Competition and online trade: navigating dual distribution and hybrid intermediaries in antitrust law

Dual distribution' and 'hybrid intermediaries' emerge as salient concepts in the context of vertical agreements and antitrust law.

Dual distribution occurs when an entity chooses to market its products both directly and through external distributors, thus creating a situation of even potential competition with the latter. This phenomenon requires a careful analysis of market dynamics, especially with regard to the exchange of information between the parties involved. This is particularly relevant in the context of online sales, where it is imperative to prevent possible antitrust violations.

In parallel, hybrid intermediaries emerge in the context of online commerce when a platform simultaneously acts as a reseller for a supplier's products and as a seller of its own articles. In this scenario, a dynamic of potential competition develops between the two entities, given that, in this context, intermediaries may have an interest in furthering their own sales, as they also have the ability to influence the competitive landscape among the companies using their online intermediary services.

___________________________________

1. Regulatory context and legal framework.

L'Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits agreements between undertakings which may adversely affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.

However, the third paragraph of Article 101 provides for an exemption to this principle: agreements which, although restricting competition, contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods, or to technical or economic progress, remain valid, provided that a fair share of the resulting benefit is reserved for consumers.

Applying these principles to vertical agreements, i.e. contracts aimed at restricting competition, is far from easy. To assist practitioners in the complex analysis of compliance with Article 101(3) TFEU, the European Commission has issued specific regulations[1] - the last of which is the Regulation (EU) 2022/720). These regulatory documents aim to clearly delineate the boundaries within which vertical agreements, while restricting competition, may be considered lawful, ensuring that they actually contribute to the improvement of production, the distribution of products and technical and economic progress, consistent with Article 101.

Against this background, Article 2(1) of the regulation provides that, subject to specific exceptions detailed in the regulation itself, vertical agreements are automatically exempted. This premise is based on the assumption that, generally, such agreements are likely to generate positive economic impacts by optimising the production or distribution of products and stimulating technical or economic progress, while ensuring that an appropriate share of the benefits achieved is passed on to consumers.

As already explored in a previous article, Article 3 of the Regulation generally preserves the exemption for all those agreements in which both supplier and buyer do not exceed the 30% of shares in the relevant market; thus, all vertical agreements between entities that do not exceed these thresholds benefit from a presumption of legality, provided that the contracts do not incorporate hardcore restrictions (the so-called hard-core restrictionsoutlined in Article 4 of the regulation). These, essentially, in an exclusive distribution system, include the prohibition of resale price maintenance to the distributor, the prohibition of passive sales outside the exclusive territory and customer base, and the categorical ban on Internet use.

It is essential to stress that vertical agreements between competing undertakings, which do not benefit from the automatic exemption, are not subject to a presumption of illegality. Therefore, they should not be considered incompatible with the internal market, and consequently, prohibited, without a prior examination of their effects on competition. From a practical point of view, they will have to be assessed individually in order to verify their compliance with Article 101 of the Treaty.[2]

Read also: Market share above 30% and impacts on distribution contracts.

 

___________________________________

2. Vertical agreements between competing undertakings.

2.1. Effective competition and dual distribution.

In this context, Article 2(4) of the Regulation excludes vertical agreements concluded between competing undertakings from the exemption.

However, the Regulation emphasises the need to examine effective competition in the specific context of the individual vertical agreement. In this perspective, Article 2(4)(a) and (b) grant exemption to vertical agreements between entities which, although competing on a horizontal level, do not compete directly at the precise levels of production or distribution involved in the vertical agreement in question.

The intention is to grant the exemption to those links between entities that, while competing at a certain stage of distribution, are not so at the levels for which the vertical agreement is configured, thereby focusing on the specific effect each agreement has on the market, irrespective of competition between the parties at other distribution levels.

With a view to a careful analysis of the actual competitive situation, irrespective of the roles played by the contracting parties in the market, recitals 12 and 13 of the regulation introduce a complementary principle called 'dual distribution'. This phenomenon occurs when the supplier markets goods or services both upstream and downstream, thereby competing with its independent distributors.

For example, dual distribution occurs when a shoe manufacturer, which initially distributed its products exclusively through distributors, decides to sell directly to shops, thus effectively entering into competition with its distributors, acting on the same level of the distribution chain.

In such a scenario, the vertical agreement would not automatically enjoy exemption as it would, in fact, become a relationship between competing parties.

___________________________________

2.2. The exchange of information in dual distribution.

Within the context of dual distribution, a context in which situations of potential competition are greater than in 'traditional' markets is certainly to be found in online sales. Take the case, which is far from unusual, in which the manufacturer combines sales through distributors with direct online sales, whether through its own site or, for example, through the use of an application specially developed by it.

Although the manufacturer will make every effort to harmonise sales channels, it may not always succeed in this endeavour and may find itself in actual or potential (see section 4 below) competition with its distributors.

Regardless of the manufacturer's efforts to manage the two channels, one element that may be of significant practical relevance is the one introduced by Art. 2(5) of the regulation, which imposes an important limitation regarding any exchange of information between supplier and buyer.

Based on what is outlined in recitals 12 and 13 and Article 2(4), Article 2(5) of the regulation provides that in situations of agreements between competitors (irrespective of the circumstances that led to that circumstance), exchanges of information between supplier and buyer that are not directly related to the implementation of the vertical agreement or that are not indispensable to optimise the production or distribution of the contract goods or services are never exempted and, therefore, may potentially infringe antitrust law.

For the interpretation of Article 2(5) of the Regulation, one may consider the Commission guidelines.[3] Although they have no binding force, they are of crucial importance in decision-making practice and the interpretation of rules.

In particular, paras. 99 and 100 provide examples of information that may or may not meet the requirements of Art. 2(5), thus outlining which information is arguably legitimate and which may not be legitimate from an antitrust perspective.

The point 99 lists information that, by its nature, is directly related to the implementation of the vertical agreement and necessary to improve production or distribution. These include:

  • Technical Informationrelated to the goods or services covered by the contract, necessary for compliance with regulatory measures and to adapt the goods or services to the customer's needs.
  • Logistical informationrelated to the production and distribution of goods or services in upstream or downstream markets.
  • Customer informationconcerning customers' purchases, preferences and reactions, provided they do not limit the territory or the customers to whom the buyer may sell.
  • Information on sales prices: charged by the supplier/manufacturer to the buyer for the contract goods or services.
  • Information on resale prices: concerning recommended or maximum resale prices and the prices at which the buyer resells the goods or services, provided that they do not restrict the buyer's ability to determine its own selling price.
  • Marketing informationrelating to the marketing of the goods or services covered by the contract.
  • Information on resultsrelating to the marketing and sales activities of other purchasers of the contract goods or services.

The point 100 lists information that is generally unlikely to fulfil these conditions. Namely:

  • Information on future pricesconcerning the future prices at which the supplier or buyer intends to sell the goods or services on the downstream market.
  • Information on identified end-usersunless they are necessary to meet the requirements of a particular end user or to implement or monitor compliance with a selective or exclusive distribution agreement.
  • Information on own-brand goods sold by a buyerexchanged between the buyer and a manufacturer of competing branded goods, unless the manufacturer is also the producer of those own-brand goods.

The above-mentioned points should be used by practitioners as a tool to understand the limits within which exchanges of information can take place without incurring antitrust violations in the context of vertical agreements between even potentially competing parties.

Although the illustrations provided by the Commission may offer a partially useful guide for the supplier wishing to comply with the requirements laid down in Article 2(5), the distinction between information that may be shared and information that may not be shared needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In principle, the latter can be said to be those data that, once shared, give a party, potentially in competition with its contractor, the ability to penetrate the market by exploiting a competitive advantage not in line with European competition principles.

___________________________________

3. Online intermediaries performing a hybrid function.

 

A further aspect, explored in the context of competition between players operating at different market levels and which is specifically related to online sales, concerns vertical relationships with online intermediary service providers.

Concretely, this refers to the dynamics between a supplier and an online service intermediary, i.e. a platform that facilitates the sale of products or services.

In these relationships, which are categorised as vertical agreements since the platform acts as a mediator of the manufacturer's products, Article 2(6) of the regulation states:

"the exemptions in paragraph 4(a) and (b) do not apply to vertical agreements relating to the provision of online brokering services where the provider of such services is an undertaking competing on the relevant market for the sale of the goods or services being brokered. "

In essence, the legislation identifies a situation in which an online platform exercises a so-called 'hybrid function',[4] by acting both as an intermediary for the supplier's sales and by promoting the sale of its own products or services, which compete with the intermediated products. In this context, the exemptions provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 2(4) of the regulation are not applicable, considering that one finds oneself in a situation in which intermediaries may have an interest in promoting their own sales, as well as the ability to influence the outcome of competition between undertakings using their online intermediary services.[5]

Although the quoted legal text is not easy to read, we can try to simplify it, far from trivialising it, by emphasising that, once again, it is essential to examine the actual competitive relationship established between the contracting parties. In particular, if the online intermediary plays not only the role of intermediary, but also that of potential competitor on the same platform that it provides as a space for the sale of the contracting parties' products, we would clearly find ourselves in a situation of effective competition between subjects operating on the same distribution level and therefore of a relationship that is not exempt from the regulation under consideration.

As will be examined in more detail in the following section, in the context of hybrid brokering (analogous to dual distribution), competition from the platform does not necessarily have to manifest itself effectively; even potentially perceptible competition is sufficient. In this sense, it is sufficient that the provider of the online intermediation services, within a relatively short period of time (usually not exceeding one year), undertakes the necessary additional investments or incurs other indispensable costs in order to gain access to the relevant market for the sale of the goods or services being intermediated.[6]

It is essential to emphasise that the application of Article 2(6) of Regulation (EU) 2022/720 presupposes that the vertical agreement entered into by the online intermediary service provider performing a hybrid function cannot be classified as a commercial agency agreement, which does not fall within the scope of Article 101.[7]

Read also: But are online platforms commercial agents?

___________________________________

4. Risks associated with potential competition.

It is important to emphasise that competition does not necessarily have to be actual, but it is sufficient that it is also only potential. Article 1(c) of the regulation defines a 'competing undertaking' as an entity that competes both actually and potentially. An actual competitor is an undertaking which is active on the same relevant market, whereas a potential competitor is an undertaking which, in the absence of the vertical agreement, would realistically have the possibility of entering the relevant market within a short period of time and incurring the necessary investments and costs.

The Guidelines further decline this definition.[8] They emphasise that the assessment of potential competition must be based on realistic considerations, taking into account the market structure and the economic and legal environment. A mere theoretical possibility of entering a market is not sufficient; there must be a real and concrete possibility, without insurmountable barriers to entry. In any event, it is not necessary to demonstrate with certainty that the undertaking will actually enter the relevant market and maintain its position.

