The power of the principal to change the client portfolio of his agent

[:en]With Judgment of 2 July 2015, No 13580the Court of Cassation has ruled on a point that is very often the subject of dispute in contractual relations between agent and principal. The case was as follows: a principal, who had been assigned the power to change the customer portfolio of its agent during the course of the contractual relationship, used this clause, in order to effect a drastic reduction in the agent's customer portfolio of 88% (on this point see also Unilateral changes to the agency contract by the principal).

The Court, which was questioned on the legitimacy of such conduct, noted that although the principal is generically given the power to reduce the customer base of its agent, this power should, however, be exercised primarily for the purpose of adjusting the contract to the actual evolution of the relationship over time. Moreover, again according to the Supreme Court, this power must in any event be subject to limits and be exercised by the holder with fairness and good faith.

The appeal was essentially based on the allegation of breach and/or misapplication, by the principal, of theArticle 2 A.E.C. 2002 (collective economic agreements) and Article 2697 of the Civil Code. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 (relevant here) of Article 2 A.E.C. 2002 read as follows:

"Zone variations (territory, clientele, products) and the amount of commissions, except in minor cases (meaning reductions of up to five per cent of the value of the commissions accruing to the agent or representative in the calendar year preceding the variation, or in the twelve months preceding the variation if the preceding year has not been worked in full), may be implemented upon written notice to the agent or representative to be given at least two months in advance (or four months in advance in the case of agents and representatives engaged in business exclusively for one company), unless the parties agree in writing to a different commencement date.

If these changes are of such a magnitude as to appreciably alter the economic content of the relationship (appreciable variation being understood as reductions greater than twenty per cent of the value of the commissions accruing to the agent in the calendar year preceding the variation, or in the twelve months preceding the variation if the preceding year was not worked in full), the written notice shall not be less than that provided for the termination of the relationship.

If the agent or representative communicates, within 30 days, not to accept changes that significantly alter the economic content of the relationship, the communication of the principal shall constitute notice of termination of the relationship of agency or representation, at the initiative of the principal".

It follows from reading this article, therefore, that the principal is conferred a potestative right, consisting in the possibility of decreasing his agent's clientele. In that case, if the agent communicates that it does not accept the decreases imposed on it by the principal, a just cause for terminationwhich allows the principal to terminate the contractual relationship without having to pay the agent the termination indemnity pursuant to Article 1751 of the Civil Code.

However, this potestative right is, according to settled case law, also subject to the general principles of our legal system, of fairness and good faithin the performance of the contractual relationship, governed precisely by Articles 1175, 1375 and 1749 of the Civil Code (cf. Cass. no. 9924/09).

Moreover, the Court itself referred to a guideline of its own (cf. Cass. 5467/2000), according to which, in general, in an agency contract, the granting to the principal of the power to amend certain clauses (in particular those relating to the territorial scope and the amount of the commission) should 'be justified by the need to better adapt the relationship to the needs of the parties as they have changed over time'.

The use of potestative powers, therefore, must not, however, result in a substantial circumvention of contractual obligations and must therefore be limited and subject to the principles of fairness and good faith.

The Court concluded, stating that in the present case, the principal essentially used and disguised its own potentative rightthe purpose of reducing, precisely, the clientele of its agent, in order to put the latter in a de facto situation impossible to accept and, therefore, with the purpose and function of having the contractual relationship terminated, without the obligation to pay the indemnity in lieu of notice arising.

Finally, it is recalled that the Court has already referred numerous times to the principle of acting in good faith pursuant to Article 1375 of the Civil Code. On other occasions it has, for example, considered contrary to this principle the conduct of the principal who had made a radical change in pricing policyso as to make it effectively impossible for the agent to operate (cf. Cass. Civ. 1995 No. 1142), the refusal unconditionally and systematically of make garlic course orders transmitted by the agent (Court of Cass. Civ. 1985 No. 6475), replace the agent during the notice period, at the same time informing the customers (Cass. Civ. 1991 No. 1032).[:de]With Judgment of 2 July 2015, No 13580the Court of Cassation has ruled on a point that is very often the subject of dispute in contractual relations between agent and principal. The case was as follows: a principal, who had been assigned the power to change the customer portfolio of its agent during the course of the contractual relationship, used this clause in order to make a drastic reduction in the agent's customer portfolio, amounting to 88%.

The Court, which was questioned on the legitimacy of such conduct, noted that although the principal is generically given the power to reduce the customer base of its agent, this power should, however, be exercised primarily for the purpose of adjusting the contract to the actual evolution of the relationship over time. Moreover, again according to the Supreme Court, this power must in any event be subject to limits and be exercised by the holder with fairness and good faith.

The appeal was essentially based on the allegation of breach and/or misapplication, by the principal, of theArticle 2 A.E.C. 2002 (collective economic agreements) and Article 2697 of the Civil Code. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 (relevant here) of Article 2 A.E.C. 2002 read as follows:

"Zone variations (territory, clientele, products) and the amount of commissions, except in minor cases (meaning reductions of up to five per cent of the value of the commissions accruing to the agent or representative in the calendar year preceding the variation, or in the twelve months preceding the variation if the preceding year has not been worked in full), may be implemented upon written notice to the agent or representative to be given at least two months in advance (or four months in advance in the case of agents and representatives engaged in business exclusively for one company), unless the parties agree in writing to a different commencement date.

