owner of a car that caught fire has not proved that the fire was caused by a defect in the functioning of the car and/or a hidden defect and/or a problem with the car's equipment attributable to the seller); Cf. Court Nocera Inferiore, section I, 07/02/2012, 'On the subject of the burden of proofagainst the creditor acting for performance, termination or the compensation of damagethere is not only the proof performance of its obligation, but also the proof of the exact performance and, therefore, would seem to be applicable also to the hypothesis of defects or non-conformities of the work, as they fall within the category of inexact performance.

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matrix-leather-coat__32936_std

Internet law II. The trade mark and the TLD.

[:en]The domain name consists of a Top Level Domain (TLD) and by a Second Level Domain (SLD). THE TLD can essentially be of two types, generic (gTLD) (when it is appropriate to distinguish, in principle, the sector of operation - e.g. .com for commercial activities and .org for organisations non-profit) or geographical - country code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) (when it is capable of signalling the 'virtual' location of the computer).

Consider, that there is no guarantee that, in practice, to a geographical domain, for example .en for Italy, .fr. for France and so on, actually corresponds to a computer located in the territory evoked by the ccTLD.

The assignment of domain names is carried out by bodies whose task is to establish the procedures for registering domains and assigning them to applicants marked by the country code '.it'. Each state has its own bodies in charge of these functions, and each country operates independently, as the various states are distinguished by their own country codes (.de, .fr, .nl, .be). It will therefore be possible for the same domain name to be used by different parties in different states and for the addresses to differ only by country code (e.g. '.www.esempio.it" e www.esempio.de"). On the basis of the above, the Internet being a worldwide platform, regulated by independent state bodies, it is evident that the risks and opportunities for confusion between domain names used by trade mark owners operating in different parts of the globe, will be increasingly numerous and frequent.

The question therefore arises as to whether the owner of a trade mark registered in Italy may take action to prevent a third party from using a domain name containing his company's trade mark if it is characterised by a different TLD (e.g., "the trade mark of the company"). www.abcd.it and www.abcd.fr).

Here too, a distinction must be made between renowned and non-renowned brands

 a)   renowned brand cases

According to doctrine and case law in the case of trade marks with a high reputation, the problem of the TLD does not even seem to ariseas the counterfeiting of the sign is also in re ipsa related to the registration of the domain name, regardless of the TLD it has and even in the absence of actual use.[1]

b)   cases of non-renowned trade marks

In trade mark cases so to speak sic et simpliciter, it does not seem tenable to assert that the owner of a registered trade mark, which is neither well-known nor well-known, can oppose the registration of an identical or similar domain name, but with a different TLD (e.g. .it and .de).

In fact, since the law on trade marks applies only in a national context, the owner of a trade mark registered in Italy is not the owner of a right to exclusive use of the trade mark outside the national territory and cannot therefore prevent a third party from registering abroad a domain name equal or similar to that trade mark, but with a different TLD.

In any case, it must be considered that if the third registers the domain name abroad in order to direct users to its own site where it in fact advertises or sells certain competitive goods or services, in which case the territory in which the cotraffactive sign is placed on the network is irrelevant (e.g. formaggitaliani.it and formaggitaliani.com).

Indeed, given the global nature of the Internet communication system, each user, including Italian users, will be able to connect to the site corresponding to the domain name possibly confusable with the registered trade mark.[2]

It can therefore be considered that "the proprietor of the trade mark registered in Italy is not the owner of a right to exclusive use of the trade mark outside the national territory, and cannot prevent a third party from registering abroad a domain name equal to or similar to that trade mark within a [different] geographical or thematic TLD, unless its use for offering for sale or advertising goods or services results in an infringement of the right.[3]

In conclusion, therefore, it is held that the owner of an Italian trade mark cannot prevent a third party from using a domain name confusable with the said trade mark if it bears a different TLD, at least that such registration has infringed the proprietor's right to use the trade mark, since it is likely to direct users to a website on which identical, similar or related goods or services are offered or advertised.

On the basis of the above, however, it is considered necessary, given the complexity and specificity of the discipline, for this opinion to be used as a guideline and for individual cases to be analysed specifically.

ABSTRACT
  • The TLD can essentially be of two types, generic (gTLD) (when it is used to distinguish, the sector of operation (.com), business (.org) or geographical (country code Top Level Domain ccTLD) when it is capable of signalling the 'virtual' location of the computer (.it, .de)
  • The question therefore arises as to whether the owner of a trade mark registered in Italy may take action to prevent a third party from using a domain name containing his company's trade mark if it is characterised by a different TLD (e.g., the "TLD" of the company's trade mark). www.abcd.it and www.abcd.fr)
  • In the case of well-known trade marks, the problem of the TLD does not even seem to arise, since the counterfeiting of the sign is also in re ipsa linked to the registration of the domain name, regardless of the TLD it has and even in the absence of actual use
  • in the cases of non-renowned trade marks can therefore be considered as '.the proprietor of the trade mark registered in Italy is not the owner of a right to exclusive use of the trade mark outside the national territory, and cannot prevent a third party from registering abroad a domain name equal to or similar to that trade mark within a [different] geographical or thematic TLD, unless its use for offering for sale or advertising goods or services results in an infringement of the right

[1] Court of Reggio Emilia 30.5.2000 (ordinance); Peyron, Giur. it. 2001, 96.

[2] Court of Reggio Emilia 30.5.2000 (ordinance)

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Wall Street

Purchase of a shareholding and seller's warranties (by Valerio Sangiovanni).

[:en]Courtesy of the author Valerio Sangiovanni and the publishing house Ipsoa Wolters Kluwer reproduces the article that appeared in Notariat, 2012, pp. 203-213]

by VALERIO SANGIOVANNI

 The warranties offered by the seller to the purchaser of corporate participations normally represent one of the central elements of contracts for the purchase and sale of shares. The matter is of great practical relevance, being the subject - frequently - of nerve-racking negotiations between the parties. In view of such an important subject matter, it is striking that the issue of warranties in sale/acquisition contracts is relatively little dealt with in both case law and doctrine, although probably the presence of few case law decisions is attributable to the fact that disputes on this point are generally settled by arbitration. In this article we will deal with this issue, focusing on the types of clauses that allow the seller's liability to be limited.

1. The Share Purchase Agreement

The Share Purchase Agreement[1] is the contract by which a first party sells (profile of 'transfer') and a second party acquires (profile of 'acquisition') a shareholding[2]. In such a contract, it is quite usual for the seller to offer express warranties in favour of the purchaser (concerning not only the shareholding bought and sold in and of itself, but also - and above all - the substantial characteristics of the underlying company), and it is this profile - of great practical relevance - that we wish to focus on in this article[3].

Assuming that the participation transfer contract is subject to Italian law (a different choice may be made, for example, when one of the parties is foreign)[4]it is to be qualified as a contract of sale, since our legislative definition of a contract by which the ownership of a thing or another right is transferred for the consideration of a price (Art. 1470 of the Civil Code) is fulfilled: the object of the transfer is the shares or quotas of the company (and only indirectly, and pro quotaassets and liabilities of the company), while the price is the consideration that is paid by the buyer. The sale/acquisition contract is a common sale/purchase contract characterised by the fact that the asset bought and sold is a shareholding.

The qualification of an acquisition contract as a sale and purchase explains, at the terminological level, the circumstance that it is sometimes referred to - in practice - as a sale and purchase contract. More frequent, however, is the use of terms such as 'assignment' or 'acquisition'. However, 'acquisition' is nothing other than the same transfer of the shares or stocks seen from the perspective of the party opposite the one that 'transfers'. Ultimately, 'assignment' and 'acquisition' are to be considered synonymous, and the transfer mechanism is well expressed by the single term 'sale', which encompasses both.