In order to assess whether an undertaking, absent from a market, is in potential competition with undertakings present on that market, it is necessary to examine whether there are real and concrete possibilities for that undertaking to integrate the market and compete with the others. This criterion excludes the possibility of establishing potential competition based on mere assumptions or intentions not supported by concrete, preparatory actions.[9]

The assessment of the existence of potential competition must be made in the light of the market structure and the economic and legal framework governing its operation. Assessing potential competition involves a careful examination of the structure and context of the market, considering several key factors and operational dynamics. Below is a list of some key areas and points to explore during such an assessment:

  • Market structure and context: The first phase of the assessment involves a careful analysis of the market and its functioning, observing not only the current distribution of companies and their market share, but also the prevailing dynamics, trends and business models.
  • Regulatory constraints and intellectual property: The presence of regulatory barriers and intellectual property rights, such as patents and trademarks, need careful scrutiny, as they may create barriers to entry or otherwise affect the ability of new entrants to compete effectively in the marketplace. Indeed, intellectual property may restrict access to crucial technologies or knowledge and thus alter competitive dynamics.
  • Determination and ability to enter the market: the assessment must extend to an enterprise's willingness and ability to penetrate the market. This involves analysing the resources, skills and strategies that the company can mobilise to enter the market, as well as its resolve to overcome any barriers. The firm's strategic decisions, investments and assets are therefore crucial in assessing the potential competitive impact.
  • Preparatory measures and entry strategies: it is also crucial to observe what concrete steps the company has taken to prepare for entering the market. This could include developing or purchasing products, applying for relevant certifications or authorisations, and developing marketing and distribution plans. A detailed analysis of planned or already ongoing initiatives and operations can provide insight into the real intentions and capabilities of the company.
  • Additional elements corroborating competition Potential: Other factors may offer additional indications of a firm's determination to be a competitive force. For example, the formation of agreements with other firms, especially if they were not previously active in the market of interest, may indicate the feasibility of their intentions and potential to compete effectively.

___________________________________ 

5. Fines, sanctions and procedural initiatives

Non-compliance with antitrust law may be established not only by the Commission and the national antitrust authority, either on their own initiative or on the recommendation of third parties, but may also be brought to the attention of the ordinary courts by the other contracting party or by third parties who consider that they have suffered harm as a result of anti-competitive conduct.

With regard to fines, the Commission has set a significant threshold of up to 10% of annual turnover total realised in the last business year by the undertaking fined. This is due to the fact that the fine must have a 'sufficiently deterrent effect, in order not only to sanction the undertakings concerned (specific deterrent effect), but also to deter other undertakings from engaging in or continuing conduct contrary to Articles 101 and 102'.[10]

Similarly, national legislation[11] confers on the Authority the power to impose pecuniary sanctions in the presence of particularly serious unlawful conduct, which do not have "the nature of a civil asset measure (...) but of an administrative sanction with punitive connotations (akin to those of a criminal sanction)."[12]

As to the procedural steps that may be taken by the other contracting party or third parties, these include the ascertainment of a breach, the declaration of the nullity of the contractual relationship, actions for damages and the adoption of precautionary measures. In these cases, there are no predetermined upper limits for compensation; rather, the quantification of damages will be determined on a case-by-case basis, according to the general principles of compensation established by the law applicable to the individual situation.

___________________________________

[1] Regulation (EU) 2022/720; Regulation (EC) No 330/2010: Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999.

[2] Point (48) and (91) of the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.

[3] Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2022/C 248/01).

[4] Point (104) of the Guidelines.

[5] Point (105) of the Guidelines.

[6] Point (106) of the Guidelines.

[7] Point (72) Commission guidelines.

[8] Point (90) of the Guidelines.

[9] Judgments of 30 January 2020, Generics (UK) and others/Competition and Markets AuthorityCase C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraphs 36-45;

[10] See Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

[11] (Art. 15 Law 287/1990).

[12] Council of State, Judgment No. 1671 of 2001.


Contratti di distribuzione

Market share above 30% and impacts on distribution contracts.

1. Framing.

As is well known, within the European market, the free market principle applies.

Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU deems incompatible with the internal market and prohibits all agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.

The third paragraph of Art. 101 does, however, provide for an exemption to this principle: agreements which, although restricting competition, contribute to improving the production/distribution of goods, or technical or economic progress, remain valid, provided that a fair share of the resulting benefit is reserved for consumers.

In order to decline these principles and provide operators with more clarity, so as to prevent the free market from de facto blocking the structuring of trade through the conclusion of agreements between private parties, the Commission has over the years issued the so-called regulations on vertical agreements, most recently the vertical sales regulation entered into force in June 2022, which aims to exempt, within certain limits, agreements between companies operating at different levels of the distribution chain (which fully includes the distribution contract) from a general non-compete clause.

In order to clarify the scope and content of the exemption regulation, the Commission published, concurrently with the entry into force of Reg. 720/2022, the "Guidelines on Vertical Restraints" so-called "Guidelines on Vertical Restraints".Orientations". Although this is an extremely authoritative text, which plays a key role in the interpretation of European legislation, it is not binding on the decision-making bodies. [1]

_______________________________

2. The threshold of 30% and the safety zone of the regulation.

The new regulation maintains in Article 3 the exemption for all agreements in which both supplier and buyer do not exceed 30% of the shares in the relevant market; of which they enjoy a presumption of lawfulness all those vertical agreements between parties that do not exceed the above-mentioned thresholds, provided that the contracts do not contain hardcore restrictions prohibited by the regulation (the so-called hard-core restrictions of Article 4 of the regulation, which are essentially, in an exclusive distribution system, a prohibition on imposing the resale price on the distributor, a prohibition on passive sales outside the exclusive territory and customers, an absolute ban on the use of the Internet).

It is very important to emphasise that exceeding the 30% threshold does not create a presumption of illegality.

The purpose of the threshold imposed by Article 3 of the regulation is to establish a "security zone"and distinguish those agreements that enjoy a presumption of legality from those that require individual assessment. The fact that a vertical agreement does not fall within the 'safe harbour', therefore, does not mean that it is incompatible with the internal market and therefore prohibited.[2]

With the introduction of the 'safe harbour', the Commission wanted to prevent potentially more dangerous agreements (due to the greater market power of the undertakings concerned) from automatically benefiting from the exemption and escaping scrutiny as to their actual effects on the market. It is therefore crucial to ascertain whether individual agreements exceed that market share, an assessment that is far from easy, given the difficulty of identifying the relevant market (product and geographic) on which to calculate that market share and the actual impact of the agreement on that market.

In order to understand how the relevant marketI refer to what has already been written in the previous article. Briefly, in order to make this analysis operational and more organic, the relevant market is one in which:

  • "all products and/or services are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use";
  • "the undertakings concerned supply or purchase goods or services, [where] the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and [where] it can be distinguished from neighbouring geographic areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas. "

Thus, the reference market on which the market share is to be calculated does not necessarily coincide with a single territory, but may be higher or lower; for this purpose, it must be ascertained whether companies located in areas other than the one in which the distributor makes its sales actually constitute an alternative source of supply.

As for the method of calculation of market shares (of the supplier and the buyer), Article 8 of the Regulation provides that they are to be assessed on the basis of the previous year's data on the value of sales and purchases, or, if not available, on the basis of reliable estimates.

If a market share does not initially exceed the 30% threshold, but subsequently exceeds it, the exemption continues to apply for a period of two consecutive financial years beginning with the year in which the 30% threshold was first exceeded.[3]

_______________________________

3. Restrictions by object and effect.

As mentioned at the beginning of the article, Article 101 of the Treaty qualifies as incompatible with the internal market all agreements between undertakings which have 'as their object' or 'as their effect' the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.

There is thus a clear distinction between the notions of 'restriction by object' and 'restriction by effect', each subject to a different evidentiary regime.[4]

Indeed, there are agreements between undertakings that can be considered, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of competition,[5] so much so that where they present 'restrictions by object", negative effects on competition need neither be sought nor proved in order to qualify them as unlawful, since they lead to reductions in production and price increases, to the detriment, in particular, of consumers.[6]

So-called 'restrictions of competition by object' are of an exceptional nature, of which they must be interpreted restrictively and thus applied to a very limited number, reserved precisely for those agreements that are so damaging to competition that it is unnecessary to examine their effects on the internal market.[7]

For cases relating to "restrictions as a result of', individual cases must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature and quantity, whether limited or not, of the products covered by the agreement, the position and importance of the parties on the market for the products in question, the stand-alone character of the agreement or, on the contrary, its position in a complex of agreements.[8]

_______________________________

4. Evaluation of individual clauses.

For the assessment of a possible withdrawal of the benefit of the exemption, it is necessary to determine the foreclosure and anti-competitive effects that individual agreements may have on consumers, leading to higher prices, limited choice of goods, lower quality of goods and reduced innovation or services at the level of the supplier.[9] The negative market effects that may result from vertical restraints and that EU competition law aims to prevent are:[10]

  • anticompetitive foreclosure of the market against other suppliers or other buyers, as a result of the creation of barriers to entry or expansion;
  • the weakening of competition between the supplier and its competitors (so-called competition inter-brand);
  • weakening of competition between the buyer and its competitors (d. intra-brand competition).

From a very brief analysis, it can be deduced that agreements may contain contractual clauses that lead to a reduction in either intra-brand competition (i.e. competition between distributors of goods or services from the same supplier), or inter-brand competition (i.e. competition between distributors of goods or services from different suppliers).

In principle, the Commission considers it to be more "dangerous"agreements affecting inter-brand competition, as opposed to those affecting intra-brand competition: it is considered to be unlikely that a reduction in intra-brand competition (i.e. intra-brand) may in itself lead to negative effects for consumers if inter-brand competition (i.e. inter-brand) is strong.[11]

This must certainly be taken into account when assessing the individual clauses normally contained within a distribution contract that have an impact on competition. The most important of these can be listed below:

  • monarchism;
  • exclusive supply;
  • exclusive allocation of customers;
  • ban on online sales.
Monarchism.

Monarchism (this is a translation of the phrase "single branding"), is a category in which numerous clauses affecting free competition fall, including:

  • exclusive sourcing (whereby the buyer is obliged to purchase only contractual products from the supplier);
  • non-compete obligation during the course of the relationship (where the purchaser undertakes not to resell products that compete with the contractual products);
  • imposition of minimum purchase volumes.

In practice, this is a category that groups together agreements whose main characteristic is to induce the buyer to concentrate orders for a particular type of product with a single supplier.[12]

Of the above clauses, only the one relating to the de facto non-compete obligation impacts on competition inter-brand which, when combined with exclusive sourcing, will have an even greater impact, both on the market inter-brandthat on that intra-brand. In such a case, the distributor will be a single-brand distributor, which is obliged to purchase products only from the supplier, thereby impacting competition both within the contract market and on the competing market.

4.2. Exclusive supply.

Exclusive supply refers to restrictions that oblige or induce the supplier to sell the contract product only or primarily to a single buyer.

It is therefore the mirror image of the exclusive supply clause, since in the former, the supplier/dealer undertakes to supply (in a given market) only one buyer, and in the latter, it is the distributor who undertakes to obtain supplies only from the supplier, without the latter necessarily being granted exclusivity within the market where it operates.

Very often (but not always), the two clauses go hand in hand, so that an exclusive distribution relationship is coupled with an exclusive supply relationship.

In particular, in markets where the distribution of a brand is granted on an exclusive basis to one or more distributors, there will be a reduction in intra-brand competition, which does not necessarily reflect negatively on competition between distributors in general.[13]

Where a supplier allocates a very large territory (e.g. that of an entire state) to a buyer/distributor without restricting the sale of the downstream market, anti-competitive effects are unlikely. Where appropriate, the same may be offset by advantages (ex Art. 101(3)) in terms of logistics and promotion, the buyer being particularly inclined to invest in the licensed trade mark.[14]

4.3. Exclusive allocation of customers.

This clause recognises exclusive sales of the contract products to a single buyer/distributor for the purpose of resale to a certain category or group of customers. Similarly, the distributor is often prohibited from active sales to other exclusively recognised purchasers.

This clause is also among those that have an intra-brand impact, provided that it is not included in combination with other clauses that actually impact competition between competing brands.