If these changes are of such a magnitude as to appreciably alter the economic content of the relationship (appreciable variation being understood as reductions greater than twenty per cent of the value of the commissions accruing to the agent in the calendar year preceding the variation, or in the twelve months preceding the variation if the preceding year was not worked in full), the written notice shall not be less than that provided for the termination of the relationship.

If the agent or representative communicates, within 30 days, not to accept changes that significantly alter the economic content of the relationship, the communication of the principal shall constitute notice of termination of the relationship of agency or representation, at the initiative of the principal".

It follows from reading this article, therefore, that the principal is conferred a potestative right, consisting in the possibility of decreasing his agent's clientele. In that case, if the agent communicates that it does not accept the decreases imposed on it by the principal, a just cause for terminationwhich allows the principal to terminate the contractual relationship without having to pay the agent the termination indemnity pursuant to Article 1751 of the Civil Code.

However, this potestative right is, according to settled case law, also subject to the general principles of our legal system, of fairness and good faithin the performance of the contractual relationship, governed precisely by Articles 1175, 1375 and 1749 of the Civil Code (see Court of Cassation No. 9924/09).

Moreover, the same Court referred to its own orientation (see Court of Cassation 5467/2000), according to which, in general, in an agency contract, the granting to the principal of the power to amend certain clauses (in particular those relating to the territorial scope and the amount of the commission), should "be justified by the need to better adapt the relationship to the needs of the parties, as they have changed in the course of time".

The use of potestative powers, therefore, must not, however, result in a substantial circumvention of contractual obligations and must therefore be limited and subject to the principles of fairness and good faith.

The Court concluded, stating that in the present case, the principal essentially used and disguised its own potentative rightthe purpose of reducing, precisely, the clientele of its agent, in order to put the latter in a de facto situation impossible to accept and, therefore, with the purpose and function of having the contractual relationship terminated, without the obligation to pay the indemnity in lieu of notice arising.

Finally, it is recalled that the Court has already referred numerous times to the principle of acting in good faith pursuant to Article 1375 of the Civil Code. On other occasions it has, for example, considered contrary to this principle the conduct of the principal who had made a radical change in pricing policyso as to make it effectively impossible for the agent to operate (cf. Cass. Civ. 1995 No. 1142), the refusal unconditionally and systematically of make garlic course orders transmitted by the agent (Civil Cass. 1985 No. 6475), replace the agent during the notice period, at the same time informing the customers (Civil Cass. 1991 No. 1032).[:en]With Judgment of 2 July 2015, No 13580the Court of Cassation has ruled on a point that is very often the subject of dispute in contractual relations between agent and principal. The case was as follows: a principal, who had been assigned the power to change the customer portfolio of its agent during the course of the contractual relationship, used this clause in order to make a drastic reduction in the agent's customer portfolio, amounting to 88%.

The Court, which was questioned on the legitimacy of such conduct, noted that although the principal is generically given the power to reduce the customer base of its agent, this power should, however, be exercised primarily for the purpose of adjusting the contract to the actual evolution of the relationship over time. Moreover, again according to the Supreme Court, this power must in any event be subject to limits and be exercised by the holder with fairness and good faith.

The appeal was essentially based on the allegation of breach and/or misapplication, by the principal, of theArticle 2 A.E.C. 2002 (collective economic agreements) and Article 2697 of the Civil Code. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 (relevant here) of Article 2 A.E.C. 2002 read as follows:

"Zone variations (territory, clientele, products) and the amount of commissions, except in minor cases (meaning reductions of up to five per cent of the value of the commissions accruing to the agent or representative in the calendar year preceding the variation, or in the twelve months preceding the variation if the preceding year has not been worked in full), may be implemented upon written notice to the agent or representative to be given at least two months in advance (or four months in advance in the case of agents and representatives engaged in business exclusively for one company), unless the parties agree in writing to a different commencement date.

If these changes are of such a magnitude as to appreciably alter the economic content of the relationship (appreciable variation being understood as reductions greater than twenty per cent of the value of the commissions accruing to the agent in the calendar year preceding the variation, or in the twelve months preceding the variation if the preceding year was not worked in full), the written notice shall not be less than that provided for the termination of the relationship.

If the agent or representative communicates, within 30 days, not to accept changes that significantly alter the economic content of the relationship, the communication of the principal shall constitute notice of termination of the relationship of agency or representation, at the initiative of the principal".

It follows from reading this article, therefore, that the principal is conferred a potestative right, consisting in the possibility of decreasing his agent's clientele. In that case, if the agent communicates that it does not accept the decreases imposed on it by the principal, a just cause for terminationwhich allows the principal to terminate the contractual relationship without having to pay the agent the termination indemnity pursuant to Article 1751 of the Civil Code.

However, this potestative right is, according to settled case law, also subject to the general principles of our legal system, of fairness and good faithin the performance of the contractual relationship, governed precisely by Articles 1175, 1375 and 1749 of the Civil Code (see Court of Cassation No. 9924/09).

Moreover, the same Court referred to its own orientation (see Court of Cassation 5467/2000), according to which, in general, in an agency contract, the granting to the principal of the power to amend certain clauses (in particular those relating to the territorial scope and the amount of the commission), should "be justified by the need to better adapt the relationship to the needs of the parties, as they have changed in the course of time".