With respect to the subject matter of the sale, the expression, although it is recurrent in practice, of 'purchase of a company' does not appear to be correct: in fact, the contract does not concern the company, but only the shareholding that a shareholder holds in the company. Even if the acquisition of shares implies, to the relevant extent, the acquisition of the assets and liabilities pertaining to the company, this only occurs indirectly. The distinction, used by the case law and to which we will return below, between the 'immediate' object of the acquisition (the shareholding) and the 'mediated' object of the acquisition (the assets and liabilities pertaining to the company) therefore appears to be correct.

To tell the truth, the use in practice of expressions such as 'contract of assignment' or 'contract of acquisition' gives rise to misunderstandings not only of a linguistic but also of a substantive nature. Indeed, it is sometimes claimed in doctrine that the contract of 'assignment' or 'acquisition' is not one of the named contracts expressly regulated in our legal system. The debate on the nature of the contract for the sale or acquisition of corporate participations appears in fact to be essentially pointless: indeed, such a contract cannot be considered atypical, but must instead be qualified simply as a 'sale'. The contract could be peacefully referred to by the parties as a 'contract of sale'; what is particular - in the contract of assignment/acquisition - is only its object, consisting of a shareholding.

If the contract for the transfer of corporate shares is to be characterised as a contract of sale, attention must then be paid to the provisions governing warranties in this type of contract, with particular reference to Art. 1490(1) of the Civil Code, according to which the seller is obliged to ensure that the what sold is free from defects rendering it unfit for use or appreciably diminishing its value. What, in the specific context of acquisitions of participations, is the 'thing' sold? As pointed out above, the object of the contract is represented - directly - by the equity interest (and only indirectly by the assets and liabilities included in the equity interest). The real problem of warranties, however, concerns not the participation itself, but the assets and liabilities which the acquisition of the participation brings with it, pro quotawith itself. With regard to the 'mediated' subject matter of the purchase and sale (assets and liabilities), it is a recurring assertion that the provisions on warranties in the sales contract are excessively favourable to the purchaser and, for that reason, not particularly suited to the context of corporate acquisitions. In the context of these transactions, it is usual to seek a better balance between the position of the seller and the buyer. With the share purchase agreement, the seller makes every effort to limit the security it offers the buyer with respect to the assets and liabilities of the company. This limitation of warranty, however, is subject to a precise condition of effectiveness, since the agreement excluding or limiting the warranty has no effect if the seller has in bad faith concealed from the buyer the defects of the thing (Art. 1490(2) Civil Code).

2. The activity of due diligence and the preliminary flow of information

We have seen that whoever buys a shareholding buys, directly, only shares or quotas. By acquiring the status of shareholder, however, he becomes part of a company with assets and liabilities. The main problem for the purchaser is that, being generally - prior to the purchase - an outsider to the company, he does not know its characteristics. If he buys the shareholding without careful prior verification, he may find himself exposed to negative surprises compared to his expectations (where certain assets are overvalued or even non-existent or certain liabilities are undervalued or even hidden). The amount of information available to a person outside the company is normally insufficient to ensure an appropriate assessment of the risks involved in the purchase.

In order to reduce the risks associated with the purchase of company shareholdings, the signing of the shareholding purchase agreement is generally preceded by a so-called 'due diligence"[5]. The expression 'due diligence', of Anglo-Saxon origin, can be translated - literally - as 'due diligence': this is the diligence a prudent buyer uses in making all necessary checks before purchasing a shareholding. In practice, the buyer is normally given the opportunity to carry out a series of checks on the target company: the due diligence can be carried out directly by the buyer or, more frequently, by hiring external experts.

A point that is rarely emphasised is that the activity of due diligence also implies the cooperation of the company whose shares are to be acquired, which must make the required material available on the basis of a list. This activity of preparing the material is the responsibility of the directors of the target company.

It may happen that, faced with a shareholder wishing to sell his shareholding, there is no cooperation on the part of the company in making the requested information available to the potential purchaser. This problem does not arise when the shareholder is also a director of the company, being able - in that capacity - to have direct access to the information and, in principle, to pass it on to third parties. In some cases, however, the shareholder does not hold any administrative office.

The problem of the possible conflict between the shareholder and the company must then be addressed by the shareholder exercising his right to information vis-à-vis the company. By exercising this right, the shareholder collects the material to be made available to the potential purchaser. On this point, however, a distinction must be made between the s.r.l. and the s.p.a.: as is well known, whereas in the former type of company a broad right of the shareholder to information is recognised (Art. 2476(2) of the Civil Code)[6]in the s.p.a. there is no provision in the s.p.a. that provides for such an extensive right of information of the shareholder. Article 2422 of the Civil Code allows shareholders to do little: only to examine the register of shareholders and the register of meetings and resolutions. The legislator takes into account the different nature of the two types of company and, consequently, structures the right to information and control differently. In a company that is usually assumed to have few shareholders, such as the s.r.l., the right of control is recognised to a broad extent; conversely, in a company type such as the s.p.a., which - hypothetically - may have a large shareholder structure, confidentiality is protected to a greater extent. It follows that, whereas in the s.r.l., the shareholder can easily gather the information to be given to the potential purchaser, in the s.p.a., it is by no means self-evident that the shareholder can achieve this result.

In the s.p.a., the problem of the lack of a broad right of control-information of the shareholder can be resolved by reconstructing a duty of information on the part of the directors arising from the general obligation to conduct themselves in good faith in the performance of their duties in the interest of the company[7]. It follows that, where the shareholder's request is not contrary to the company's interest, the managers must comply with it. In order to avoid damage to the company, however, it is certainly advisable to precede the transmission of information by the signing of a confidentiality agreement, whereby the third party undertakes not to disclose and not to use what comes to his knowledge.

However, even in the s.r.l., even in the presence of a broad right of control of the shareholder established directly by law, conflicts may arise between the shareholder and the directors with respect to the exercise of the right to information as a means of permitting - then - third parties access to data and information. Allowing third parties access to the company's documents may be risky in cases where the third party has conflicting interests with those of the company, for example in the event of litigation or in the case of a company engaged in competitive activities. It may therefore happen that the directors oppose the shareholder's request for information.

Returning to the case standard (the one in which there is no internal obstacle in making company information available to the potential buyer), it can be noted that - traditionally - the documentation subject to due diligence was prepared in paper format and was made accessible for a certain period of time in a room set up for that purpose (hence the expression ''paper'').data room"data room). In recent times, it is more common for information to be made available in a virtual mode, which the buyer can access - always for a limited time - electronically.

La due diligence can be more or less wide-ranging depending on the case: the most common types of audit are financial, tax and legal. At the outcome of the due diligencea written report is generally prepared - addressed to the potential purchaser of the participation - describing the main risks involved in the purchase of the shares/shares.

The purpose of the due diligence is twofold. On the one hand, it has a purely informative purpose for the purchaser: to learn more about the characteristics of the target company. On the other hand, the due diligence has a specific objective of identifying the risks that the target presents. Once these risks have been identified, it is up to the clauses of the sales contract to provide adequate protection. There is therefore a close link between the due diligence and the content of the subsequent contract.

The activity of due diligence is sometimes reflected in a special clause in the acquisition contract. Thanks to the preliminary check on the targetthe buyer has become aware of the characteristics of the company in which it wants to acquire a participation, including its critical aspects: this enables it to determine (and agree with the counterparty) the 'right' price for the participation. The seller does not want the buyer to be able, subsequent to the completion of the acquisition, to activate warranties enabling him to obtain compensation (economically equivalent to a price reduction). In order to achieve such a result (i.e. to 'stabilise' the price), the seller insists on the inclusion in the contract of a clause by which the purchaser declares that it has carried out thorough checks on the company and, to the best of its knowledge, has not found any circumstances that would allow it to activate a security. Such a provision prevents improper conduct on the part of the buyer, who could conceivably - having identified the defects in advance - remain silent about them, and then, as soon as the contract is finalised, claim damages.