_______________________________

5. Relevant Factors for the Evaluation of Agreements that Exceed the Threshold.

Now, in the case of a distribution relationship, the parties to which exceed the so-called 'safe harbour threshold' of 30%, understanding whether such clauses can benefit from the exemption must be thoroughly assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account different elements, as well as the impact of such agreements on competition, with the understanding that the combination of the individual clauses with each other has a greater impact on competition.

The following factors are particularly relevant in determining whether a vertical agreement involves an appreciable restriction of competition:[15]

  • the nature of the agreement;
  • the market position of the parties;
  • the market position of competitors (upstream and downstream);
  • the market position of the buyers of the contract goods or services;
  • barriers to entry;
  • the level of the production or distribution chain concerned;
  • the nature of the product;
  • market dynamics.

Clearly, the greater the market share of contractors (supplier and buyer) on the relevant (upstream and downstream) markets, the greater the likelihood that their market power is high. This is particularly true when the market share reflects cost or other competitive advantages over competitors.[16]

Also relevant is the market position of competitors. Again, the stronger the competitive position of competitors and the greater their number, the lower the risk of foreclosing the market to competitors or weakening competition.[17]

If, for instance, the agreement includes single branding and/or exclusive supply clauses, but the competitors are sufficiently numerous and strong, the Commission considers that significant anti-competitive effects are unlikely: competitors are unlikely to be foreclosed if they have similar market positions and can offer similar products of equivalent quality. Foreclosure of potential entrants could possibly occur if several major suppliers also enter into single-branding agreements with a significant number of buyers in the relevant market.[18]

As for the barriers to entryat the level of the suppliers, these are commensurate with the ability of companies already established in the market to raise their price above the competitive price without causing new competitors to enter the market.

What is certain is that, insofar as it is relatively easy for competing suppliers to set up their own integrated distribution network or find alternative distributors for their product, it is again unlikely that there will be a real problem of foreclosure by having single branding clauses,[19] i.e. clauses that also impact on competition inter-brand. Similarly, even in the case of exclusive supply agreements, the presence of entry barriers at supplier level should not create problems insofar as competing purchasers are contractually recognised as being able to source from alternative sources and this is also easily realisable.[20]

_______________________________

6. Concluding remarks.

In practice, there is no mathematical formula that makes it possible to identify a priori whether a distribution agreement, which exceeds the 30% quota, is actually exempt from the block exemption, since this depends on numerous factors, including the type and content of the competition-restricting contractual clauses within it and the impact these have on the reference market, which may be more or less competitive.

Thus, in order to understand whether a distribution agreement that exceeds the market threshold of 30% may nevertheless benefit from the exemption, it is necessary to analyse the individual case, also using the tools provided by the Commission and briefly referred to and summarised above. Simplifying (but far from trivialising), the most important elements that should prompt contractors to raise the threshold are:

  • market shares held by them;[21]
  • the assessment of the individual clauses contained within the agreement, their combination and their effects on the market, taking into account those that impact on competition inter-brand are riskier than those affecting the competition intra-brand;
  • the actual competitive state of the market and the position of the major player.

In conclusion, it may reasonably be argued that distribution contracts that do not contain the hardcore restrictions set out in Article 4 of the Regulation, let alone those set out in Article 5, may be exempted, despite being concluded between parties with a market share quite relevant, if the market appears to be sufficiently competitive.

Indeed, if one analyses clauses which have an impact on inter-brand competition (i.e. exclusive purchasing obligation and non-compete agreement), even if these clauses prevent competitors from entering the market (i.e. the dealer is forbidden from supplying and reselling products other than those covered by the contract), in principle they may have a negative impact on competition if it can be shown that there are not enough players within the relevant market of reference who can perform similar services (and thus other dealers who can resell competing products).

On the other hand, as regards sales exclusivity, it essentially affects competition intra-brandwhere there is sufficient competition in the relevant market inter-brandthe clause should not create any particular antitrust problems, for the reasons stated above.

_______________________________

7. Fines and ordinary actions.

Any non-compliance with antitrust law may not only be ascertained by the Commission and the relevant national authority - either at its own instance or at the instance of third parties - but may also be brought before the ordinary courts at the instance of the other contracting party or third parties who complain that anti-competitive conduct leads to an impairment of their interests.

With regard to fines, the threshold set by the Commission is particularly high, and is equal to up to 10% of the total annual turnover achieved in the previous business year by the undertaking fined. This is because the fine must have a 'sufficiently deterrent effect, in order not only to penalise the undertakings concerned (specific deterrent effect), but also to dissuade other undertakings from engaging in or continuing conduct contrary to Articles 101 and 102".[22]

Likewise, the domestic legislation,[23] recognises the Authority's power to impose fines where the unlawful conduct is characterised by seriousness, which have not '.nature of a civil asset measure (...) but of an administrative sanction with punitive connotations (akin to a criminal sanction)."[24]

As to ordinary actions, these are the typical ones, i.e. those seeking to ascertain a breach, those seeking to ascertain the nullity of the contractual relationship, those seeking to obtain damages, as well as those seeking to obtain a precautionary measure. In this case, no maximum thresholds are envisaged, but the quantification of damages will have to be calculated and assessed from time to time on the basis of the general principles of compensation provided for by the legislation applicable to the individual case.

 

_______________________________

 

[1] Bortolotti, Distribution Contracts, Wolters Kluwer, 2022, p. 775.

[2] Point 48, Guidelines.

[3] Art. 8(d) of Regulation 2022/720.

[4] Judgment of 30 January 2020, Generics (UK) and Others, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 63

[5] Judgment of 2 April 2020, Budapest Bank and Others, C-228/18, EU:C:2020:265, paragraph 35 and case law cited therein.

[6] In this sense, judgment of 30 January 2020, Generics (UK) and Others, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 64.

[7] In this sense, Budapest Bank and Others, C-228/18, 2 April 2020, EU:C:2020:265, paragraph 54 and case law cited therein.

[8] In this sense, judgment 18.11.20221, Visma Enterprise, C-306/20, no. 75.

[9] Point 19, Guidelines.

[10] Point 18, Guidelines.

[11] Point 21, Guidelines.

[12] Point 298, Guidelines.

[13] Point 21, Guidelines.

[14] Point 135, Guidelines.

[15] Point 278, Guidelines.

[16] Point 282, Guidelines.

[17] Point 283, Guidelines.

[18] Point 303 and 328, Guidelines.

[19] Point 305, Guidelines.

[20] Point 326, Guidelines.

[21] I would point out that, if very high and in the presence of a market that is not particularly competitive, this could even constitute a dominant position hypothesis under Article 102, which I reserve the right to investigate further if requested.

[22] Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

[23] Art. 15 Law 287/1990.

[24] Council of State, Judgment No. 1671 of 2001.


The new European Regulation on Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices maintains the exemption for all agreements in which both supplier and buyer do not exceed the 30% of market shares on the relevant market; all vertical agreements between parties that do not exceed these thresholds enjoy a presumption of lawfulness, provided that the contracts do not contain hardcore restrictions prohibited by the Regulation.

This has to be coordinated with the fact that over the past decades the Commission has issued a number of Notices, which aim to clarify a very relevant principle in antitrust matters, namely the inapplicability of the prohibition of Article 101(1) of the Treaty to agreements whose impact on trade between Member States or on competition is negligible.

Not to mention the theory de minimis developed by the Court of Justice, according to which the agreement does not fall under the prohibition of Article 101 if, in view of the weak position of the participants on the product market, it affects the market to an insignificant extent.

Applying these principles to exclusive distribution relationships is a far from easy task, and this article will attempt to provide the reader with an overview of the subject, thus offering food for thought and insight.

______________________________

1. Typical competition-restricting clauses in exclusive dealership contracts.

The new European Regulation 2022/720 on Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices maintains the approach already adopted by Regulation 330/2010, under which all restrictive clauses of competition included within vertical relationships (as defined in Article 1) are automatically exempted, with the sole exception of a limited group of impermissible agreements.

The expressly prohibited covenants fall mainly into two groups, namely:

  • severe or fundamental restrictions (so-called hardcore restrictions), listed in the 4, the presence of which excludes the entire agreement from the benefit of the block exemption (and which, in an exclusive distribution system, are essentially the prohibition of resale price maintenance to the distributor, the prohibition of passive sales, and the prohibition of the use of the internet);
  • the restrictions set out in 5which, although not exempted by the Regulation, their presence does not prevent the rest of the agreement from benefiting from the exemption (and which, in an exclusive distribution system, are essentially the over five-year non-compete obligation[1] and the post-contractual non-compete obligation).

In the context of a dealership relationship, such an approach whereby everything that is not expressly prohibited (even if in itself restrictive of competition under Article 101) is implicitly authorised, is perfectly in line with the approach taken by the Commission in the (now distant) decision Grundig,[2] where the absolute protection of dealers and the creation of 'closed exclusive' distributions was deemed contrary to the principles of the European single market,[3] so-called 'open exclusivities' were considered admissible and in line with the European competition principle,[4] which in fact guarantees the possibility of parallel markets to the exclusive one.[5]

Read also: Parallel Sales in the EU. When and to what extent can a manufacturer control them?

In addition, therefore, to the classic (open) exclusivity clause, a further clause typically included in sales dealership contracts that may be deemed automatically exempted by the European Regulation (since it is not expressly prohibited) concerns the imposition of an obligation on the part of the supplier/dealer not to make sales (not even passive sales) to customers in the territory reserved exclusively for the dealer.

Similarly, it could be said, as indeed part of the doctrine affirms,[6] that a clause prohibiting the supplier/dealer from selling products to parties outside the territory, of which he is aware that they supply within the dealer's area, is also admissible.

Otherwise, a clause by which the distributor undertakes to obtain its supplies exclusively from the supplier would seem to fall within the scope of the definition of the non-compete obligation provided by Article 1(f)[7] and therefore subject to the time limit set out in Article 5 of the Regulation.

Having made a very brief 'roundup' of the typical clauses of exclusive dealership contracts that may have restrictive impacts on competition, we will examine below the impact that the market share of the supplier and dealer may have under antitrust law. On this point, in fact, it is noted that:

  • Article 3 of the Regulation provides that the exemption applies to all agreements in which both supplier and buyer do not exceed 30% of quotas in the "relevant market";
  • the European Commission, in line with the Court of Justice, in its Communication of 30.8.2014, set the market shares below which the prohibition of Article 101 is to be considered inapplicable, with the exception of restrictive clauses by 'object' and fundamental clauses;
  • the European Court of Justice developed the theory de minimisaccording to which in the presence of insignificant market shares, the individual agreement may not fall in full under the prohibition of Art. 101.

______________________________

2. Market shares above 30%.

The new regulation in Art. 3 has maintained, for all vertical agreements, the so-called safety zone provided for in the previous regulation,[8] delimited by the market share threshold of 30%, which must be exceeded by both the supplier and the buyer within the relevant market where they respectively sell and purchase the contract goods or services. They benefit from the automatic exemption granted by the Regulation, i.e. a presumption of lawfulness, provided also that they do not contain hardcore restrictions prohibited by Article 4 of the Regulation.

______________________________

2.1. Identification of the relevant market.

Applying this principle to exclusive dealerships, in order to understand whether the individual agreement enjoys this presumption, it is necessary to identify the relevant market of both the manufacturer and the seller and to assess whether both parties have a share of more than 30%.

In particular, it must be understood whether the reference market is the contractual one (and thus corresponds to the territory granted on an exclusive basis), or whether it must be broadened to include areas in which the dealer does not actively operate.

The answer, far from immediate, is partly offered by the Point 88 of the old Commission Guidelines (2010/C 130/01)as well as by the point 170 of the new guidelines. The latter, in particular, refers for the definition of the relevant market to the criteria used by the Commission in its Communication 97 /C 372/03.