The use of potestative powers, therefore, must not, however, result in a substantial circumvention of contractual obligations and must therefore be limited and subject to the principles of fairness and good faith.

The Court concluded, stating that in the present case, the principal essentially used and disguised its own potentative rightthe purpose of reducing, precisely, the clientele of its agent, in order to put the latter in a de facto situation impossible to accept and, therefore, with the purpose and function of having the contractual relationship terminated, without the obligation to pay the indemnity in lieu of notice arising.

Finally, it is recalled that the Court has already referred numerous times to the principle of acting in good faith pursuant to Article 1375 of the Civil Code. On other occasions it has, for example, considered contrary to this principle the conduct of the principal who had made a radical change in pricing policyso as to make it effectively impossible for the agent to operate (cf. Cass. Civ. 1995 No. 1142), the refusal unconditionally and systematically of make garlic course orders transmitted by the agent (Civil Cass. 1985 No. 6475), replace the agent during the notice period, at the same time informing the customers (Civil Cass. 1991 No. 1032).[:]


Derogation of the agent's notice period.

Article 1750 of the Civil Code, as replaced by Article 3 of Legislative Decree No 303 of 10 September 1991 (implementing the Community Directive 86/653), states that:

"If the agency contract is a indefiniteeither party may terminate the contract by giving notice to the other within a fixed period of time (para. 2).
"The notice period may in no case be less than to one month for the first year of the contract, to two months for the second year commenced, to three months for the third year commenced, to four months for the fourth year, to five months for the fifth year and to six months for the sixth year and all subsequent years (para. 3).
"The parties may agree on longer notice periods, but the principal may not observe a shorter time limit to that imposed on the agent"(para. 4).

It should be recalled that the amendments made to Article 1750 of the Civil Code by Legislative Decree No 303 of 1991 were implemented in line with Community Directive No 653 of 1986, which expressly provided that:

1. If the agency agreement is concluded for an indefinite period, either party may terminate it by notice.
2. The notice period is one month for the first year of the agency agreement, two months for the second year commenced, three months for the third year commenced and for subsequent years. The parties may not agree on shorter terms.
3. Member States may fix the notice period at four months for the fourth year, five months for the fifth year and six months for the sixth and all subsequent years. They may provide that the parties may not agree on shorter periods.

The question has been raised as to whether the parties may derogate in part from the normative dictate of Article 1750 of the Civil Code.., reducing the notice periods set by the legislature. Specifically, it has been argued that the protection expressly provided for by the directives is referable only to the first three years and that therefore it would be permissible to argue that the term of notice mandatory by the parties would be referable only to the three months. If this theory were followed, the parties could partially derogate from Art. 1750 of the Civil Code and provide for a notice period of three months also for relationships lasting more than three years.

The Court of Cassation has ruled on this issue, rejecting this argument in its entiretyarguing that "in the matter of agency contracts of indefinite duration, the term of notice, pursuant to Article 1750 of the Civil Code (as replaced by Article 3 of Legislative Decree No 303 of 10 September 1991), cannot be less than one month for each year, or fraction thereof, of the duration of the contract up to a maximum of six months, since the Italian legislature - as permitted by Article 15 of EEC Council Directive No 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986, without prejudice to the mandatory protection for the first three years - has provided for increasing terms of four, five, and six months for the years following the third year. 15 of EEC Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986, without prejudice to the mandatory protection for the first three-year period, the Italian legislature - as allowed by Article 15 of the EEC Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986, without prejudice to the mandatory protection for the first three-year period - has provided, also for the years following the third year, increasing terms of four, five and six months (respectively for the fourth, fifth, sixth and subsequent years) which cannot be derogated by the parties." (Cass. Civ. No. 16487, 2014)

Therefore, according to the Court, the notice period in Art. 1750 of the Civil Code is not binding on the parties, or rather, the parties may only provide for terms that are longer, but not shorter, than those indicated in the code.

Lastly, I recall that failure to give notice entitles the agent to demand theallowance in lieu of notice.

 


Main obligations of the agent. Is a simple propaganda activity sufficient?

According to Art. 1742 of the Civil Code, the agent in the contractual relationship "undertakes on a permanent basis to promote, on behalf of the other, against remuneration the conclusion of contracts in a specified area." (cf. obligations of the agent under German law)

With reference to this article, the Court of Cassation recently pronounced a judgment that focused precisely on the essential elements of the agency contract. The Court specified that the activity of promoting the conclusion of contracts, which precisely constitutes the typical obligation of the agent pursuant to Article 1742 of the Civil Code, cannot consist in a simple activity of '....propaganda"even if this results in an increase in sales; in fact, a mere activity of promoting the conclusion of contracts is not sufficient to accrue the agent's entitlement to commission, as it is it is necessary for the agent himself to carry out an activity of convincing the potential customer to place orders for the principal's products. Only in that case, i.e. if the promoted contract is successful due to the agent's activity, will the agent be entitled to the commission. (see also Unilateral changes to the agency contract by the principal. e The agent's obligation to inform the principal).

The Supreme Court has stated on this point that the agent's performance consists of

"at acts of varied and non-predetermined content - such as advertising, preparing contracts, receiving and forwarding proposals to the principal for acceptance - acts all of which tend to promote the conclusion of contracts in a particular area on behalf of the principalnone of these activities constitutes an indispensable component of the agent's performance." (Cass. Civ. 4.9.2014 no. 18690).