3. The Most Common Guarantees in Share Purchase Agreements

It is difficult to make a list of the warranties normally contained in a share purchase agreement: practice shows considerable differences from case to case. Much depends on the competence of the lawyers assisting the parties. Also relevant is the level of necessity, more or less stringent, for one party rather than the other to conclude the contract quickly: those who wish to conclude the transaction quickly tend to give less weight to the guarantee clauses, which operate only eventually.

Sometimes the clauses concerning guarantees are written in a particularly analytical manner: this is the contractual technique favoured in Anglo-Saxon countries, where contracts are characterised by being particularly detailed. The analytical listing of warranties is moreover generally accompanied or replaced by closing clauses stating a certain state of facts in a summary manner. With reference, for example, to the matter of litigation, it may be repeated for each matter (environmental, labour, relations with customers and suppliers, etc., etc.) that there are no disputes between the company and third parties; however, it seems more effective to confine oneself to a general clause attesting to the absence of any litigation.

Turning to the content of the clauses, a common distinction is that between guarantees relating to the 'title' of the participation and guarantees relating to the 'content' of the participation.

The 'title' clauses are those that refer directly to the characteristics of the participation and the target from a corporate point of view: e.g. the seller warrants that he is the owner of the shares and that they are free from any third party rights; or the seller warrants that the company has been validly incorporated and is validly existing under the national law governing it. Title clauses are absolutely usual in contracts for the purchase and sale of corporate shares and the seller can hardly refuse to grant such warranties to the buyer. Such clauses are generally not subject to quantitative limitations on damages: even where there are thresholds to the seller's liability, they do not apply to this type of security, which is too basic to be subject to any limitation.

Decidedly more important in practice, and therefore the subject of more negotiations[8]are the guarantees relating to the 'content' of the shareholding (assets and liabilities of the company). They can cover the most diverse topics and vary from case to case, also depending on the sector in which the company is active.

Among the most common warranties in contracts for the acquisition of shareholdings are those concerning the balance sheet[9]. Linked to the guarantees on the balance sheet are those on tax matters, consisting essentially of the assertion that the company has always correctly fulfilled all its tax obligations[10]. From an economic point of view, guarantees regarding labour relations as well as social security and pension contributions may be important. Another group of significant guarantees are those relating to contractual relationships to which the target company is a party[11]. Depending on the circumstances, intellectual property warranties may have significant practical relevance. Environmental warranties are quite common, especially where the company carries out a manufacturing activity or - in any event - one that easily leads to pollution. Another common clause concerns the existence of all administrative authorisations and concessions required for the exercise of the activity. Finally, the catalogue of guarantees normally includes the one on litigation, understood as the exclusion of the existence of pending litigation.

With the activity of due diligence and by the sale and purchase agreement the purchaser seeks to insure itself against the risks resulting from the purchase of the shareholding, in particular against the probability, which - depending on the circumstances - may be greater or lesser, that harm will be caused to the company. Such detriment would reduce the value of the company and thus, pro quotaalso of the shares acquired. Where a certain loss has already occurred prior to the conclusion of the contract (which shall then, more correctly, be referred to as a "liability"), the purchaser shall take it into account ex antei.e. in determining the price he is prepared to pay for the company's shareholding. The underlying idea is that the buyer pays for the shares or units at their 'fair' price, i.e. that which reflects all the assets and liabilities that the company has at the time of purchase.

Contractual warranties, on the other hand, serve to protect the purchaser against circumstances that have not yet produced harm at the time the contract is signed, but may produce it in the near future. The likelihood, whether less or more, of the harm occurring depends of course on the circumstances of the case. By means of the warranty clauses, the seller undertakes to bear the damages that would arise if the event referred to in the contract were to occur within a reasonable time in the future.

Sometimes the danger of damage occurring is particularly high. In the course of due diligence concrete risks may have been identified that may produce, in the short term, the harm feared by the acquirer. One thinks of the case in which the land owned by the company in which one wishes to acquire an interest is being inspected for suspected environmental damage that could, if confirmed, imply an obligation for the company to pay compensation, or one thinks of the hypothesis in which the company is a party to a litigation in which it is a defendant: if the case is lost, the company will be forced to pay a sum of money to a third party. In such cases, the buyer has identified circumstances that may - in the near future - lead to damages. There is no harm at the time the contract is concluded, but the parties are aware that it may soon materialise. In such a situation it is difficult for the buyer to insist on a decrease in price, since the seller will argue that the harm has not yet materialised. These special situations (of concrete and imminent risk) are generally resolved by a so-called "indemnity" clause (indemnity): it is guaranteed in the contract, by an appropriate covenant, that the seller is obliged to indemnify the buyer with respect to any third party claims related to that specific event. The clauses of indemnityPrecisely because they relate to a concrete and imminent danger of harm, they are not subject to quantitative limitations, unlike the guarantees of a generic nature that we will now examine.

In addition to the indemnity, contracts for the purchase and sale of shareholdings usually also contain warranties of a generic type, designed to cover dangers of damage that were entirely abstract at the time the contract was signed. Imagine the case of a company engaged in manufacturing activities, which - on the basis of verifications made in the course of due diligence - appears to comply with all applicable environmental regulations. The buyer may, nevertheless, insist on the inclusion in the contract of a clause guaranteeing such compliance. If, after acquisition, it turns out that there are environmental violations, the clause may be activated by the buyer against the seller in order to obtain damages. These are clauses covering abstract dangers, where the damage not only has not occurred but - in the state of the parties' assessments - is not even likely to occur. In principle, the seller should have no problem consenting to the inclusion of such warranties in the contract, since it is unlikely that the damaging event will occur.

4. Termination and annulment of the contract

What happens if a contractual warranty offered by the seller to the buyer in a contract for the sale of shares is not honoured? The remedies generally provided by law in the presence of defects of the goods are termination of the contract or reduction of the price (Art. 1492(1) of the Civil Code). The problem is that these remedies, which are dictated for sale and purchase in general (and not for the particular case of the sale and purchase of corporate shareholdings), are as a rule not suited to the needs of the parties involved in corporate acquisitions. This applies especially to the 'restitutory' remedies (termination of the contract, but - as we will see below - also avoidance thereof).

With reference to the resolution of the contract, it must be considered that such a declaration would have the effect of rendering the acquisition transaction null and void. But the parties, if they move to buy or sell a participation, are generally determined not to retrace their steps. Moreover, since the termination of the contract is a restitutory remedy, the same conditions prior to the acquisition would have to be recreated. Given the complexity of the transaction, the resolutory remedy is generally unsuitable: restitution would be time-consuming and costly. In some respects, a complete restoration of the pre-acquisition situation may be impossible, since the company may - in the meantime - have undergone significant changes that can no longer be reversed. Wanting to draw a parallel, similar problems arise in the context of takeovers as in the case of mergers. Here the legislature has expressly provided that the only possible remedy is compensatory damages (Art. 2504-quater c.c.) precisely because a declaration of invalidity of the merger would imply restitution that, in complex realities such as that of a company, is not reasonably practicable[12].

As an alternative to termination of the contract, it is possible - for the purchaser of the shareholding - to invoke thecancellation.

Annulment may be claimed for fraudulent intent where the seller has intentionally given untrue information or where the seller has artfully withheld information otherwise decisive for the buyer's consent (Art. 1439 Civil Code).[13]. In practice, however, it is difficult to obtain the annulment of the contract by this route, due to the difficulty of proving the assignor's fraud.[14]. A similar consideration applies to accidental intent, which would legitimise not so much annulment of the contract as compensation for damages (Art. 1440 Civil Code).[15].