First, it is necessary to understand and define what is meant by the relevant (product) market, which includes (point 7 of the 97 Communication):

"all products and/or services that are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use. "

Thus, in order to calculate 30%'s quota, it is first necessary to understand whether the contract products can be substituted by other similar products, based on the purposes for which they were conceived, designed and sold, from the point of view of the end consumer.

Having done so, one has to move on to the relevant geographic market (here is the definition, taken from paragraph 88 of the 2010 Commission Guidelines):

"The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply or purchase of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and can be distinguished from neighbouring geographical areas because the conditions of competition are significantly different in those areas. "

With specific reference to the relevant geographic market, paragraph 13 of the Notice clarifies:

"An undertaking or group of undertakings cannot exert a significant influence on current sales conditions, and in particular on prices, whether customers are able to switch easily to substitute products available on the market or to suppliers located elsewhere. Basically, the market definition exercise consists of identifying the actual alternative sources of supply for the customers of the companies concerned, both in terms of products/services the geographical location of suppliers. "

Paragraph 29 of the Notice would seem not to exclude that the relevant market may also be regional, but in order to be defined as 'relevant', it must actually be ascertained whether undertakings located in areas other than the area in which the distributor makes its sales really constitute an alternative source of supply for consumers; this is done by means of an analysis of the characteristics of demand (importance of national or local preferences, current purchasing habits of consumers, product differentiation and brands, etc.), aimed at determining whether undertakings located in different areas really constitute an alternative source of supply for consumers.

On this point, the Commission states:

"The theoretical test is also based here on the substitution effects that arise in the event of a change in relative prices, and the question to be answered is always the same: whether the parties' customers would decide to turn to companies located elsewhere for their purchases, in the short term and with negligible costs. "

Point 50 of the Communication finally points out that obstacles and costs related to switching to suppliers located in another geographical area must also be evaluated.

It is stated precisely that:

"Perhaps the most obvious obstacle to switching to a supplier located in another area is the incidence of transport costs and possible transport difficulties resulting from regulatory requirements or the nature of the relevant products. The incidence of transport costs normally limits the geographical market radius for bulkier and lower-value products, although it should not be forgotten that disadvantages arising from transport costs may be offset by comparative advantages in terms of other costs (labour or raw material costs). "

In view of the foregoing, it may reasonably be argued that the relevant market for the purposes of the Regulation is not to be understood as the air to which the distributor has been granted exclusivity, but it is possible (if indeed this is the case) to extend that air to a larger, or smaller, geographical area.

Certainly, if within the same relevant market the licensor designates a large number of exclusive distributors, there will be an increased ease for final purchasers to travel to other areas to purchase the products sold, by virtue of the particular fragmentation of the market into several exclusive zones.[9]

If, on the other hand, the market in a given country is granted on an exclusive basis only to one dealer, and in that market both parties have a share of more than 30% of the relevant market, it will certainly be less easy (though far from impossible) to prove that the relevant reference market should be extended to a supranational area, not covered by the contractual exclusivity.

Importantly, however, the Commission considers that the mere exceeding of market shares under Article 3 does not automatically presume that the agreement (which does not contain hardcore restrictions of competition under Article 4) does not benefit from the block exemption.[10]

This will require an individual assessment of the likely effects of the agreement, with an invitation to the companies to make their own assessment, no notification being necessary.[11] The Commission suggests in §§ 97 ff. methods for evaluating these effects.

 

______________________________

3. Market share below 15%.

 

Over the past decades, the Commission has issued a number of Communications, most recently the current one of 30.8.2014which aim to clarify a very relevant principle in antitrust matters (a principle most recently reaffirmed by the Court of Justice in the judgment Expedia,[12]) i.e. the inapplicability of the prohibition in Article 101(1) of the Treaty to agreements whose effect on trade between Member States or on competition is negligible.

Article 5 of the Notice makes it clear that the Notice, although non-binding, is to be embraced as an essential tool for judges and responsible authorities in the interpretation of European competition law.

Article 8(b) states that the vertical agreement (in this case, the exclusive distribution agreement) is irrelevant if the shares held by each of the parties do not exceed 15% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement.[13]

In line with the case law of the Court of Justice, it is made clear that the inapplicability of the prohibition to minor restraints does not apply to restrictions for "object",[14] as well as the hardcore restrictions in Article 4 of the Regulation (i.e. prohibition of resale price maintenance, passive sales and the use of the Internet).

The Notice, on the other hand, expressly determines the applicability of the prohibition of restrictive practices to minor restraints under Article 5 of the Vertical Agreements Regulation. On this point, the second part of Article 14 provides that:

"The safe harbour is [...] relevant for agreements covered by a Commission block exemption regulation to the extent that such agreements contain a so-called excluded restriction.".

As we have seen, the clauses included in Article 5 of the Regulation (so-called excluded restrictions) that are most often used in exclusive distribution systems are the five-year non-compete covenant and the post-contractual non-compete covenant; these clauses, which by definition are excluded from the restrictions "by object", would therefore appear not to be automatically subject to the prohibition of Article 101, whenever the individual relationship does not exceed the relevant market share of 15% identified by the Commission.

______________________________

4. Market share below 2%.

In (far) 1969, the Court of Justice in its judgment Völk-Vervaeckehad developed a theory according to which the agreement does not fall under the prohibition of Article 101 if, in view of the weak position of the participants on the product market, it affects the market to an insignificant extent.

In the present case, the shares held were 0.008% in EEC production and 0.2% in Germany, and the Belgian dealer had a share of 0.6% in the Belgian and Luxembourg markets.

In that circumstance, the Court had recognised the possibility of establishing a relationship of even absolute exclusivity (and thus closed exclusivity), "because of the weak position of the participants on the market for the products concerned in the protected area."

In such cases (where the quota is "irrelevant"and not "negligible"as in the case outlined by the Commission), even agreements containing clauses would be valid hardcoreon the assumption that if the agreement does not have any appreciable effect on competition, the degree of dangerousness of the clauses contained therein cannot be relevant.[15]

It should be noted that it was deemed "an undertaking of sufficient size for its behaviour to affect trade'. a company holding 5% of the market,[16] thus a company holding 3%, if these percentages are higher than those of most competitors and taking into account their turnover.[17]

______________________________

 

[1] The new Regulation maintains the previous approach, leaving the five-year period unchanged, the new guidelines introduce (at §248) an important novelty with regard to the hypothesis (iii) of tacit renewal, non-compete clauses that are tacitly renewed beyond five years may be exempted, provided that the distributor is allowed to effectively renegotiate or terminate the vertical agreement containing the non-compete obligation with reasonable notice and without incurring unreasonable costs, and that the distributor is then able to switch to another supplier after the expiry of the five-year period.

[2] Decision Grundig-Costen, 23.9.1964.

[3] Closed' exclusivity is characterised by the fact that the dealer is granted perfect territorial protection by imposing on all distributors in the network not to resell to persons outside their area, and with the further obligation to impose this prohibition on their buyers, etc.

[4] Open exclusivity is characterised by the fact that the dealer obtains the right to be the only party to be supplied by the manufacturer in a given territory. In any case, the position guaranteed to the latter is not a 'monopoly', since parallel importers, albeit within the limits imposed by atitrust law (on this point cf. Parallel Sales in the EU. When and to what extent can a manufacturer control them?) will be able to purchase the goods from third parties (wholesalers or dealers in other areas), and then possibly resell them in the dealer's exclusive territory.

[5] On this point see Bortolotti, I contratti di distribuzione, p. 690, 2016, Wolters Kluwer.

[6] Bortolotti, p. 695.

[7]"Non-compete obligation' means any direct or indirect obligation [...] which obliges the buyer to purchase from the supplier or from another undertaking designated by the supplier more than 80 % of its total annual purchases of the contract goods or services.. "

[8] See Art. 3 Reg. 330/2010. Reg. 2790/99 postulated, as a condition for the exercise of the presumption, a market share (normally held by the supplier) not exceeding the threshold of 30%. The double threshold had also been advocated by the Commission with regard to the 1999 version; however, the proposal had been dropped due to widespread opposition by practitioners and then accepted in the 2010 regulation, given the awareness of the growing size of the 'buying power' of large-scale distribution, Restrictions by object, Ginevra Buzzone, Trento 2015.

[9] On this point see also §130 of the New Guidelines.

[10]§ 275 of the new Guidelines, in accordance with § 96 of the previous Guidelines.

[11] § 275 of the new Guidelines, in accordance with § 96 of the previous Guidelines.

[12] See Case C-226/11 Expedia, in particular paragraphs 16 and 17.

[13] Point 19 also states that "Where in the relevant market competition is restricted by the cumulative effect of agreements for the sale of goods or services entered into by several suppliers or distributors (cumulative foreclosure effect of parallel networks of agreements having similar effects on the market), the market share thresholds under paragraphs (8) and (9) are reduced to 5 %, both for agreements between competitors and for agreements between non-competitors. Individual suppliers or distributors whose market share does not exceed 5 % are in general not considered to contribute significantly to a cumulative foreclosure effect (3 ). Such an effect is also unlikely to arise where less than 30 % of the relevant market is covered by (networks of) parallel agreements having similar effects. "

[14] Since 1966, the Court has in fact indicated, in Consten & Grundig that 'for the application of Article 101(1), it is unnecessary to consider the actual effects of an agreement where it appears that it has as its object the restriction, prevention or distortion of competition' and specified in Société Technique Minière that, in order to consider an agreement restrictive by object, one must consider "the very object of the agreement, taking into account the economic circumstances in which it is to be applied. (...) If the examination of these clauses does not reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition, the effects of the agreement will have to be examined and the agreement will be caught by the prohibition if it appears that competition has been prevented, restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent in practice.". Cf. Restrictions by object, Ginevra Buzzone, Trento 2015; Commission Staff Working Document Guidance on restrictions of competition 'by object'.

[15] Bortolotti, p. 653.

[16] Case 19-77, Miller International.

[17]

Selective online distribution: the Amazon.it case.

1. Selective distribution: the regulatory and jurisprudential context.

Based on the assumption that the goal of every manufacturer is to maximise its profit, there are cases in which this goal can only be achieved by restricting access to the official sales network to distributors and resellers with special requirements, so as to protect the image of excellence and product quality.

This tends to be the case for technically complex products - for which customer service is particularly important - and the manufacturer believes that the certainty of an adequate service can positively influence the purchaser's choices, or in the case of beauty or fashion products, where the protection of the product's image or prestige may be considered essential in order not to dissuade the consumer from purchasing a product that is offered together with goods of much lesser value.[1]

Here is the manufacturer's interest in creating a selective distribution within which, each authorised member undertakes to sell the contractual goods or services only to distributors selected on the basis of predetermined criteria, in order to safeguard, in the consumer's perception, the aura of exclusivity and prestige of the products, thanks precisely to a presentation of the goods to the public that enhances their aesthetic and functional specificity.

Although selective distribution is abstractly capable of restricting competition on the market (thus contrary to theArticle 101(1) TFEU), it is nevertheless regarded as a legitimate selling method (pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU) provided that:

  1. the characteristics of the products actually require a selective distribution system, in view of their high level of quality and technologyin order to preserve their quality and ensure their proper use;
  2. the choice of dealers is made according to objective criteria of a qualitative nature, established indiscriminately for all potential resellers and applied in a manner non-discriminatory;
  3. the system proposes a result apt to improve competition and thus counterbalance the restrictions on competition to the same;
  4. the criteria imposed do not go beyond what is necessary.[2]

Under these conditions, therefore, a selective distribution system is permissible.