Case law, therefore, makes a clear distinction between propaganda and promotional activity.

The activity of promotion, in fact, is considered to be the typical performance of the commercial agent, pursuant to Article 1742 of the Civil Code. Promoting the conclusion of a contract therefore means pushing, proposing, implementing a series of activities so that certain contracts are concluded in a given area. Promotional activities, it should be noted, include several impulse' activities and 'facilitation', aimed precisely at the placement of a good or service in a given area, designed to increase or support towards purchase the demand for the product offered by the principal.

These impulse activities include (mainly) propaganda, which is designed to persuade and inform a potential customer of the existence of the product or service, illustrating its qualities and characteristics.

In any event, mere propaganda activity is not sufficient for an agency relationship to be deemed to exist. Lastly, I note that case law does not exclude the possibility of making the action of propaganda pre-eminent over that of preparing and arranging the contract.


The termination clause for just cause in the agency contract. Valuation parameters.

On the subject of the termination of the employment relationship, Article 2119 of the Civil Code provides that "either party may terminate the contract before the end of the term, if the contract is a fixed-term contract, or without notice, if the contract is of indefinite duration, if a cause arises that does not permit the continuation, even temporarily, of the relationship."

Case law, now rather uniformly, considers Article 2119 of the Civil Code is applicable by analogy. also to the agency relationship. Therefore, also in this context, the obligation of the terminator of an open-ended contract to give notice does not exist if there is a (just) cause that does not permit the continuation of the relationship, even temporarily (Cass. Civ. 14.2.2011 no. 3595).

Moreover, according to case law and authoritative doctrine, in such cases the principal's obligation to pay the agent would cease to exist. indemnity in lieu of notice which was not given, given the termination of the relationship for reasons attributable to the agent himself.

Given that the analogical applicability of Art. 2119 para. 1 of the Civil Code to the agency relationship is rather unquestionable, the question arises as to when a just cause for termination of the contract can be said to exist for the principal.

The Supreme Court of Cassation has ruled on this issue stating that '.the institution of termination for just cause, provided for by Article 2119, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code in relation to the employment contract, is also applicable to the agency contract, taking into account, however, for the assessment of the seriousness of the conduct, that in the latter context the relationship of trust - in correspondence with the greater autonomy of management of the activity in terms of places, times, methods and means, in accordance with the achievement of the business purposes - assumes greater intensity compared to the employment relationship. It follows that, for the purposes of the lawfulness of the termination, a fact of minor importance is sufficient, according to an assessment entrusted to the judge of the merits which cannot be challenged in a court of law, if adequately and correctly motivated. (In the present case, the Court held that the existence of just cause for the agent's termination had been correctly established, due to the non-payment of commissions relating to a specific order, received directly from the principal, but from third parties falling within the agent's exclusive area and which the latter had previously acquired as customers)." (Cass. Civ. 5.11.2013 no. 24776).


The indemnity in lieu of notice in an agency agreement.

In Italian law, the duration and termination modalities of the agency contract are regulated by Article 1750 of the civil code.

The first paragraph of this article states that 'the fixed-term agency contract which continues to be performed by the parties even after the expiry of the term is transformed into a contract of indefinite duration."

Para. (2) of Art. 1750 of the Civil Code regulates the minimum notice to be given by the parties in the event of termination. Specifically, it provides that: the "open-ended agency contract may be terminated by the parties only if notice is given, which may not be less than":

  • 1 month for the 1st year,
  • 2 months for the 2nd year,
  • 3 months for the 3rd year,
  • 4 months for the 4th year,
  • 5 months for the 5th year,
  • 6 months for the 6th and subsequent years.

Importantly, the parties may provide for a longer notice period, but never inferior to that dictated by the codified rules.

The question arises, therefore, what happens if the notice period is not observed: does the principal owe the agent an indemnity for the notice period not observed?

Example:

Agent X has worked for principal Y for 6 years. Principal Y decides that it does not want to continue working with the agent, a decision supported by mere personal reasons and without the existence of just cause. It terminates the contract without notice and pays the commissions due up to the date of termination.

The lawyer of principal Y, upon learning of the incident, contacted the principal advising him that, on the basis of settled case law, in the event of a principal's failure to give notice of termination the agent is nevertheless entitled to receive a indemnity in lieu of said notice (in this case 6 months) to be calculated on the average of the commissions accrued in the year prior to termination[1].

It may be concluded that where a party terminates, without there being a reason sufficient to justify such a choice, it is obliged to compensate the other party for the damage.

In the event of termination by the principal, such damage shall, in principle, correspond to the commissions that the agent allegedly received in the remaining period of the relationship. [2]

It is disputed whether such indemnity in lieu of notice is due only in the case of (unjustified) termination by the principal or also in the case of termination for just cause by the agent. According to the prevailing case law, it is held that the agent should also be entitled to the indemnity in lieu of notice in this case. [3]in addition to any damages[4].

Moreover, the case law holds that the agent's termination for just cause is converted, where it is established that there is no just cause and unless a different intention on the part of the agent emerges, into a termination without notice, with the consequent right of the principal to receive the indemnity for lack of notice.[5]

Finally, according to authoritative doctrine (Bortolotti) and case law,[6] It would seem that the right of the party affected by the termination cannot be excluded a priori to claim 'full' damages if it proves that the damages amount to a sum greater than the severance pay.