From an operational point of view, however, it is more common for the plaintiff to request the annulment of the contract for mistake, on the basis of the assumption that the information provided by the seller - albeit without malice - has caused the buyer to misrepresent reality, leading him to conclude a contract that he would not otherwise have concluded. According to the general rules, this must be an essential mistake (Art. 1429 of the Civil Code) and recognisable (Art. 1431 of the Civil Code).

Examining the case law on the avoidance of contracts for the sale and purchase of shareholdings, it appears that the most recurring mistake is the one concerning the assets of the target company. The purchaser of the shareholding pays a price reflecting, firstly, the net worth of the company (assets less liabilities) and, secondly, generally a premium for obtaining a majority (this 'premium' normally consists of a multiple of the profits realised in the last financial year). The company's assets are thus the starting point for the buyer to 'calculate' the price of the shareholding. Errors may occur in this context, such as to alter the purchaser's free provision of consent. Imagine the case where the share capital is assumed to exist, which has instead been - in whole or in part - lost, or the assumption that the net worth of the company is lower than assumed. If, contrary to the seller's assertion, the capital and/or assets do not exist as promised, the purchaser suffers a loss, consisting of paying a price in excess of the assumed value of the participation.

It should be noted, however, that jurisprudence is hesitant to grant the remedy of contract avoidance for mistake in the case of an erroneous assessment by the purchaser of the economic, financial and asset situation of the target company. As we shall see by analysing some of the most recent precedents on the subject, avoidance may be obtained only where there is an express and specific warranty in the contract as to the assets of the company, but not where such a warranty is lacking. In other words, the pure and simple assignment of units or shares does not imply any guarantee as to the characteristics of the underlying company. If the purchaser desires such a guarantee, it must have it expressly granted in the purchase contract.

Among the most recent interventions of the jurisprudence of legitimacy on the problem of the annulment of the contract of sale of shareholdings can be reported a decision of the Court of Cassation of 2008, according to which the error on the economic evaluation of the thing object of the contract (in the case in point a shareholding) does not fall within the notion of error of fact capable of justifying a pronouncement of annulment of the contract, in so far as the defect in the quality of the object must relate only to the rights and obligations that the contract in concrete terms is capable of conferring, and not to the economic value of the object of the contract, which relates to the sphere of the motives on the basis of which the party has determined to conclude a particular agreement, a sphere not protected by the instrument of annulment, since the legal system does not recognise any protection against the misuse of contractual autonomy and the error of one's own personal assessments, for which each of the parties assumes the risk[16]. This was a case where the contract lacked a specific contractual guarantee of the company's assets.

No different was the solution adopted by a slightly earlier ruling of the Court of Cassation (of 2007), which started from the consideration that the transfer of shares in a joint stock company has as its 'immediate object' the shareholding and only as its 'mediated object' the portion of the company's assets that this shareholding represents[17]. With respect to shares in companies, the qualities of the shares that, according to common appreciation, must be considered determinative of consent, must be limited to those pertaining to the typical function of the shares, i.e. the set of faculties and rights that they confer on their holder in the structure of the company, without any regard to their market value. The regulation of the law is limited to the immediate object (i.e. the shares that are the subject matter of the contract), while it does not extend to the consistency and value of the assets constituting the company's assets, unless the purchaser, in order to achieve that result, has had recourse to an express warranty clause, the result of contractual autonomy, which allows the parties to reinforce, reduce or exclude the warranty by agreement, in such a way as to explicitly link the value of the shares to the declared value of the company's assets. The Supreme Court concludes that an error as to the value of the company, in the absence of a clause to that effect, does not constitute an essential error capable of causing the contract to be void. In the case of a sale of shares in a company - which is assumed to have been concluded at a price not corresponding to their actual value - without the seller having given any guarantee as to the company's assets, the economic value of the shares does not fall within the qualities referred to in Article 1429(2) of the Civil Code concerning essential mistake. Therefore, an action for the annulment of the sale cannot be brought based on an alleged revision of the price by auditing accounting documents (balance sheet and profit and loss account) in order to prove what is nothing more than an error of valuation on the part of the purchaser, even when the company's balance sheet published prior to the sale is false and conceals a situation such as to make the rules on the reduction and loss of share capital applicable. The position taken by the Court of Cassation in this judgment is particularly strong in that even the falsity of the balance sheet is not sufficient to obtain the annulment of the sale contract[18].

In light of these case-law guidelines, the purchaser wishing to adequately guarantee itself must insist on the inclusion - in the contract for the sale of the shareholding - of an appropriate clause on the assets of the target company. Contractual practice shows that such stipulations are quite common.

5. Price Reduction and Damages

Also the price reduction (Art. 1492 of the Civil Code) is not normally an appropriate remedy in the context of corporate acquisitions, since it is reasonable to assume that the seller determines to the transaction in reliance on the valuation of the shareholding that was actually made, without any intention to revise ex post downward the price. In other words, the risk that the seller does not want to run is that the buyer will claim breaches of warranties, immediately after the conclusion of the contract, in order to obtain undue restitution of part of the price paid for the shares. It must be said that, from a strictly economic point of view, price reduction and damages are very similar. Suppose that the participation is sold for 1,000,000 euros and compensation of 100,000 euros is subsequently claimed: once this sum has been returned by the seller to the purchaser, it is as if the real purchase price of the participation was - in total - 900,000 euros. The economic effect of damages consists in a reduction of the purchase price.

In contractual practice it is common to provide, in the event of breach of contractual warranties, only the obligation to compensate the harm suffered by the purchaser. There is normally a clause in the contract that excludes the enforceability of remedies other than damages, excluding in particular the possibility of obtaining termination of the contract and its avoidance. The clause by which this is achieved is that of the"exclusive remedy"(exclusive remedy). In other words, the contract, after stating what warranties are offered by the seller and stating that in case of breach of those warranties the buyer is entitled to damages, provides that the buyer may not assert any other remedy.

The categories of harm that the obligor may be called upon to compensate are various. The seller, on the other hand, has an interest in limiting the types of harm that may be claimed by the buyer. It is therefore usual in negotiations to witness discussions on the types of harm that the seller assumes the obligation to indemnify in the event of a breach of warranties.

In this respect, the most important distinction is that between actual loss and loss of profit (Art. 1223 of the Civil Code), where - obviously - the seller will seek to limit its liability to the first item. The problem of loss of profit may be relevant in the context of acquisitions in two respects: on the one hand, the purchaser generally pays a sum as a premium for the purchase of the participation (on the basis of the assumption that the company will be able to produce profits also in the future), on the other hand, the purchaser aims in any event - irrespective of any profit-linked purchase price - to obtain even greater profits in the future from the participation he acquires (e.g. by achieving synergies with companies he already owns). The economic risk associated with a liability for lost profits may therefore be particularly severe for the seller.

If a circumstance arises that legitimises a claim for damages, the purchaser - in the absence of derogating clauses, and thus on the basis of the general provision of the civil code - could insist on obtaining not only the emerging damage, but also the loss of profit. Imagine the case of a piece of land purchased in the context of the acquisition, which later turns out to be polluted and requires 100,000 euros in clean-up costs; imagine also that the clean-up work requires the closure of the plant for 15 days, resulting in lost profits of 200,000 euros. Depending on how the clause is structured, the purchaser may obtain compensation only for the loss suffered (100,000 euros) or also for the loss of profit (another 200,000 euros). Hence, the assignor's interest in limiting the compensation in the contract to only actual loss.

6. The Duration of Guarantees

In practice, it is rare for the seller to be willing to offer warranties without any limitation in a contract for the purchase and sale of shares; instead, it is quite usual for various limitations to be included in the contract. There are contractual techniques for limiting the extent of the seller's liability arising from the breach of warranties.

A first way to limit the seller's liability has to do with the 'time' factor.