The first and main advantage (linked in fact to the very essence of selective distribution itself) is the fact that in such a system, the manufacturer may oblige those belonging to the network and, therefore, bound to it by a contractual relationship, not to promote sales to parties (other than end users) not belonging to the network (Art. 4(b)(iii)), subject however to the possibility of sales cross between authorised members (Art. 4(d)).[3] Therefore, in the event of a breach of contractual obligations, the manufacturer will have the possibility of retaliating against the non-performing member by resorting to the remedies typical of breach of contract.

- Read also:  Selective distribution. A brief overview: advantages and disadvantages.

On the other hand, as far as relations with parties outside the network are concerned, with whom the producer by definition has no contractual relationship, it can now be affirmed without hesitation that the producer has the right to seek injunctive relief against the parallel distributorsif, and only if, the manner of resale is such as to damage the image of luxury and prestige - which the manufacturer seeks to defend precisely by adopting a selective distribution system - or if there is a confusing effect as to the existence of a commercial link between the proprietor of the trade mark and the unauthorised reseller.

As is well known, thearticle 5 c.p.i. - which in its first paragraph lays down the so-called principle of exhaustion, in its second paragraph provides for an exception, stating that the holder of an industrial property right may, if there are legitimate reasons, oppose the further commercialisation of its products already on the market, in particular if their condition is changed or altered; it is now common ground that selective distribution falls within this exception.[4]

- Read also:  Parallel Sales in the EU. When and to what extent can a manufacturer control them?

The application of these principles to sales onlineThis has led to the consolidation of a guideline that considers unlawful, as constituting a serious restriction of competition, a contract that absolutely prevents the sale via web[5] and that a restriction on the distribution online would only be lawful if it aimed to make authorised dealers of a selective system comply with certain quality standards with the main purpose of safeguarding the image of the contractual products.

- Read also: Can a manufacturer prevent its distributors from selling online?

Given that online sales have been de facto 'cleared' by European jurisprudence, albeit with the limitations mentioned above, a further issue has arisen, namely whether parallel distributors can also claim the right to make sales via web. A recent judgment of the Court of Milan - applying the principles already well established in the field of 'traditional' sales - held that in relations extra-contractualthe proprietor of exclusive property rights, may only block sales to persons outside the selective sales network if there is actual prejudice to the luxury or prestige image of the trade mark, thus affirming that the failure to distinguish by a maerketplace (in this case amazon.co.uk) between luxury and inferior products can confuse the consumer and damage the prestige of the brand.[6]

2. The case Shiseido v. Amazon.

With order of 19 October 2020 (currently the subject of a complaint), the Court of Milan again confirmed its orientation, upholding the appeal brought by the licensees of trademarks including "Narciso Rodriguez" e "Dolce & Gabbana" for the manufacture and marketing of perfumery and cosmetics products, preventing 'amazon.it' from promoting and offering for sale products bearing its trademarks, which are the subject of selective distribution agreements.

The Court of Milan, in order to verify the existence of the fumus boni iurisIt established the existence of the following three requirements:

  1. if the products in question could qualify as luxurious;
  2. if the selective distributionof the applicant was legitimate;
  • if the off-network sale would bring an effective damage to the reputation of the trade mark.
2.1. Ascertaining the luxury category of products.

The examination of this requirement was carried out, in this case, on the basis of quality indexes, finding, with reference to the trade marks 'D&D' and 'Narciso Rodriquez':

"the search for high quality materials, the care for packaging [...], the public presentation promoted at publicity level by personalities from the entertainment industry, the wide accreditation in the sector of reference deducible from [...] awards obtained, the consolidated recognition by the specialised press".

The Court, on the one hand, held that such serious, precise and concordant evidence, pursuant to Article 2729 of the Civil Code, proved that such fragrances belonged to the high-end category (reserving the right to conduct a more detailed investigation at the merits stage) and, on the other hand, again using the same indices and parameters of assessment, declared that the aura of luxury had not been sufficiently proven with reference to the marks "Iseey Miyake", "Elie Sahh" e "Zadig&Voltaire', thus placing these fragrances in the high-end category.

2.2. Verification of selective distribution contracts.

After verifying the aura of prestige of the products in question, it was necessary to verify the actual existence of selective distribution.

According to European case law, in order to benefit from the exemptions of Article 101(3) of the Treaty, it is not sufficient that a manufacturer has made a significant promotional effort in favour of high-end products, but also the conclusion of agreements that effectively impose on other independent economic operators obligations restricting their freedom of competition, since, otherwise, each manufacturer could justify the use of a selective distribution system only on the basis of the promotional activities carried out, so that any restrictive infringement criterion would be justified by the fact that it was necessary to protect the marketing strategy desired by the manufacturer.[7]

Moreover, once the existence of a selective distribution system has been verified, according to a recent orientation of the Court of Appeal of Milan, the producer may only claim the advantages deriving from it, and thus derogate from the principle of exhaustion, if, in application, the existence of an effective vigilance exercised on the market by the manufacturer.[8]

In the present case, the Court analysed the clauses of the contracts and verified that the obligations imposed on authorised dealers appeared to be aimed solely at protecting the luxury aura of the trade marks, having been applied "objective, qualitative, non-discriminatory criteria proportionate to the luxury character of the products distributed" and therefore "confirms the regulatory and jurisprudential principles cited'.

In particular, limitations on brand and sign positioning, sales and advisory service, sales methods, use of advertising material, qualification of sales personnel and customer care were deemed appropriate.

The contracts provided for further restrictions on how sales could be made via internet, as only authorised dealers are allowed to carry out such activities. availability of at least three physical points of sale and only after specific authorisation by the licensee, who, once the admission procedure had been activated, still had to set up and operate the site in accordance with the contractually imposed standards (graphical quality of the site, quality space dedicated to competing luxury products of the same level, absence of products other than perfumery or beauty products).

The General Court held that the limitations imposed by Shiseido on its authorised retailers, including making the use of e-commerce conditional on the availability of at least three physical points of sale, did not appear to go beyond what was necessary, in view of the fact that (with reference to the requirement of physical points of sale) the same is admitted by the European Commission itself in paragraph 54 of the Guidelines of the Exemption Regulation.

2.3. Brand reputation bias.

The last element to be ascertained by the Court, which is necessary for the application for an injunction to be granted, is the existence of a concrete injury to the holder of the patent rights, since it is not sufficient to merely note the circumstance that the unauthorised seller does not comply with the standard imposed on authorised dealers.

Indeed, case law requires that the specific manner of sale must concretely damage the prestige of the trade marks in order for the proprietor to prevent the unauthorised reseller from further resale.[9]

For the purposes of the injury determination, Amazon was challenged:

  • the absence of physical shops (relevant for the products in question, i.e. fragrances and cosmetics, also for possible allergy testing of products),
  • the lack of a customer service concept similar to that provided in the real shop with the presentation of a capable person,
  • the combination of the perfumes in question with other heterogeneous, non-luxury products (toilet paper, insecticides),
  • the presence of advertising material of products of other brands, even of lower market segments, on the same Internet page where the perfumes in question are present.

Of particular interest is the fact that the General Court thus held that it was not so much the fact that other, even non-luxury products were sold within amazon that was decisive, but rather that in the same virtual space (web page), heterogeneous goods were presented, thus applying a well-established orientation of European case law to the 'virtual'.

In particular, the European Court of Justice had confirmed the possibility for entities outside the network to sell contractual products in multi-brand shops (in this case a hypermarket), provided that the sign of the retailer does not devalue its luxury image and the sale is made in a reserved department or space in order to enhance the qualities of the products.[10]

Applying this principle to the virtual means, in practice, having to ascertain not only that the good is sold in a 'proper' manner, reserving a virtual space appropriate to its allure luxury, but also that it is promoted and sold on a marketplace or e-commerce whose signage does not devalue its image.

3. Amazon is an 'active' hosting provider

An element of absolute importance is the fact that the Court in this order established the nature of Amazon as an 'information society service provider' within the meaning of the Directive No. 2000/31/EC (on this point see also the legal nature of online platforms: the Uber and Airbnb cases) and, in particular, recognising that subject's role as an 'active' hosting provider in relation to the activity of managing its own sales portal, even where the same is limited to the provision of intermediation services, i.e. it does not carry out active sales activities within the site, but as a provider of services to third parties using the platform to promote sales.[11]

The Court, in particular, established Amazon's role as an 'active' hosting provider,[12] and as such not subject to the liability exemptions outlined by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of Directive 2000/31/EC, in view of the fact that the platform (i) '(i)manages the storage and shipment of products", (ii) "operates a customer service for third-party sales listings, which is the only service the customer has to interface with the seller", (iii) "is also responsible for promotional activity through advertisements on third-party websites" and (iv) "allows consumers to infer the existence of a link between Amazon"and the companies producing the products sold on the platform.

Read also - The hosting contract and the hosting provider's liability profiles.

4. Some reflections

The judgement that is the subject of this brief commentary now aligns with a well-established jurisprudential orientation that, in fact, reflects the reality of commerce today, namely a steadily increasing thinning between in-store shopping experience and online.

One can understand how the online distribution of luxury and high-end products will be less and less able to disregard the careful and rigorous care of sales methods and adhere more and more to strict standards that in physical shops are now taken for granted, not only from a legal point of view, but (above all) from a cultural point of view.

Indeed, it would not even be conceivable that a designer shop could sell a high-fashion dress together with a packet of toilet paper, which still regularly happens online, without causing such a stir for the consumer, who is perhaps more focused on the price and not on the online shopping experience.

This element will increasingly have to be taken into account by manufacturers in their sales strategies

Such a ruling, read a few years from now, will probably raise eyebrows, as a user cannot even imagine that within the same (virtual) shop a high-end perfume could be sold in the same manner and on the same page, together with liquid plumber.

[1] On the subject, Pappalardo, The Competition Law of the European Union, p. 405 ff, 2018, UTET.

[2] On this point see ECJ, 12 December 1996, Galec v. EC Commission, para. 16, ECJ, 13 October 2011, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmetique, para. 41, EU Guidelines Reg. 330/2010, para. 175.

[3] In this regard, reference is made to what the Court of Justice stated in the case Metro-Saba IJudgment of 25.10.1977, at para. 27 ".Any sales system based on the selection of distribution points inevitably implies - otherwise it would make no sense - the obligation for wholesalers who are part of the network to supply only authorised retailers.

[4] Orders of 19 November 2018 and 18 December 2018 of the Court of Milan. with comment by Alice Fratti

[5] Court of Justice case, Pierre Fabre C-439/09.

[6] Court of Milan, 3 July 2019, with comment by RIVA, E-commerce and selective distribution agreements: the case 'Sisley v. Amazon', in Industrial Law, 1/2010, WoltersKluver.

[7] ECJ, 12 December 1996, Groupement d'achat Eduard Leclerc v. Cmmission, para. 111; see also Vichy v. Commission, judgment.

[8] Court of Appeal Milan, 25 November 2019, no. 5682.

[9] Court of Justice, 4 November 1997, Dior v. Evora.

[10] ECJ, 12 December 1996, Groupement d'achat Eduard Leclerc v. Cmmission.

[11] On this point, see also Traina Chiarini, Amazon is an 'active' hosting provider, according to the Business Court of Milan.

[12] To be contrasted with the passive hosting provider who, according to recital 42 of Directive 31/2000/EC, is to be qualified as such any service provider who does not exercise 'authority or control' and has a merely 'technical, automatic and passive role' and who 'neither knows nor controls the information transmitted or stored'.