However, it is important to emphasise that the indemnity in lieu of notice is mandatory and cannot be excluded either by collective or individual agreements.[2]

ABSTRACT

  • a fixed-term contract that is continued to be performed following its expiry turns into an open-ended contract
  • the parties may provide for a notice period longer, but never shorter than that provided for by law
  • if terminated without notice, an indemnity in lieu of such notice is nevertheless provided for, to be calculated on the average of the commissions accrued in the year prior to termination
  • it is held that even if the termination for just cause is effected by the principal, the latter shall be entitled to the indemnity for lack of notice
  • it would seem that the right of the party affected by the termination cannot be excluded a priori to claim 'full' damages if it proves that the damages amount to a sum greater than the notice payment

[:de]Art. 1750 of the Civil Code regulates the duration of the agency contract and its termination.

The first paragraph provides that 'the fixed-term agency contract which continues to be performed by the parties even after the expiry of the term is transformed into a contract of indefinite duration."

The second paragraph of Article 1750 of the Civil Code further provides that the "open-ended agency contract may be terminated by the parties only if notice is given, which may not be less than":

- 1 month for the 1st year
- 2 months for the 2nd year
- 3 months for the 3rd year
- 4 months for the 4th year
- 5 months for the 5th year
- 6 months for the 6th and subsequent years

The parties may provide for a notice period that is longer, but never shorter, than that dictated by the codified rules.

The question arises, therefore, what happens if the notice period is not observed: does the offeror owe the agent an indemnity for the notice period not observed?

E.g. Agent X has worked for 6 years for proponent Y. Proposer Y decides it does not want to continue working with the agent, a decision supported by mere and simple personal reasons and without the existence of a just cause. It terminates the contract without notice and pays the commissions due up to the date of termination.
The lawyer of offeror Y, having become aware of the event, contacts the principal advising him that, according to settled case law, in the event of failure to give notice of termination by the principal, the agent is in any event entitled to receive an indemnity in lieu of such notice (in this case 6 months) to be calculated on the average commissions accrued in the year preceding the termination[1].

It is important to stress that the indemnity in lieu of notice is mandatory and cannot be excluded either by collective or individual agreements.[2]

ABSTRACT

  • a fixed-term contract that is continued to be performed following its expiry turns into a contract of indefinite duration;
  • the parties may provide for a notice period longer, but never shorter than that provided for by law;
  • if terminated without notice, an indemnity in lieu of such notice is nevertheless provided for, to be calculated on the average of the commissions accrued in the year prior to termination

[:en]Article 1750 of the Italian Civil Code governs the duration of the agency agreement and its termination.
The first paragraph provides that "the agency agreement for a fixed-term contract, which continues to be performed by the parties even after the expiry of the term turns into an open-ended contract.

The second paragraph of art. 1750 cc, it also provides that the 'agency agreement for an indefinite period may be terminated by the parties only if it is given notice, which may not be less than'.

  • 1 month for the 1 year
  • 2 months for the 2nd year
  • 3 months for the 3rd year
  • 4 months for the 4th year
  • 5 months for the 5th year
  • 6 months for the 6th year and for subsequent years

The parties may stipulate a longer period of notice, but not shorter than that dictated by above mentioned terms.

One wonders, therefore, what happens if the notice period is not met: the principal must pay to the agent compensation for the notice period is not respected?

For example: The agent Caio has worked for six years for the principal Tizio. Tizio chooses not to continue working with the agent, a decision supported by mere and simple personal reasons and without the existence of a just cause. He terminates the contract without notice and pays the commission due to the date of recission.

The lawyer of Tizio, aware of what happened contacts the principal warning him that, based on a constant Italian case-law, in the event the principal teminates the contract without notice the agent is still entitled to receive the payment of the notice period (in this case six months) to be calculated on the average of commissions earned in the year prior to the termination.

Important! The compensation in lieu of notice is mandatory and can not be excluded nor by collective bargaining or individual contracts.

IN SUMMARY
the fixed-term contract which is continued to be performed after its expiry turns into permanent contracts;
the parties may provide for a notice period higher, but never lower than that provided by law;
in case of termination without notice and cause, the agent has right to a compensation in lieu of notice, to be calculated on the average of commissions earned in the year prior to withdrawal[:]


What is the difference between an agency contract and a business intermediary?

What is the main difference between the agent and the business intermediary?

To answer this question, one must first define the two professional figures.

La definition of agentor rather, of agency contract is given by the Civil Code, which provides in Art. 1742 of the Civil Code that

"By the agency contract one party permanently assumes the task of promoting, on behalf of the other, for remuneration the conclusion of contracts in a specified area." (the commercial agent in Germany)

The figure of the agent is not expressly regulated by the Civil Code and thus belongs to the category of atypical contracts, i.e. contracts not expressly regulated by civil law, but created ad hoc by the parties. However, a definition has been given by case law that has qualified the procurer as the one who:

  • "collects customers' orders by forwarding them to the company from which it has been commissioned to procure such commissions, without any stability and on an entirely occasional basis." (Cass. Civ. 1999 no. 1078);
  • "carries out intermediary activities for the purpose of facilitating the conclusion of business, when the activity is carried out on an occasional and occasional basis". (Cass. Civ. 1999 no. 1078).