The warranties are contained in the purchase contract and therefore, in principle, attest to circumstances existing at the time of the signing of such contract. The problem is that, as a rule, the contract does not produce the immediate effect of the transfer of the ownership of the participations, having merely obligatory effects: with the preliminary contract, the parties undertake, upon the fulfilment of certain conditions, to conclude - at a future time - the final contract for the transfer of the participations. The need to separate the two steps arises from the fact that a certain intermediate time is normally required to put in place all the necessary fulfilments for the realisation of the transaction (the most frequent reason for the separation of the two steps is the need to obtain, in the meantime, the go-ahead from the authorities antitrust). The signing of the preliminary contract is usually referred to by the English expression of "signing"(subscription), whereas the completion of the contract for the transfer of participations is referred to by the expression "closing"(finalisation or closing of the transaction). A certain period of time (sometimes even several months) may elapse between the conclusion of the purchase contract and the notarial deed. While the seller has an interest in limiting the scope of its warranties to the time of the signing of the contract, the buyer would like those warranties to exist even at the later time when the transaction is finalised with the deed of transfer and payment of the price. Generally the problem is resolved in the sense of distinguishing between representations whose content depends on the seller's fact and those that are independent of it: in the first case the seller may guarantee a certain fact until closingin the second case only until signing.

It is common, in contracts for the sale and purchase of corporate participations, to provide for the duration of guarantees[19]. Evidently seller and buyer, on this point, have opposing interests, the seller wanting the shortest possible collateral and the buyer the longest possible collateral. In this respect, it is useful to distinguish between warranties pertaining to the security (such as the title of the participation in the seller and the absence of encumbrances on it) and other warranties: for the first type of security the seller will generally have no difficulty in providing for particularly long terms; in the case of other warranties, on the other hand, the assignor tends to limit their duration as much as possible. In practice, durations varying between 12 and 36 months are generally agreed upon. In order to limit the duration of the warranties, the seller frequently invokes the argument that, after the first balance sheet has been drawn up, the purchaser cannot have failed to discover the circumstances which may give rise to the activation of the warranties and therefore, if it intends to avail itself of them, it must do so immediately. In short, the buyer's needs must be reconciled with those of the seller who, after a reasonable period of time, wants to be sure not to be called upon for liability in respect of an interest now transferred.

7. Clauses limiting the obligation to pay damages

The liability of the seller of a shareholding is normally limited in contract in quantitative terms.

A clause limiting the scope of the seller's indemnification obligation is the so-called ".de minimis". This clause consists in providing that the seller is not obliged to indemnify the buyer in cases where the damage does not reach a certain minimum threshold (let us assume 10,000 euros): the clause thus fixes a limit below which the buyer is obliged to bear the damage himself, without being able to claim against the other party. This type of clause finds its raison d'être in a judgement of proportionality: in the case of transactions of considerable value, it would be undesirable for the parties - once the acquisition has been finalised - to start quarrelling over trivial matters. A clause 'de minimiswell drafted" must specify what is to happen when the threshold is exceeded. Suppose, in the example given, that the harm amounts to 30,000 euros. It should be specified in the contract whether the purchaser is entitled to claim all of that harm (30,000 euros) or only the part that exceeds the threshold (and thus, in the example given, 20,000 euros may be claimed, 10,000 euros being deducted from 30,000 euros).

Sometimes the clause 'de minimis"is added, in contracts for the purchase and sale of corporate participations, the so-called '.basketball"(literally 'basket', or - more technically - collective threshold). This stipulates that damages may only be claimed by the buyer from the seller if the sum of the individual items of damage exceeds a second threshold (let us assume 100,000 euros). For example, in the case of a single item of damage with a value of 60,000 euros, in the presence of a "basketball" the guarantee - even if it exceeds the minimum limit of €10,000 - cannot be activated unless it is activated together with a second claim which, together with the first claim, exceeds the collective threshold. If, for example, two claims are brought (a first claim of EUR 60,000 and a second claim of EUR 60,000), then both contractual limits are reached. Even in the case of a "basketball"it should be properly provided for in the contract whether the purchaser is obliged to compensate the entire damage or only the part exceeding the second threshold.

The combined effect of a first threshold "de minimis" and a second threshold "basketball"is that the seller is only liable for a particularly serious single loss (in the example given: EUR 100,000) or for the sum of several losses that are not particularly serious, but also not insignificant (in the example given: several losses of at least EUR 10,000 that altogether reach the threshold of EUR 100,000).

A third type of recurring clause in acquisition contracts consists of a maximum threshold (cap) to the seller's equity liability: it is agreed that the seller's liability may in no event exceed a certain amount. This amount generally varies between 10% and 30% of the purchase price of the participation. A distinction is normally made in the contract between warranties relating to the "security" and other warranties. No security (e.g. security relating to the ownership of the participation by the seller and the fact that it is free of encumbrances) is applied to the former. cap. In this case, the indemnification obligation may even be higher than the purchase price of the participation (otherwise a maximum threshold corresponding to the purchase price is provided for). In contrast, for guarantees other than those pertaining to the 'security' it is usual to provide for a maximum amount of the indemnifiable harm.

Other clauses that have the effect of limiting the seller's asset liability vis-à-vis the purchaser are also to a greater or lesser extent to be found in contracts for the sale and purchase of corporate participations.

A frequent clause is that the seller is only liable in the case of 'major' (material) breaches of the guarantees it offers. The problem with this covenant is its vagueness, which tends to lead to disputes between the parties in its interpretation. As soon as, in fact, the buyer were to invoke a warranty, the first objection raised by the seller would be precisely that the alleged breach cannot be considered important. In order to avoid endless discussions and lengthy litigation, it is advisable for the parties to determine already in the contract (e.g. in definitions) the meaning of "importance" (materiality). The materiality clause goes hand in hand with clauses quantitatively limiting the seller's indemnity obligation: to write in the contract that the seller is not liable for damages of less than EUR 10,000 is nothing other than to introduce, in other words, a materiality threshold. From an operational point of view, it is certainly better to concretely indicate the value limit beyond which a warranty may be invoked than to introduce vague clauses on the materiality of the breach.

Another way of limiting the seller's obligation to indemnify is to exclude its liability where third parties may be held liable for the act alleged in the contract. The typical case is that of insurance companies that might cover the harm suffered by the buyer. In this hypothesis the buyer cannot sue the seller since the damage is covered by the insurance. These clauses may be structured in the sense that the buyer may not bring any action against the seller when there is a claim against the insurer, or in the sense that it may bring an action only for the part of the harm which is not covered by the insurance.


[1] On the contract for the sale and purchase of shareholdings, see AA.VV., Contracts for the acquisition of companies and businesses, edited by U. Draetta-C. Monesi, Milan, 2007; G. De Nova, The Sale and Purchase AgreementAn annotated contract, Turin, 2011; L. Picone, Equity Purchase Agreements, Milan, 1995; A. Tina, The Share Purchase Agreement, Milan, 2007.

[2] On the subject of buying and selling shareholdings, see, by way of example, M. Benetti, Transfer of shares: effectiveness, enforceability and exercise of corporate rights, in Company, 2008, 229 ff.; G. Carullo, Observations on the Sale of the Shareholding, in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 954 ff.; G. Festa Ferrante, Buying and selling shareholdings and purchaser protection, in Riv. not., 2005, II, 156 ff.; F. Funari, Transfer of shares and non-competition agreements, in Company, 2009, 967 ff.; F. Laurini, Rules on transfers of limited liability company shares and business transfers, in Soc. Rev., 1993, 959 ff.; F. Parmeggiani, On the subject of the voidability of the sale of shares, in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 1185 ff.; C. Punzi, Disputes relating to disposals and acquisitions of shareholdings and actions that may be brought, in Riv. dir. proc., 2007, 547 ff.; D. Scarpa, Presupposition and contractual balance in the transfer of a shareholding, in Just. civ., 2010, II, 395 ff.; A. Tina, Transfer of Shareholdings and Contract Cancellation, in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 110 ff.