Scioglimento concessione di vendita e gestione giacenze e stock

Termination of the sales concession contract and inventory management: rights and obligations of the parties.

Sales dealership agreements often contain an agreement on how to deal with the stock of goods purchased by the dealer during the term of the agreement; this regulation may take the form of an option for the franchisor to repurchase the goods at a certain price, or the former dealer may distribute these goods.

Other times, the parties do not provide for any contractual provision governing this case, and upon termination of the relationship, the problem arises as to whether or not the former dealer may resell the stock in inventory, or require the supplier to repurchase the goods.

In the following, these cases will be analysed, albeit briefly, in view of their relevance from both a technical and legal as well as a practical and commercial point of view.


1. Absence of a written agreement in the concession contract.
1.1. Right to resell products in stock.

In the absence of different contractual agreements, the case under analysis must be treated from two different aspects: under the principles of civil law, on the one hand, and those of intellectual property law, on the other.

Civilly the grantor may not prevent his dealer from reselling the goods purchased by the latter, unless the same have been sold subject to reservation of title and the dealer disposes of the contractual goods before becoming the owner: in this case, in addition to the breach of contract, the disposal will even constitute the offence of embezzlement (Art. 646 of the Criminal Code).[1]

From the point of view of intellectual property lawInstead, it is necessary to take up a principle that has already been addressed several times in this blogthat of thebrand exhaustionreferred to inart. 5 c.p.i.

Read also - Parallel sales and the principle of trade mark exhaustion.

According to this principle, once the owner of one or more industrial property rights places a good directly or with his consent on the market in the territory of the European Union, he loses the relevant rights.

The exclusivity is therefore limited to the first act of marketingwhereas no exclusivity can subsequently be claimed by the proprietor of the trade mark on the circulation of the product bearing the mark.

Since in a sales dealership agreement, the consent to the first placing on the market (i.e. the sale by the grantor to the dealer) stems from the contractual relationship between the parties, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the grantor may not oppose the resale of the contractual goods even once the relationship has ended.

It is stated in case law on the subject that:

"the entrepreneur, who has purchased goods with distinctive signs, is indeed entitled to market the product even after termination of the relationship because, according to the principle of exhaustion, the holder of an industrial property right cannot oppose the circulation of a product, to which that right relates, when that product has been placed on the market by the holder of that right or with his consent in the territory of the state or in the territory of other Member States of the European Union."[2]

The principle of exhaustion nevertheless knows a limitation: the second paragraph of Art. 5 of the IPC contains a safeguard rule that allows the trade mark proprietor to oppose the circulation of the product placed on the market with his consent and, therefore, "exhausted", if there are

"legitimate reasons for the proprietor to object to the further marketing of the products, in particular when their condition is changed or altered after they have been placed on the market".

Therefore, in the absence of 'legitimate reasons'[3]the supplier may not prevent the dealer from reselling inventories, let alone from using its trade mark, if it is used by the dealer for the sole purpose of advertising the availability of the product it intends to sell or lease and the advertising activity is not such as to create in the public the belief that the dealer is part of the licensor's authorised network, otherwise such conduct would constitute a confusing offence under Article 2598(1)(1) of the Civil Code on the subject of unfair competition.[4]


1.2. Right to have inventories repurchased.

In the absence of a contractual obligation, in order to understand whether the dealer may require the grantor to repurchase the goods remaining in stock, one must refer primarily to the principles of loyalty and good faith formerly Article 1375 of the Civil Code.

The clause of good faith in the performance of the contract operates as a criterion of reciprocity, requiring each party to the obligatory relationship to act in such a way as to preserve the interests of the other, and constitutes an autonomous legal duty incumbent on the parties to the contract, irrespective of the existence of specific contractual obligations or of what is expressly laid down by law.[5]

Since this is a very broad principle and certainly not easy to implement in practice, it is necessary to assess from time to time how it should be applied to the concrete case, on the basis of all those factors that may impact on the contractual balance: it will certainly be assessed differently if the concessionaire had been contractually obliged to maintain a stock in stock, as opposed to the case where the stocks are due to a failure to adhere to the rules of prudence, which should have advised the dealer to suspend or otherwise reduce purchases and dispose of medium warmth inventories in view of an upcoming report.[6]

A ruling by the Court of Milan is recorded,[7] which considered contrary to these principles the conduct of a supplier who prevented (contrary to the principle of exhaustion) the plaintiff from marketing the product it had supplied prior to withdrawal, without having cooperated in safeguarding the interest of the other party by making available - although not contractually provided for - the repurchase of the goods.

The Court therefore ordered the defendant to pay damages, quantified in the value of the goods remaining in stock.

There is also a further ruling, again by the Court of Milan,[8] relating to a licensing relationship, in which the court reached such a result with the aid of the instrument provided by Article 1340 of the Civil Code, according to which contractual usages or usage clauses are deemed to be included in the contract if it is not apparent that they were not intended by the parties.

The Court therefore held that the licensor was obliged to repurchase the goods sold, in addition to cooperation and conduct in good faith, on the basis of the fact that in the industry in which the parties operated it was customary for the licensor to purchase at least part of the unsold goods following the termination of the relationship.


2. Existence of an agreement between the grantor and the concessionaire.
2.1. Prohibition to resell stock.

A contractual clause that imposes a prohibition on the dealer to sell goods in stock following termination of the contractual relationship, without there being a commitment on the part of the grantor to repurchase such goods, is, in the opinion of the writer, of doubtful validity, both from a antitrustand civil law, for the reasons set out below.

In the field of antitrustArticle 5(b) of the Regulation 330/2010imposes limitations on the supplier's ability to require its buyer to engage in competitive activities after termination of the relationship. "The parties may not impose any direct or indirect obligation on the buyer, after the agreement has expired, not to manufacture, purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services, unless such obligation [...].:

  • refers to goods or services in competition with the contract goods or services;
  • is limited to the premises and land from which the purchaser has operated during the contractual period;
  • is indispensable to protect the 'know-how' transferred from supplier to purchaser;
  • the duration of this obligation is limited to one year. "

Since the requirements for the legitimacy of this obligation are cumulative, the rule does not normally apply to typical forms of sales concessions, which do not imply the need to protect know-how provided to retailers, but rather to the franchising,[9] with the consequence that this exemption can hardly be applied to the contractual case under analysis.

Moreover, the non-compete obligation is not part of the 'severe restrictions' (hardcore) governed by Article 4 of the Regulationbut of those that are simply not exempt, with the consequence that these limitations are only applied to contracts that have no less importancei.e. which do not appreciably restrict competition: this is the case whenever the market share held by each of the parties to the agreement exceeds 15% on the relevant markets affected by the agreement.[10]

If the dealership contract qualifies as a contract of minor importance, an agreement imposing a prohibition on the resale of the stored goods would benefit from the exemption and would (at least from a antitrust) lawful.

Mind you, this does not alter the fact that such a contractual agreement must in any case be subjected to the scrutiny of the principles of good faith and contractual fairness, so that it may be invalid if it is not adequately counterbalanced by - for example - an obligation on the part of the grantor to repurchase the goods in stock, in particular if the latter was contractually obliged to maintain a stock minimum in stock in the course of the report.[11]


2.2. The grantor's right to repurchase the goods.

A different reasoning must be made - again for the purpose of assessing its legality - in the case where the parties provide for a right of the grantor to repurchase the stock of the products, following the termination of the relationship.

To do so, it is first necessary to understand the legal nature of such an agreement, i.e. whether it should be framed as:   

  • preliminary contract formerly 1351 of the Civil Code, ancillary to the concession contract, i.e.
  • purchase option agreement, formerly 1331 c.c.

The differences between these institutions are briefly examined below.

(a) Preliminary contract.

This is the case whenever in the contract both parties agree that upon termination of the relationship the products to stock will be bought back by the supplier at an agreed price. 

Ex. The parties agree that at the end of the contract the dealer shall be obliged to resell to the licensor the entire remaining stock of products at a price equal to the invoice price net of VAT, with a discount of _____.

Such a contractual clause (which would indeed constitute a preliminary contract) is certainly valid, unless it is proved that the contract was null and void ab originee.g. for lack of consent of one of the parties, abuse of rights, etc.

(b) Call option covenant.

If, on the other hand, in the contract one party undertakes to hold firm to its own proposal and the other party (the beneficiary) is granted the right to make use of the option to accept the proposal or not, we fall into the different case of the option contract formerly Article 1331 of the Civil Code.

Ex. At the end of the contract, the grantor has the option to repurchase the stock at the price _______, to be notified within _____ of the termination of the contract.

Such an agreement must also tend to be considered valid; the only problem might be connected with the case where the option right is granted free of charge, i.e. without payment of a price (so-called premium). 

Some (albeit minority) case law[12] holds that in such a case the option agreement would be null and void, since the right cannot be granted free of charge (e.g. a discount on the repurchase of goods). It should be noted, however, that the majority jurisprudence is in favour of the option being gratuitous: "Article 1331 of the Civil Code does not provide for the payment of any consideration and, therefore, the option may be offered for consideration or free of charge".[13]


[1] Torrente - Schlesinger, Handbook of Private Law, Giuffrè, § 377.

[2] Trib. Milan, 6.5.2015; in case law Court of Justice, 8.7.2010, Portakabin case.

[3] The following constitute 'legitimate reasons' for the non-application of the principle of trade mark exhaustion: (a) the modification or alteration of the condition of the goods, after they have been put on the market and (b) all those cases implying a serious and grave prejudice: the latter must be ascertained in concreto. On this point cf. Trib. Milan 17.3.2016.

[4] On this point Civil cassation 1998, no. 10416; Trib. Rome, 28.4.2004.

[5] Cass. Civ. 2014, no. 1179.

[6] On this point cf. Trib. Milan, 19.9.2014.

[7] Trib. Milan, 21.5.2015.

[8] Trib. Milan, 19.9.2014.

[9] Bortolotti, Distribution Contracts, Walters Kluver, 2016.

[10] Cf. De Minimis Communication 2014 of the EU Commissionin conjunction with the Commission Notice on Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.

[11] On this point cf. Trib. Milan, 19.9.2014.

[12] See Appeal Milan 5.2.1997.

[13] Trib. Milan 3.10.2013


piattaforme online La natura giuridica delle piattaforme online Uber ed Airbnb

The legal nature of online platforms: the Uber and Airbnb cases

With the Airbnb and Uber judgments, the Court of Justice ruled on the legal qualification of two very important online platforms. In this article, we are going to understand to what extent an online platform can be qualified as an 'information society' and when not.

One of the founding principles of the EU internal market is the free movement of goods and services. As we have already discussed some of the problems that the European legislator has had to deal with in trying to find a balance between the principle of free trade in goods and the interest of producers in creating competitive distribution networks (The mixed system: when the manufacturer chooses to adopt both exclusive and selective distribution), this article intends to focus attention on how the principle of free movement of services coordinate with the operation of platforms onlinewhich increasingly characterise the economic fabric of the internal market.

To do so, one must probably start from the origins of European law, which, with the introduction of the internal market (Art. 26 of the TFUE), aimed at guaranteeing any entity operating in a Member State to carry out an economic activity in another Member State (Art. 54 - Freedom of establishment) and offer its services there (Art. 56 - Services)[1].