From these definitions, it follows that the business intermediary differs from the commercial agent essentially with regard to the stability of tenure. Whereas the agent undertakes to promote (precisely) the conclusion of business deals on a permanent basis, the intermediary does not assume any obligation of continuous collaboration and may therefore freely decide whether or not to promote a deal (see also Main differences between the agency contract and the commercial distribution contract)

As to the requirement of occasionality(i.e., the frequency of business that is conveyed), the question arises in doctrine and case law as to how this parameter should really be interpreted as a criterion distinguishing mere procuring activity from agency. In an important ruling in 1999, the Court expressed itself as follows:

"Regarding the character of the continuityit should be noted that it not to be confused with the concept of stability. Stability, in fact, means that the performance is repeated periodically over time, not only de facto, as in continuous performance, but also in compliance with a contractual commitment (Art. 1742(1) of the Civil Code).

The difference is very clear in the case of the agent and the business intermediary. The former's performance is stable in that he is obliged to carry out an activity of promoting contracts; the service of the latter, on the other hand, is occasional in the sense that it does not correspond to a legal necessity, but depends exclusively on the initiative of the procurer. " (Cass. Civ. 1998 No. 7799).

According to this orientation, therefore, in order to distinguish the two figures, one must focus essentially on the obligations assumed by the intermediary: if the latter undertakes to promote business in stable and continuous manner, these will have to be qualified as agentwhereas, in the case does not undertake in any way to promote the principal's business, the principal will qualify as a business intermediary. The volume and quantity of orders that the two figures actually manage to promote have no relevance: paradoxically, the business intermediary may promote and realise a significantly higher number of orders than an agent, but the latter will still qualify as an agent if, contractually, he has not committed himself in any way to promoting the intermediary's activity. The performance of the intermediary is therefore occasional in the sense that it depends solely on his initiative.

Lastly, the question arises as to which of the provisions laid down for the agency contract may be considered applicable by analogy to the business agent contract.

In a judgement of 23.11.2007, the Court of Rome recently ruled that the two figures were applicable on the basis of their intrinsic distinction,

"only those provisions inherent to the agency contract, such as commissionswhich do not presuppose a stable and predetermined character of the relationship and not also those - of law and contract - which do presuppose it."

Basically, only certain agency rules apply to the agent by analogy, but it must be ruled out that those that grant special protection to the agent, such as Article 1750 of the Civil Code, concerning notice periods, and Article 1751 of the Civil Code concerning indemnity for termination of the contract, are applicable to it.


Advance notice by the agent and continuation of the contractual relationship

In its judgment No. 668 of 25 May 2012, the Court of Cassation reaffirmed the principle of ultratractivity of the contractual relationship. According to that principle, an agency contract of indefinite duration does not terminate when one of the contracting parties terminates the contract, but only when the notice periodestablished in the interest and for the protection of the non-terminating party.

In the present case, the principal communicated his intention to terminate the contract; in the course of the notice periodthe agent also communicated its intention to terminate the contract.

According to the Court, this very declaration by the agent was to be regarded as an implicit waiver of the notice period, with the result that the agent could not request theindemnity in lieu of notice.

In the present case, therefore, given that "the termination of the relationship remains attributable to the will of the principal, the latter remains obliged to pay the termination indemnity pursuant to Article 1751 of the Civil Code."The agent, in fact, is entitled to the indemnity under Art. 1751 of the Civil Code even when he withdraws from the contract for circumstances that, although not constituting a just cause, are attributable to the principal.

 

 

Next stop: paradise (1991)
Directed by Albert Brooks


The agency contract in Germany.

The purpose of this article is to give the reader some elements for a better understanding of the regulation of the agency contract in Germany, the importance of which is very significant, taking into account the fact that the European directive on the subject of agency was inspired by this model and, consequently, Italian legislation, too, was adapted to it, with the regulatory interventions of 1991 and 1999 the figure 


1) Agency contract and self-employed person.

In German law, the legal figure of the commercial agent is governed by Book 1, Title 7 of the German Commercial Code (HGB- Handelsgesetzbuch) and more precisely by §§ 84-92c. Section 84 HGB opens this title with a definition that qualifies the commercial agent as one who is entrusted by a principal with the task of interceding, in the capacity of an autonomous trader, in business transactions in favour of the latter or of concluding them on its behalf. An agent is one who performs his activity in substantial autonomy and can regulate his own working hours.

This legislative assumption is obviously used in the courts to distinguish the commercial agent from the employee. Case law considers the definition in § 84 Para. I HGB as a general parameter for being able to distinguish the two legal figures, although the circumstances of the case must be taken into account in their entirety and totality.

Given the generic and not easily interpretable character of the concept of autonomy required by § 84 HGB for commercial agents, case law has repeatedly come across this problem. In a well-known ruling of the Federal Labour Court (BAG) in 2003, several contractual agreements were defined as "Arbeitnehmerverdächtig", i.e. which give rise to the suspicion of an employment relationship. Some of them are listed below:

  • request for the transmission of a quarterly forecast on the development of production, covering the individual production departments and a forecast of the percentage assessment of the closing of business of individual customers. Such a request goes beyond the duty to protect the interests set forth in § 86 Para. 1 HGB, which obliges the agent to endeavour to sell products or to complete business, taking into account the interests of the principal;
  • orders to block holidays. This limits the agent's autonomy to determine working hours;
  • the name of the contract is irrelevant for the classification of the legal figure; the absence of an agreement on the beginning and end of the working hours and on the indication of the organisation of the work will be interpreted in favour of the commercial agent's autonomy:

On the contrary, it does not preclude autonomy:

  • the obligation to attend weekly 5-hour conference calls and, in extraordinary cases, to carry out collection orders within a short time,
    the imposition of deadlines for the completion of work, as well as, during the company's settling-in period, the blocking of holidays for a period of 4 to 8 weeks;
  • the communication of production targets, if there remains a considerable margin for self-organisation of working hours:
    an obligation to provide information, unless the agent is obliged to provide copious information on its activities and at short intervals;
  • a quarterly forecast on the development of production certainly exceeds the usual duty to inform, but in itself cannot be regarded as a substantive indication of subordination;
    the agent's prohibition of competition;
  • instructions on working hours, as the employees of the external service also have to adapt to the time requirements of their customers.

According to the OLG (Oberlandesgericht - Court of Appeal) in Koblenz, the type of relationship is explicitly inferred from the personal dependence between the two legal figures and that an economic dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient.
The fact that the agent is linked to the principal through indications and directives that the latter has the power to issue, in general does not affect what is the status of the agent as an independent worker. The employee is one who, unlike the agent, performs his services within an organisation defined by a third party. Relevant for the qualification of the legal figure are the circumstances under which the service is performed and the manner of payment, or purely formal connotations such as the payment of taxes to the social security and health care institutions or the keeping of the agent's personal files.


2) The right to commission.

The agent has according to the § 87 para. 1 HGB right to commission. The agent may exercise this right on all business the conclusion of which has been made possible through an activity attributable to him, or on business concluded with third parties acquired by the agent as clients for business of the same type (§ 87 para. HGB). Therefore, in order to claim the right to commission, it is sufficient to any cooperation of the agent that made it possible for the deal to be concluded.

The parties may, however, agree on an exception clause. Importantly, the second paragraph of Section 87 HGB provides that "the right to the provision ceases when it is certain that the third party does not perform, the sums already received must be returned" ( 87a para. 2 HGB) (so-called star of belief).

It is important to specify that if the principal does not perform the deal completely or partially correctly or in the manner in which it was stipulated, the agent is nevertheless entitled to commission (87-a para. 3 HGB). However, the entitlement to commission shall lapse if the non-performance is attributable to conditions that are not the responsibility of the principal.

La German Supreme Court (BGH - Bundesgerichtshoff) recently ruled on §87a para. 2 HGB specifying that this does not apply if the third party has failed to perform due to a failure to perform on the part of the principal or due to causes attributable to the principal. The Court further specifies that the principal is liable for all situations that led to the non-performance, not only when they are attributable to its personal fault, but also when they are attributable to an entrepreneurial or business risk.

Although it is in the principal's interest to receive the highest number of offers from the agent, the principal's right to decide whether to accept the proposed deal remains unaffected. This decision-making power in the hands of the principal results indirectly from the 86a para. 2 HGBwhich obliges the latter to inform the agent of its intention to accept substantially less business from the agent. This decision-making power is, however, not unlimited: the principal may not refuse completely arbitrarily the conclusion of a procured contract. It must also be emphasised that jurisprudence considers it to be outside the powers of the judge to interfere in the policy of the company, evaluating the decisions taken by the latter. Therefore, the judge must accept any decision that may appear at least plausible.


3. The Area Agent.

Flanking the figure of the agent is that of the area agent (Bezirkshandelsvertreter). This figure is characterised by the fact that he/she has to deal exclusively with an area, entrusted to him/her by the principal or, in other cases, with a specific clientele.

The § 87 para. 2 HGB provides that the area agent is also entitled to commission for business that has been concluded, within the area assigned to him, albeit without his cooperation. Precisely for this reason, it is evident that the appointment of an area agent may have to be rather concealed. It is assumed that the agent may be considered a zone agent if it has been sufficiently clearly qualified as such. In the event of a dispute, the burden of proof falls on the party claiming that the agent is so qualified. Any contractual uncertainties must be clarified by the contracting party.

As for the obligations of the agentThe latter, in carrying out his activity, must look after his area continuously and with particular care, and only by acting in accordance with these criteria will he be entitled to the commission.

A rather recent BGH ruling stated that a business outside the area cannot be considered to be prevented a priori. In fact, if the principal accepts the business, this can be regarded as a tacit enlargement of the area or customer base.

As a rule, an area agent who, with the consent of the principal, carries out activities outside the principal's area or with customers other than those granted, is also entitled to the commission referred to in § 87 para. 1 HGB. However, the parties are free to agree otherwise.


4. Direct sales without producer intervention.

The direct sale to a customer by the manufacturer, despite the fact that the manufacturer has granted a exclusive right to the reseller, is to be considered a breach of contract. But even in the case where exclusivity has not been granted, the manufacturer may not perform at its sole discretion, direct sales to customers in the area the dealer's responsibility.

According to the German Federal Court of Justice, the manufacturer must take due account of and may not, without good reason, oppose the legitimate interests of the retailer who subjects his business and operations to the requirements of the manufacturer.

In a Judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal of 21.06.2013 (G.R. No. 16 U 172/12) the judges instead denied the existence of a violation of theobligation of loyalty because the manufacturer had not arbitrarily disregarded the legitimate interests of the retailer. In this case, the customers had in fact reiterated that they wanted direct sales from the manufacturer, otherwise they would not have purchased the products.