[3] On the subject of guarantees in the purchase and sale of shareholdings, see F. Bonelli, Acquisitions of companies and reference share packages: the seller's guarantees, in Dir. comm. int., 2007, 293 ff.; P. Casella, The two substantial methods of guaranteeing the buyer, in Acquisitions of companies and reference share packages, edited by F. Bonelli and M. De Andrè, Milan, 1990, 131 ff, C. D. Alessandro, Sale of shareholdings and promise of quality, in Just. civ., 2005, I, 1071 ff.; A. Fusi, The sale of shareholdings and the lack of quality, in Company, 2010, 1203 ff.; L. Renna, Notes on a debated topic: the sale of shares or quotas in companies and the transferor's guarantees, in Giur. it., 2008, 365 ff.

[4] For private international law profiles on the transfer of shareholdings, see S. M. Carbone, Conflicts of Laws and Jurisdiction in the Regulation of Bundle Transfers, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1989, 777 ff.

[5] In matters of due diligence cf. G. Alpa-A. Saccomani, Negotiation procedures, due diligence e memorandum informative, in Contracts, 2007, 267 ff.; L. Bragoli, La due diligence legal in the context of acquisition transactions, in Contracts, 2007, 1125 ff.; A. Camagni, La due diligence in the acquisition and valuation of companies, in Riv. doc. comm., 2008, 191 ff.; C. F. Giampaolino, Role of the Due Diligence and burden of information, in AIDA, 2009, 29 ff.; L. Picone, Negotiations, due diligence and disclosure obligations of listed companies, in Bank, stock exchange, cred. tit., 2004, I, 234 ff.

[6] On the right of control and information of the shareholder, see the monograph by R. Guidotti, Shareholder's control rights in the limited liability company., Milan, 2007. See also, to confine oneself to some recent contributions, P. Benazzo, Controls in the limited liability company: singularity of type or homogeneity of function?, in Soc. Rev., 2010, 18 ff.; D. Cesiano, The (limited?) right of consultation of the member formerly-administrator in the limited liability company., in Company, 2010, 1131 ff.; A. Pisapia, Shareholder control in the S.r.l.: object, limits and remedies, in Company, 2009, 505 ff.; V. Sangiovanni, Right of control of the limited liability company shareholder and statutory autonomy, in Notariat, 2008, 671 ff.; V. Sanna, The scope of the control rights of 'shareholders not participating in the administration' in the limited liability company, in Jur. comm., 2010, I, 155 ff.; F. Torroni, Notes on the subject of the shareholder's powers of control in the limited liability company, in Riv. not., 2009, II, 673 ff.

[7] See, for this approach, U. Tombari, Problems concerning the alienation of the shareholding and the activity of due diligence, in Bank, stock exchange, cred. tit., 2008, I, 70 ff.

[8] Remaining outside the scope of the present study are questions relating to the possible liability for negotiations, which may be asserted by one of the parties in the event that the other party violates the canon of good faith enshrined in Art. 1337 of the Civil Code. On the subject of negotiation liability see recently, in a comparative law perspective, E. A. Kramer, Withdrawal from negotiations: a comparative sketch, in Resp. civ., 2011, 246 ff. (translated by R. Omodei Salè). See also G. Afferni, Pre-contractual liability and breakdown of negotiations: compensable damage and causal link, in Damage resp., 2009, 469 ff.; M. Capodanno, Letters of intent, duties in contrahendo and good faith in negotiations, in Riv. dir. priv., 2008, 305 ff.; C. Cavajoni, Unjustified withdrawal from negotiations and damages, in Contracts, 2007, 315 ff.; G. Gigliotti, Negotiations, minutes and good faith. Liability for unfair conduct, in Corr. mer., 2008, 302 ff.; G. Guerreschi, Pre-contractual liability: free to withdraw from negotiations but up to a certain point, in Damage resp., 2006, 49 ff.

[9] The latest financial statements of the company are generally attached to the contract (or interim financial statements are prepared and attached precisely for the purpose of the acquisition) and the seller warrants that such financial statements are complete, true and give a true and fair view of the company's economic, financial and asset situation, and assumes the obligation to indemnify in the event of any discrepancy between the financial statements and the true state of affairs. Balance sheet guarantees are also important for the determination of the company's purchase price, as the purchase price is normally determined as the sum of the company's net assets and a multiple of the latest profits. On balance sheet guarantees in takeover contracts see R. Pistorelli, The 'analytical' guarantees on balance sheet items, in Acquisitions, cit., 157 ff.

[10] On tax guarantees see A. Pedersoli, Fiscal, social security and ecological guarantees, in Acquisitions, cit., 147 ff.

[11] The guarantee generally concerns the validity of existing contracts and the fact that they will not be terminated as a result of the acquisition. In this regard, it should be noted that contracts to which the target company is a party sometimes contain a change of control clause, which entitles the contractual counterparty of the target to withdraw from the contract in the event of a change of ownership. Should the contract be of considerable economic significance, this could have a significant negative impact on the buyer.

[12] On the subject of merger invalidity, see the monograph by P. Beltrami, Liability for Fusion Damage, Turin, 2008. See also V. Afferni, Invalidity of merger and reform of capital companies, in Jur. comm., 2009, I, 189 ff.; A. Colavolpe, On the subject of invalidity of the deed of merger, in Company, 2008, 483 ff.; P. Lucarelli, Incongruous Exchange Ratio, Merger Invalidity and Remedies: A Relationship Still to be Explored, in Riv. dir. comm., 2001, II, 269 ff.; L. Picone, Invalidity of the merger and shareholder remedies, in Company, 1999, 458 ff.; V. Sangiovanni, Invalidity of merger and damages, in Resp. civ., 2010, 379 ff.

[13] Cass., 12 January 1991, no. 257It has ruled that fraud as a ground for avoidance of a contract may consist either in deceiving with false information or in concealing decisive facts or circumstances from the knowledge of others by silence or reticence.

[14] See, for example, Cass., 12 June 2008, no. 15706, which held that no proof had been provided that the seller of the participation had given false information to the buyer, and therefore rejected the claim for annulment of the contract for fraudulent intent.

[15] Cass., 19 July 2007, No. 16031, in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 103 ff., with a note by A. Tina; in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 1176 ff., with a note by F. Parmeggiani; in Giur. it., 2008, 365 ff., with a footnote by L. Renna, stated that false or omitted statements of fact may entail the obligation for the mendacious or reticent contracting party to pay damages if the other party would have nevertheless determined to conclude the deal but on different terms.

[17] Cass., 19 July 2007, No. 16031, in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 103 ff., with a note by A. Tina; in Jur. comm., 2008, II, 1176 ff., with a note by F. Parmeggiani; in Giur. it., 2008, 365 ff., with a note by L. Renna.

[18] With regard to case law on the merits, we can point out Trib. Roma, 16 April 2009, in Company, 2010, 1203 ff., with a footnote by A. Fusi, who ruled that a contract for the assignment of company shares is voidable when there has been a specific promise by the assignor as to the assets of the company whose shares are involved. According to the court, Roman quality of the thing is anything that may allow it to be enjoyed better and more profitably, and it is therefore plausible that the solidity of the social enterprise, reflected in the value and profitability of the share, constitutes a quality of that share. In the present case, an express guarantee had been given as to the company's assets, which, however, turned out to be different from what had been declared: in particular, the company's very serious debt situation had led to the loss of its entire share capital, whereas the assignor had declared that such capital existed. The case dealt with by the Court of Rome differs from the case dealt with by the Court of Cassation precisely because, in the case decided by the Roman court, there was a specific clause on the company's assets.