With the 2006/123/EC[2] (relative
services in the internal market) Europe wanted to strengthen the principle of the
freedom to provide services[3], considering
that the pursuit of this objective "aims to establish increasingly
between the states and peoples of Europe and to ensure economic progress
and social
"[4]as well as
to eliminate "barriers in the internal market [that] prevent the
providers, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises, to expand beyond the
national borders and make full use of the single market
. "[5]

To understand whether the services offered by the platforms online, who increasingly play the role of intermediaries with the end user, fall under the definition of 'services" referred to in Article 56 TFEU and Article 4 of Directive 2006/123 and are therefore addressees of the protections guaranteed by those rules, it is first necessary to give a definition of 'platform online". Indeed, if one searches within the European legislation, the only definition provided to us is that of "online brokerage"referred to in Article 2 of Regulation 2019/1150[6]this rule qualifies this activity as that performed by "information society services', pursuant to Article 1(1)(b) of the directive 2015/1535[7]which in turn is taken from Article 2(a) of the  Directive 2000/31[8] on e-commerce.

It is therefore at the term 'information society service" that one must resort to in order to begin to give legal status to such entities; it is qualified (by the above-mentioned directives) as any service "normally provided for remuneration, at a distance[9]electronically[10] and at the individual request of a recipient of services."

The EU after having defined, albeit generically, the concept of information societywith Directive 2000/31 considered it appropriate to ensure that the free market for services is also ensured for entities operating online and, in order to induce Member States to remove restrictions on the cross-border movement of services rendered by the information societyArticle 2 stipulated that Member States may not adopt measures restricting this exercise unless they are necessary for reasons of public policy, public health, public security or consumer protection (Art. 3).

Furthermore, it provided that the Member State must (subject to nullity of the measure)[11] having previously notified the Commission and the Member State in whose territory the service provider in question is established of its intention to take the restrictive measures in question (Article 3(b), second indent).

It follows from this that it is of paramount importance to understand whether a platform online may or may not be qualified as information societysince only in the latter case will the person enjoy the above-mentioned specific protections recognised by European law on the free movement of services.

On this point, it should be noted that the Court of Justice was recently asked about this very issue, in relation to the mediation services provided by the digital platforms Uber Spain, Uber France and Airbnb Ireland. We will now briefly analyse these rulings in order to try to understand what is the ratio which led the Court to take opposite decisions on (apparently) very similar situations.

1. The Uber Spain and Uber France cases.

With two 'twin' decisions, Uber Spain of 20.12.2017[12] and Uber France of 10.4.2018[13]the Court of Justice was called upon to decide whether the UberPop service, which is provided via an international platform, should be assessed as transport service and in that case subject to national legislation making the carrying out of that activity conditional on the hauliers obtaining a licence, or a service of the information societywith the consequent requirement of prior approval by the Commission of national regulatory measures prohibiting such activity.

The European Court of Justice in its first analysis acknowledged that:

"an intermediary service enabling the transmission, by means of a smartphone application, of information relating to the booking of a transport service between the passenger and the non-professional driver, who, using his own vehicle, will carry out the transport, meets, in principle, the criteria to be qualified as an 'information society service'."[14]

In any case, the
Court continues its reasoning by analysing in a
detailed what brokerage services actually are
provided through the use of the Uber application, noting that the company did not
is limited merely to putting in contact (and thus mediating) the
carrier and the transported, but also:

  • select non-professional drivers
    using their own vehicle and with the help of theapp of Uber,
    provide a transport service to persons intending to make a
    movement in the urban area, which otherwise they could not have resorted
    to these services;
  • fixed if nothing else the price
    maximum running;
  • receives payment of the customer and subsequently
    pays it to its driver;
  • exercises control on the quality of
    vehicles and their drivers and their behaviour;
  • in some cases may exercise against
    their drivers exclusion from service.

The Court, having analysed the report in its entirety, therefore came to the conclusion that:

"the brokerage service in
discussion [must] be considered as an integral part of a service
total of which the main element was a transport service, and
therefore fulfilling the qualification of 'information society service' not
[...] but to the service aspect of 'transport quality'.Pursuant to
Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123'.[15]

In view of this
legal classification of the service provided by Uber, the Court held
legitimate regulatory measures that the Spanish and French states had
enacted to prohibit and repress the exercise of this activity, taking into account
that transport services are explicitly excluded from the scope of
implementation of directive 2006/123[16] (and therefore
neither subject to the obligation to inform the Commission under Article 3
of Directive 2000/31).

2. The caso Airbnb of 21.12.2019

The same procedure
argumentation was followed by the Court in a similar case,[17] where one
found itself engaged in deciding on the legal framework of the
intermediation service provided by Airbnb Ireland through the
its electronic platform, with which they are put in contact, behind
remuneration, potential tenants with landlords, professional or otherwise, who
offer short-term accommodation services.

The issue had arisen because the French Association for Accommodation and Professional Tourism (AHTOP) had filed a complaint against Airbnb Ireland, complaining that the Irish-registered company was carrying out a real estate mediation activity on French territory, which is subject under domestic law (Law Houget) to a licensing obligation.

Airbnb Ireland, denying that it was acting as a real estate agent, entered an appearance claiming the right to freedom of establishment and arguing that the law was inapplicable to it Houget because of its incompatibility with Directive 2000/31, claiming to operate in French territory only as information society.

The Court, echoing what was decided in the previous Uber rulings, again affirmed the principle of law that in order to be able to recognise the legal nature of information societyit is not enough that they are only if the four conditions are met cumulative as referred to in Article 1(1)(b) of the aforementioned Directive 2015/1535, but it is also necessary to verify whether it appears that:

"said
mediation service is an integral part of an overall service the
which main element is a service to which a different
legal qualification
".

The Court held that the services provided by the platform related to presenting offers in a coordinated manner, with the addition of tools for searching, locating and comparing them, constitutes themain element of the service and cannot therefore be considered merely ancillary to a service to which the different legal guise of provision of accommodation must be applied.[18] In contrast, all these services (analysed in detail in recital 19 of the judgment)[19] represent the real added value of the electronic platform that allows it to stand out from its competitors.[20]

Following this reasoning, the Court held that Airbnb Ireland cannot be classified as a real estate agentThe purpose of its activity is not only to rent accommodation, but to provide an instrument facilitating the conclusion of contracts concerning future transactions. It is stated on this point that:

"a service such as that provided by the
Airbnb Ireland is not at all indispensable to the realisation of
accommodation services from the point of view of both tenants and landlords
who have recourse to it, since both have numerous other channels [...].
The mere fact that Airbnb Ireland enters into direct competition with
the latter channels
providing its users, i.e. both landlords and
to tenants, an innovative service based on the particularities of a business
information society business does not allow us to derive from this
the indispensable character for the provision of a service of
accommodation.
"

Given the legal nature of Airbnb Ireland's information societythe Court declared that it was not subject to the licensing requirement imposed by French law (Loi Houget), as restricting the free movement of services, also noting that this regulatory measure had in any event not been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2000/31.

Very interestingly, the Court came to a different decision to the Uber case, recognising the nature of information society serviceon the assumption that Airbnb Ireland does not exert a decisive influence on the conditions of the provision of accommodation services to which its mediation service relates, taking into account that the same neither directly nor indirectly determines prices of lettings, nor does it carry out the selection of landlords or accommodation offered for rent on its platform.[21]

From the study of the two judgments, it can therefore be seen that it is the independence and the failure to control on the entity using the electronic platform to promote its service, a central element in understanding whether the platform online whether or not it provides an intermediary service, which can be classified as service of information society and that this must be assessed by analysing the relationship in its entirety.

The above rulings are certainly of great significance not only from a legal point of view, as they lay the foundations for framing figures who increasingly occupy a fundamental role in our economic and social fabric.


[1] Art. 56
TFRUE "Within the framework of the following provisions, restrictions on the free
provision of services within the Union are prohibited in respect of the
nationals of Member States established in a Member State other than the one
of the recipient of the service
. "

[2] Directive
2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006,
on services in the internal market.

[3] This directive
defines in Art. 4(1) as "service' means any activity
unpaid economic activity referred to in Article 50 of the Treaty provided normally
against remuneration
. "

[4] Id.
Recital 1.

[5] Id.
Recital 2.

[6]
Regulation of 20 June 2019, promoting fairness and transparency for the
commercial users of online brokering services, effective as of
from 12.7.2020.

[7]
Directive that repealed and replaced the previous directive
98/34/EC
which defined services

[8]
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament on certain legal aspects
of information society services, in particular trade
electronic commerce in the internal market ('e-commerce directive')

[9] La
directive definesremotely"a service provided without the
simultaneous presence of the parties.

[10] La
directive defines: "electronically": a service sent originally
and received at destination by means of electronic processing equipment
(including digital compression) and data storage, and that it is
entirely transmitted, forwarded and received by wire, radio, optical means
or other electromagnetic means.

[11] Cf.
on the point Judgment
of 19.12.2019
Airbnb Irland UC vs. Association pour un hébergemen et un
tourisme professionnels (AHTOP).

[12] Judgment
of 20 December 2017
, Associación Profesional Elite Taxi vs. Uber Systems
SpainSL,

[13] Judgment
of 10 April 2018
, Uber France s.a.s.

[14] Id. 19

[15] Id. 40.

[16] Cf.
Art. 2(2)(d) Directive 2006/123

[17] Judgment
of 19.12.2019
Airbnb Ireland UC vs. Association pour un hébergemen et un
tourisme professionnels.

[18] Judgment
of 19.12.2019 Airbnb Irland UC vs. Association pour un hébergemen et un
tourisme professionnels (AHTOP), No. 54

[19] Id. In
recital 19 lists in an analytical manner the services actually offered by
Airbnb that are "In addition to the service of connecting
landlords and tenants via its electronic centralisation platform
of the offers, Airbnb Ireland proposes a number of other
services, such as a scheme defining the content of their offer, in
option, a photography service, likewise as an option, insurance for
liability as well as a guarantee for damages up to an amount of
to EUR 800 000. In addition, it provides them with a service
optional to estimate the price of their rental in the light of the averages of
market from that platform. Moreover, if a lessor accepts a
lessee, the latter transfers to Airbnb Payments UK the price of the
lease to which must be added an amount, ranging from 6% to 12% of said
amount, by way of fees and service charged to Airbnb Ireland.
Airbnb Payments UK holds the funds on behalf of the lessor after which, 24
hours after the tenant enters the accommodation, it transmits them to the landlord
by bank transfer, thus enabling the tenant to be sure of the existence
of the asset and to the lessor the guarantee of payment. Finally, Airbnb Ireland has
established a system whereby the lessor and the lessee can
make a judgement by means of a grade ranging from zero to five stars, grade
available on the electronic platform in question
. "

[20] Id. 64

[21] Id. 68


contratto di licenza e nomativa antitrust. Hello Kitty

License Agreement and Antitrust Law: The Hello Kitty Case.

Can the manufacturer block the sales of its licensee? Is the licence agreement subject to antitrust law? Some answers from the Hello Kitty, Campari and Grundig case studies.

For decades, the European legislator has had to resolve the potential conflict that exists between competition rules, which oppose any measure that could restrict the free market within the EU, and protecting the owners of intellectual property rights to dispose exclusively of the property they hold.

This raises the question of how and to what extent competition rules and IPR enforcement can limit each other.

The approach that has been adopted by the European legislator from the outset has been to assign a central role to the creation of a large unified economic area[1] and, on the other hand, provide (with theArticle 36 TFEU) that the protection of industrial property may also derogate from the prohibition of restrictions on the import, export and transit of goods, provided that

"such prohibitions or restrictions do not [constitute] a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. "

In the following, an attempt will be made to retrace, in extreme synthesis, what has been the process of regulatory and jurisprudential harmonisation followed by the European institutions, aimed at finding a balance between apparently contradictory rules.

1. Licence agreement and antitrust law from the 1960s to the present.

As far back as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice for the first time took note of this potential conflict between the existence of IPRs (which are certainly not called into question by EU law) and their exercise, which may be limited by the competition rules of the Treaty in Article 101.