Considering that the reseller had only a de facto exclusive right, which had not been contractually agreed upon, this decision of the customers constituted, according to the courts, a sufficient reason for the admissibility of direct selling to these customers, especially since the manufacturer had previously offered the reseller a commission payment as compensation.


5. Declaration of bankruptcy and entitlement to commission.

According to the § 115 para. I in correlation with the 116 paragraph I InsO (lnsolvenzordnung - 'bankruptcy law') the opening of bankruptcy proceedings leads to the termination of the agency contractwithout the need to give notice. A continuation of the contractual activities is only possible following an agreement, even tacit, between the agent and the insolvency administrator.

As for the claims to commission accrued following the conclusion of the new contract, these must always be considered as predeductible claims (debts of the estate) § 55 para. I, point InsO. Where the activities carried out by the agent prior to the opening of bankruptcy proceedings have not yet led to the conclusion of a contract with the third party, the entitlement to commission depends on the choice of curator to conclude the deal with the third party or not.

If positivethe right to commission is considered in the light of the 55 paragraph I point InsO as a preferential claim.

Otherwise The right to commission exists in any event irrespective of whether the liquidator has opted to conclude the contract with the third party or has refused it. In such a case, the commission shall be considered an unsecured claim ex § 38 InsO.

A different matter, however, with regard to the agent's entitlement to the non-competition indemnity under the § 90a para. 1 HGBIn this case, the right ceases in the event of termination of the contract following the opening of bankruptcy. At the same time, this event also terminates the agent's non-competition clause that the parties had agreed upon.

Finally, if at the opening of the bankruptcy the contract was already terminated the insolvency administrator may request ex § 103 InsO the maintenance of the non-competition clause and the right to compensation constitutes a claim on the bankruptcy estate.


L'ultimo contratto

Jurisdiction for contracts concluded on the Internet by the consumer.

[:en]What happens if one concludes a contract on the Internet, through a foreign site, and, following the conclusion, one finds problems with the contract concluded?

Which judge should I turn to? Who has jurisdiction. Read more


Indovina chi viene a cena

The hosting contract and the hosting provider's liability profiles.

[:en]In recent years, the website is no longer a simple showcase used by companies to provide general information and indications on a company's activities, but rather a medium and tool for work and promotion.

Before addressing the contractual type of 'website creation', I consider it necessary to go into a very brief analysis of what is the basis of this entire contractual relationship, the ground on which web designers, in fact, carry out their activity: the web hosting contract. Just as land is needed to build a building, in the same way, web space must be acquired to publish a site. The basis of all this is therefore the so-called 'web hosting' contract, which could be defined as the contract  by which a party acquires space on one or more servers owned by a hosting provideragainst payment of a fee.

The web hosting contract falls into the category of atypical contracts, i.e. those contracts that are not regulated and governed directly by the civil code, and ultimately consists of a provision of services. The hosting provider, more specifically, makes space available to another party on one or more computers to host pages web.

One of the most legally relevant elements in this type of contract certainly concerns the provider's liability for the data stored on its servers by the operators of the sites with which it has concluded a hosting contract.

This profile is regulated by Article 16 d.l. 70/2003 (legislative decree by which the Italian legislator transposed the EU directive 2000/31 EC). Pursuant to that article:

in the provision of an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, the provider is not responsible for information stored at the request of a recipient of the serviceprovided that this provider:

a)    is not actually aware of the fact that the activity or information is unlawful and, as far as claims for damages are concerned, is not aware of facts or circumstances that make manifest the unlawfulness of the activity or information;

b)    not as soon as they become aware of these facts, upon notification by the competent authorities, act immediately to remove the information or to disable access.

L'Article 17 of the decree also provides that

the lender is not subject to a general surveillance obligation information it transmits or stores, nor to a general obligation to actively seek out facts or circumstances indicating the presence of unlawful activities.

In this regard, an important 2009 judgment of the Court of Romein which the Court sought to clarify and specify the scope of the aforementioned legal provisions, stating that "although the Internet provider is not subject to a general obligation to monitor on stored content, as this would result in unacceptable strict liabilityhe is however subject to liability when it does not merely provide access to the network, but provide additional services (caching, hosting ) and/or set up a control of information and, above all, when, aware of the presence of suspect materialrefrains from ascertaining the unlawfulness and from removing it or if, being aware of the unlawfulness, omits to take action".[1]

The Court, therefore, given that there is no general obligation of surveillance, considered necessary for the establishment of civil liability on its part, the knowledge and awareness on the part of the provider of unlawful information or of facts and circumstances which make that unlawfulness manifest, and the failure to remove that information as soon as it becomes aware of those facts and upon notification by the competent authorities. [2]

The Court of First Instance, in this judgment, takes up the concept of strict liability, according to which a person may be liable for a tort, even if it does not result directly from his or her own conduct and is not attributable to the person's own wilful misconduct or fault. This deviates from the general principle of liability, according to which a precise causal link between the individual's conduct and the tort itself is required.

This article, however, must be regarded as a pure and simple outline of a very complex, detailed and constantly evolving subject. A kind of small explanation of what are the legal relations between new types of subjects. Interesting, however, to see how, although the instruments within society evolve, the categories and legal institutions of the civil code always remain the only true basis for regulating commercial and social relations.


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