[19] On the duration of warranties in acquisition contracts see S. Erede, Duration of guarantees and consequences of their breach, in Acquisitions, cit., 199 ff.

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Internet law part I: the trade mark and the domain name.

[:it]To be able to enter into this topic, it is necessary to take a preliminary look at some concepts that touch on both industrial law and the customary rules of the Internet world.

First of all, it is necessary to see how the domain name is framed within theItalian system. The legislator

regulated this figure for the first time with Art. 22 of the IPC (Industrial Property Code), introducing the prohibition to adopt as "a domain name a sign which is the same as or similar to another's trade mark where, because of the identity or similarity between the proprietors of those signs and the goods or services for which the trade mark is adopted, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public which may also consist in a likelihood of association between the two signs".

The domain name, therefore, may also be relevant as a distinctive sign because in the light of the progressive 'commercialisation' of the Internet, the entrepreneur no longer uses just any domain name, but requires a specific Internet address to make the products or services offered by his commercial site identifiable to surfers.

The doctrine and jurisprudence, even before the introduction of the aforementioned definition within the c.p.i., recognised the distinctive capacity of the domain name, recognising that "it does not seem justifiably contestable that the domain name in this case also has a distinctive character of the user of the site - capable of contributing to the identification of the same and of the commercial services offered by it to the public by means of the interconnection of networks (Internet) - with some apparent affinity with the figure of the sign, as the (virtual) place where the entrepreneur contacts the customer and concludes the contract with him".[1]

This interpretation is again confirmed following the introduction of the aforementioned Article 22 IPC by a recent decision of the Court of Milan of 20 February 2009, which definitively confirms the dominant jurisprudential orientation in favour of the recognition of the distinctive nature of the domain name formed prior to the IPC.[2]

Trademark protection regulations are also flanked by the network rules. On the Internet, in fact, the principle of "first come, first served", in on the basis of which a domain name is assigned to the first applicant, regardless of whether it conflicts with the rights of others. Domain allocation bodies are not obliged to carry out any prior checks to prevent/avoid registration - such as domain name - of signs or trade marks that are confusingly similar to a registered trade mark by a person other than the owner of the distinctive sign. In other words, under the current method of allocation of domain names, all names not yet registered (such as domain name) are freely registrable by anyone on the basis of the priority of applications, regardless of whether or not those names correspond to more or less well-known names or distinctive signs of third parties.

At this point, it is necessary to analyse the actual method of application of these rules and, to do so, it is necessary to subdivide trade marks into two macro-groups, namely non-renowned and renowned marks.

(a) cases of tomorrow's trade mark with no reputation

In the first case, if the domain name is identical or similar to another person's trade mark not having a reputation, two requirements must be met in order for that person to be able to prevent the use of that domain name:

- l'identity or similarity of the mark with the domain name (e.g. the registered trade mark is ABCD s.r.l. and the third party uses a coincident domain name www.abcd.it);

- l'identity or similarity of products or services offered. (both operate in the same branch of the market);

In that case, the principle of speciality of trade mark protection provided for and regulated by Art. 2569(1) of the Civil Code will apply.[3] and Article 20 para. 1 c.p.i. (a) and (b).

Obviously, the closer the products and services on offer are, the greater the public's confusion as to where they actually come from.

Therefore, even if there is no identity between the product sectors of the non-renowned brand and the domain nameif the bad faith of the holder of the domain name, that activity is deemed to be capable of precluding the holder of the trade mark from using it on the Internet as a further distinctive sign and therefore objectionable under Article 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [4]

(b) cases of tomorrow name of renowned trade mark

In the case of a trade mark with a reputation or high renown, the use of a domain name similar to the trade mark shall be deemed to be undue if the use of the sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the trade mark.[5]

ABSTRACT

  • the legislator, for the first time, regulated the domain name in art. 22 c.p.i. (industrial property code)
  • the dominant legal orientation in favour of recognising the distinctive nature of the domain name
  • in cases of domain name of an unrecognised brand name if the domain name is identical or similar to another person's trade mark, there must be identity or similarity of the trade mark with the domain name and identity or similarity of the goods or services offered in order to inhibit use of that domain name
  • in cases of domain name of a renowned trade mark, it is considered undue to use the domain name similar to the trade mark also in cases of use of signs for goods and services which are not similar if the use of the sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark

[1] Court of Milan, Order of 10 June 1997 - Amadeus Marketing SA, Amadeus Marketing Italia s.r.l. c. Logica s.r.l.

[2] "The domain name has a twofold nature, technical for addressing the logical resources of the Internet network and distinctive. As a distinctive sign - constituted by the part characterising the domain name called Second Level Domain - it may come into conflict with other signs in application of the principle of the unitary nature of distinctive signs laid down by art. 22 c.p.i.". Tribunale Milano, 20.02.2009, Soc. Solatube Global Marketing Inc. and others v. Soc. Solar Proiect and others.

[3] art. 2569, para. 1. c.c.[3] "A person who has registered in the form prescribed by law a new trade mark capable of distinguishing goods or services shall have the right to use it exclusively for the goods or services for which it is registered".

[4] Court of Milan, order of 10 June 1997 "The unlawful practice of confusion known as domain grabbing consists in registering, with the Naming Authority, another person's trade mark as a domain name, for the sole purpose of appropriating the notoriety of the sign, constitutes in itself an act of infringement - censurable pursuant to art. 22 IPC - also in so far as it is an activity capable of precluding the owner of the trade mark from using it on the Internet as a further distinctive sign".

[5] Court Milan, 20.02.2009 "The unlawful practice of confusion known as domain grabbing consists in the registration, with the Naming Authority, of another person's trade mark as a domain name, for the sole purpose of appropriating the reputation of the sign, constitutes in itself an act of infringement - censurable pursuant to Article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - also in so far as it is an activity capable of precluding the proprietor of the trade mark from using it on the Internet as a further distinctive sign"; Court Modena, 18.10.2005 "The assignment of a domain name (website name) corresponding to a trade mark - even if only de facto, but well known - may constitute usurpation of the sign and unfair competition in so far as it entails the immediate advantage of linking one's activity to that of the proprietor of the trade mark, taking advantage of the reputation of the sign and taking unfair advantage thereof. Moreover, the infringement of a trade mark - perpetrated by its use as the domain name of an internet site - is not precluded by the fact that that use has been authorised by the appropriate authority for the registration of domain names, nor by the fact that the proprietor of the trade mark has not previously registered the same name with that authority.".

 

 

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padre padrone

The contemplatio domini in contracts concluded by administrators.

[:it]It is an established principle in case law and doctrine that '.... even in the case of social representation, contemplatio domini is required, so that if the representative of a company does not use its name, the shop by the same concluded has no effect on the company itself
."
[1]

Doctrine and jurisprudence agree that the statutory provision governed by Art. 1388 of the Civil Code (".contract concluded by the representative"), is also applicable by analogy with reference to organic representation, which can be configured precisely in relation to persons having the status of representative bodies of legal persons.[2]

Requirements for the contract entered into by the principal to be effective there are essentially three:

1) the contribution of representative power;
(2) the representative's action within the limits of the proxy;
(3) the circumstance that the third party is made aware by the agent himself of the fact that the contractual arrangement is referable to the principal (contemplatio domini);

It is therefore necessary that all three elements exist at the time of conclusion of the contract for the transaction to be effective vis-à-vis the principal, and if even one of these prerequisites is lacking, the transaction will be effective only vis-à-vis the principal.

Focusing on the fundamental requirement of contemplatio dominiit is necessary to emphasise that such an element performs the dual function of externalising the representative management relationship existing between the agent and the principal and of consequently making possible the imputation of the effects of the contract concluded in its name by the former.

According to authoritative case law, the spending of the principal's name in contracts subject to written form ad substantiam must be in express mode cannot be deduced solely from presumptive elements.

In such contracts, the principle that all essential elements of the contract must be apparent from the contract requires that the spending of the principal's name also result ad substantiam from the same document in which the contract is contained.[3]

ABSTRACT

  • contemplatio domini is also required in the case of social representation
  • in order for the contract entered into by the principal to be effective, the grant of representative authority is required, the representative's acting within the limits of the power of attorney, the contemplatio domini
  • in contracts subject to written form ad substantiam the contemplatio must be expressly stated, as it cannot be deduced solely from presumed elements

[1] Civil Cassation, Sec. II, 30/03/2000, No 3903See also Civil cassation, sec. lav., 25/10/1985, no. 5271 ".If the representative of a de facto partnership does not use the name of the other partner or partners, the transaction concluded is effective only in respect of that representative, even if it relates to common interests or property;

[2] In this sense, DE NOVA, The contract, vol. X of the Treaty of Private Law, directed by P. Rescigno, Utet, Turin, 2002, p. 10;SANTORO-PASSARELLI, General Doctrines of Civil Law, Jovene, 1986 p. 288; in case law for all Cass., 18 June 1987, no. 5371, in Giur. it., 1989, I, 1, 1056

[3] "In contracts concluded by the agent, [...] where there has been no express mention of the agent's name, in which case the effects of the transaction are directly imputed to the agent even if the other contracting party has had knowledge of the agent's authority or interest in the conclusion of the transaction [...], any tacit contemplatio domini cannot be inferred from presumptions". (Civil cassation, sec. II, 12/01/2007, no. 433)

 

 

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Conference on the agency contract in the Civic Library.

[:it]Friday 8 June, 3 p.m, at the Verona Public Library conference on the Agency Contract was held, which I had the pleasure of organising in collaboration with Veronalegal. Participating as speakers were thelawyer Valerio Sangiovanni (lawyer in Milan), Dr Maura Mancini (Labour Magistrate at the Court of Brescia), Mslawyer Eve Tessera (French lawyer, registered in Verona) and the undersigned.

The following topics were covered:

I would like to sincerely thank all the participants of the conference and the speakers who proved to be not only extremely competent, but also very clear and helpful.

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Art. 1451 of the Civil Code Enforceability against third parties of the simulated transaction.

[:en]Pursuant to theArticle 1415 of the Civil Code. simulation 'may not be relied on by the contracting parties, the successors in title or the creditors of the simulated alien, to the third parties which bona fide have acquired rights from the apparent owner."In essence, the rationale is to protect the third party vis-à-vis the parties by assigning prevalence to the trust that third partiesin good faith, have been able to place on the outward appearance of the contract.

Jurisprudence has pronounced itself on this matter by stating that "for the simulation not to be enforceable against third parties who in good faith have acquired rights from the apparent owner is necessary that the third party is the holder of a related or dependent legal situation or that in some way it can be influenced by the simulative agreement."[1]

Jurisprudence agrees that the concept of third in Article 1415 of the Civil Code must be interpreted broadly and broadly, with the view that sufficient that there is a mere connection or a simple dependency relationship between the third party's legal situation and the simulative agreement.

For example, one can read "....Article 1415 Para. (1) of the Civil Code must be interpreted as meaning that the simulation may not be opposed by the apparent owner against third-party purchasers in good faith, i.e. those who, on the basis of the simulated contract, obtain a favourable legal effect in ignorance of damaging the rights of others...."[2]

On this point, the same doctrine has expressed itself in complete agreement with the aforementioned jurisprudential orientation, stating that for third parties formerly Article 1415 of the Civil Code means all those who achieve a favourable legal effect on the basis of the simulated contract (and this responds to the general rule that one who creates an apparent negotiating situation cannot enforce the real situation against bona fide third parties.[3]

Moreover, this is nothing more than an application of the more general principle of the protection of trust "... The principle of the appearance of rights, which is linked to the more general principle of the protection of innocent expectations, may be invoked when there are objective elements capable of justifying the third party's belief as to the correspondence between the apparent situation and the real one...".[4]

As to the third party's good faith, it is briefly noted that doctrine[5] and case law[6] agree that the third party is relieved of the burden of proving it since this is presumptive in nature.

Finally, it is noted that in this matter, bad faith is identified not with the "mere science"of the simulation, but with the intention of facilitating the purpose in view of which the simulation was carried out.[7]

Therefore, the third party not only does not have the burden of proving its good faith, but it is up to the apparent holder to prove its bad faith.

ABSTRACT
  • Under Art. 1415 of the Civil Code, the third party is protected with respect to the parties, the legislature having given precedence to the reliance that the third party, in good faith, has placed on the outward appearance of the contract
  • In order for the simulation not to be enforceable against third parties who in good faith have acquired rights from the apparent owner, it is necessary for the third party to be the owner of a legal situation that is connected with or dependent on, or in some way affected by, the simulatory agreement
  • The concept of third party in Article 1415 of the Civil Code must be interpreted broadly and broadly
  • The third party is relieved of the burden of proving his good faith since this is presumptive in nature, so it is up to the apparent holder to prove his bad faith

[3] cf. M. Bianca: Civil Law - The Contract - Giuffré p. 667;

[5] Mengoni, Purchase at non-domination, 1949, 117 and later editions;

[6] Cass. 1949, no. 53; Cass. 1960, no. 1046; Cass. 1970, no. 349; Cass. 1987, no. 5143; Cass. 2002, no. 3102;

[7] Cass. 1986, no. 2004; Cass. 1991, no. 13260;

 

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Lawyer's fees and competent jurisdiction.

[:it]

Recently, with the ruling of the 12.10.2011 n. 2100the Supreme Court has pronounced itself by stating that "the remuneration for professional serviceswhich is not conventionally established, is a illiquid pecuniary debtto be determined according to the professional tariff; it follows that the optional hole of the place where the obligation is to be performed (Art. 20 c.p.c., second hypothesis)'should be identified, pursuant to the last paragraph of Art. 1182 c.c.in the debtor's domicile in that same
tempo".[1]

Applying this principle to a lawyer's professional activity, the practical implications of the aforementioned judgment are evident. As is well known, in fact, Art. 20 c.p.c.which regulates as an alternative forum to the general forum of the defendant (Article 18 c.p.c.). states that 'in actions relating to rights of obligation, the court of the place where [...] the obligation in question is to be performed shall also have jurisdiction".

According to the Supreme Court, therefore, if it is not established "ab origine"The parties are entitled to the payment of the remuneration of a professional, the claim cannot be characterised as liquid since it can only be determined once the service has been rendered. Therefore, Article 1182 para. 3 of the Civil Code, which provides that ".the obligation relating to a sum of money must be performed at the domicile of the creditor at the time it is due. "

Given the non-liquid and determinable nature of the claim should instead be applied, according to the Supreme Court Article 1182 last paragraphwhich provides instead for performance of the obligation at the debtor's domicile.

This principle is clearly also applicable to the profession of lawyer. In fact, its remuneration most of the time cannot be determined in advance, especially if it concerns judicial activity, since it is not possible to foresee the actual activity to be performed in the course of the proceedings. Therefore, according to this orientation of the Supreme Court, should a lawyer proceed to recover a debt arising from his own professional activity, he will have to act at the defendant's forum ex Art. 18 c.p.c. or of the debtor ex art 20 c.p.c.

ABSTRACT

  • Remuneration for professional services, which is not agreed upon, is an illiquid pecuniary debt, to be determined according to the professional tariff
  • The optional forum of the place where the obligation is to be performed (Art. 20 c.p.c.) is to be identified, pursuant to the last paragraph of Art. 1182 c.c., in the domicile of the debtor
  • A lawyer wishing to proceed for the recovery of his own claim must act either at the defendant's court pursuant to art. 18 c.p.c. or at the debtor's court pursuant to art. 20 c.p.c..

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