This milestone is represented by the case Grundig[2] (already briefly analysed under the aspect of the parallel sales within the EU): a producer (Grundig) had agreed with its French licensee (Costen), to have recourse to an instrument recognised to it by French national law (the registration of a trade mark of the soc. Grundig in favour of Costen), in fact with the one and only purpose of insulating this territory from parallel sales of products Grundig in France, thus ensuring absolute exclusivity for the licensee. The Court held that this agreement was null and void as contrary to European competition law:

"Article 36, which limits the scope of the trade liberalisation rules contained in Chapter 2 of Title I of the Treaty, cannot restrict the scope of Article [101].. "

In practice, although the agreement between the parties did not infringe the rules of domestic industrial law, the Court found it unlawful because it had de facto led to the isolation of the French market, allowing prices to be charged for products that were not subject to effective competition.

In the 1970s, the Court confirmed this principle in the judgment Siren,[3] where it is again confirmed that:

"Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty do not preclude the existence of a right to exclusive use of a trade mark which has been conferred on it by a Member State. However, the exercise of that right may fall under those articles if the conditions are met. "

Again, with the case Bitter Campari 1977,[4] the Commission found Article 101 applicable to a trade mark licence agreement, through which the manufacturer had granted its licensees the right to manufacture the licensed products in strict compliance with the licensor's instructions, as well as to manage their marketing, albeit with severe export restrictions.

The Commission, considering the contract subject to discipline antitrustgranted the agreement an exemption formerly Article 101 § 3, considering that the limitations imposed by Campari-Milan to their distributors contributed

"to improve the production and distribution of products, [to] refine manufacturing techniques [...], to build new factories, [as well as to] intensify its brand promotion efforts [doubling] its overall sales volume."[5]

Subsequently, in the 1990s and 2000s, the Commission again considered trademark licensing agreements as a distribution agreement in cases Mooesehead/Whitbread[6] e Der Grüne Punkt,[7] thus effectively reinforcing an already established thesis.

This brought us to 2004, the year in which the Commission published the "Guidelines on the Application of Article 101"where she did not fail to reiterate the point she had already made several times,[8] arguing that IPR and competition are both necessary to foster innovations and ensure their competitive exploitation.[9]

In 2010, the Regulation 330/2010which introduced with Art. 2 § 1 the so-called principle of the".universal exemption", according to which all restrictions of competition, which are not expressly prohibited, are permitted. In particular, in Article 2 § 3 the European legislator wanted to "put in black and white" that the exemption also extends to "provisions concerning the assignment to the purchaser or use by the purchaser of intellectual property rights'. which have, however character "accessory[10]. "

The ancillary character of the IPR, as opposed to the commercial element, is a very relevant interpretative tool to understand which IPR licensing contracts fall within the scope of the Block Exemption Regulation. The Orientations of the Commission clarified on this point that:

"the primary object of the agreement should not be the assignment of IPRs or the licensing of IPRs, but rather the purchase, sale or resale of goods or serviceswhile the IPR provisions are aimed at the execution of the vertical agreement.[11]

This implies that the relationship between the parties must have as its object (main) the buying and selling of goods and IPRs, on the other hand, the role (precisely 'accessory') of "facilitate the use, sale or resale of goods or services by the buyer or its customers".[12]

Thus, where a dismissal contract falls within the scope of Art. 101, the contractual limitation clauses on free competition contained therein, will be subject to the strict European discipline on the matter governed precisely by Regulation 330/2010.

This element of 'accessory' was found in a very interesting decision of 2019,[13] by which the Commission fined the Japanese company Sanrio EUR 6.2 million for having entered into licensing agreements for the production and marketing of products (including the well-known trademark 'Hello Kitty") that violated EU competition rules. The operative part of the decision states that Sanrio had introduced a number of direct measures to limit sales outside the territory of competence on the part of licensees, as well as measures to encourage indirectly compliance with restrictions on territories (e.g. the obligation to use a specific language on a product).[14]

2. Licence agreement and trade mark exhaustion.

After having briefly analysed what limits licensors may impose on exports and sales made by their licensees, we will now analyse whether and to what extent an IPR holder may oppose the parallel importation from another Member State of a product previously marketed there by his own licensee.

As has already been analysed, the European legal system guarantees the (fundamental) freedom of movement of goods; the child of this freedom is the principle of Community exhaustionintroduced with European Directive 2008/95/EC in Article 7 and transposed into Italian law by thearticle 5 c.p.i.[15] (on this point see article Online sales by unauthorised distributors. The Amazon, L'Oréal and Sisley cases.)

According to this principle, once the owner of one or more industrial property rights directly or with your consent market a good in the territory of the European Union, he loses the relevant exclusive rights. The exclusivity is thus limited to the first act of marketingwhereas no exclusivity can subsequently be claimed by the proprietor of the trade mark on the circulation of the product bearing the mark.

The decision-making practice of European jurisprudence has made it clear that consent is also given when the marketing is carried out by an undertaking controlled by the holder of the intellectual property right or by an undertaking, as a rule a licenseeauthorised to do so by the owner.[16] It reads,

"may oppose the importation from another Member State of products having the same appearance as the design applied for, provided that the products in question have been put into circulation in the other Member State without the intervention or consent of the holder of the right or of a person bound to him by a relationship of legal or economic dependence. "[17]

The situation would certainly be different, however, if the first placing on the market had been carried out by a third party, or if after the placing on the market there are legitimate reasons for the proprietor to object to the further placing on the market of the products, in particular when the condition of the products is changed or altered after their placing on the market.

In such cases, the legal system provides means of protection, which have already been the subject of a brief analysis (see article "Online sales by unauthorised distributors. The Amazon, L'Oréal and Sisley cases."), to which reference is made.

_______________________ 

[1] The Common European Market (ECM) was born on 25 March 1957 with the signing of the Treaties of Rome, which came into force on 1 January 1958.

[2] Judgment Grundig-Costen, 13.7.1966. In particular, the producer Grundig in order to ensure the isolation of the French market, as well as having imposed numerous contractual prohibitions to its dealer (the soc. Consten), had also resorted to IPR, concluding with Consten an agreement, whereby Grundig would have created a brand Gint (Grundig International) and that this trade mark would be filed in each Member State in the name of the exclusive licensee operating in the country in question (in the case of France, the company Costen); this mark would then be affixed to all equipment produced.

This would have had the de facto aim of hindering parallel imports within the various countries, since the importation (e.g. into France) of products bearing the mark Gintwould have constituted an infringement, since only the exclusive distributor in that country enjoyed the right to use that mark. On this point see PAPPALARDO, The Competition Law of the European Union, p. 870, et seq., 2018, UTET.

[3] Judgment of 18.2.1971.

[4] Decision Bitter Campari, 23.12.1977.

[5] Id. III, A, 1.

[6] Decision 23.3.1990.

[7] Decision 20.4.2001.

[8] Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements, No 7.The fact that intellectual property laws grant exclusive rights of exploitation does not mean that such rights are excluded from the application of the competition rules. Article 101 of the Treaty applies in particular to agreements whereby the holder licenses another undertaking to exploit its intellectual property rights."

[9] Id., n. 7 "In fact, both intangible property and competition law pursue the same general objective, i.e. to increase consumer welfare and to foster an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation is a dynamic and essential component of an open and competitive market economy. Intangible property rights foster dynamic competition by encouraging firms to invest in the development or improvement of new products and processes; competition acts in a similar way by pushing firms to innovate. Therefore, intangible property rights and competition are both necessary to foster innovations and to ensure their competitive exploitation. "

[10] PAPPALARDO, op. cit. p. 338.

[11] Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, n. 35.

[12] Id. n. 36.

[13] Decision of 9.7.2019.

[14] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/IP_19_3950.

[15] Art. 5(1) IPC (Exhaustion), "The exclusive faculties granted by this Code to the owner of an industrial property right are exhausted once the products protected by an industrial property right have been put on the market by the owner or with his consent in the territory of the State or in the territory of a Member State of the European Community or the European Economic Area."

[16] Exhaustion occurs when the protected product has been put on the market by the rightholder "with his consent or by a person bound to him by ties of legal or economic dependence" (Keurkoop, cit., no. 25). On this point See Pappalardo, Il diritto della concorrenza dell'Unione Europea, p. 875, 2018, UTET.

[17] Judgment Keurkoop, 14.9.1982.


Distribuzione selettiva ed esclusiva. Sistema misto

Selective and exclusive distribution: does the mixed system work?

What happens if a manufacturer applies a mixed system (selective and exclusive distribution) within Europe? What are the main advantages and disadvantages?

As has already been pointed out, the European legislator has always
committed to finding a balance between the principle of free trade of
goods and the producers' interest in creating distribution networks
competitive.

The compromise reached by the legislator is now governed by the Regulation
330/2010
on vertical sales, which determines which agreements between undertakings
belonging to the same distribution network are subject to the prohibition of
agreements imposed by theart.
101(1) of the European Treaty
and which, instead, benefit from the exemption
from this prohibition (formerly Art. 103(3)).

In essence, the producer is given a choice between two modes
of distribution: a general one that can be used by any type of producer (the
exclusive) and a particular one for specific situations (the selective one) (cf.
on the point La
selective distribution. A brief overview: risks and benefits
e Clauses
exclusivity and vertical economic agreements in the European context: e-commerce and
territorial exclusivity
).

With the exclusive distributionsupplier divides the markets into
which it operates through the appointment of exclusive distributors, who undertake to
to purchase goods and promote their sale in a manner that tends to
free.

Article 4(a) of the Regulation provides, in fact, that the producer shall not
can restrict, neither directly nor indirectly,[1] the
power of the exclusive distributor to determine the resale price,
without prejudice to the possibility of imposing a maximum price or recommending a
sale price.[2]

The manufacturer will also not be able to prevent, formerly Article 4(a) of the
Regulations, which the distributor make
of active sales
[3]
within the territory, without prejudice to the right to reserve for itself customers
management and prevent them from retailing, in order to maintain this
level of the commercial chain, as distinct from the retail level.[4]

Finally, the distributor shall also have the right to make
sales outside the territory, provided they constitute a response
to unsolicited orders from individual customers outside the
territory (cd. sales
passive
).[5]

It is clear that such freedom of the exclusive distributor is often incompatible
with what are the interests of certain types of producers, in
particular of those in the luxury sector or who develop products that are technically very
complexes
who will be more interested in, rather than a
widespread distribution, to the fact that their products are resold
only from authorised dealers.

Like
has already been dealt with
exceptionally for specific situations
is provided for the producer to create a system of distribution
selective
which allows him, formerly Article 4(b)(iii), to prohibit members of the selective system from
sell to unauthorised distributors in the territory that the manufacturer has
reserved for such a system: in a selective system, assets can only pass
from the hands of one company admitted to the network to those of another, or to
those of the end user.[6]

In observance of the principle of free trade in goods, as
counterpart of the producer's right to impose such limitations on the
freedom of resale of members of the system, the Regulation:

  • Article 4(b)(iv) confers on them the freedom to carry out the so-called cross-sellingwhich consist of unhindered procurement from "other designated distributors in the network, operating at the same or a different level of trade'.[7];
  • Article 4(c) prevents the manufacturer from restricting to members of a selective distribution system, operating in the retail trade, the active or passive sales to end users.[8]

That being said, very often a producer, for practical, managerial and economic reasons, is unable to apply a single distribution system for the entire European market and reserves selective distribution only for those countries that are most strategic for him. In this context, the question arises, firstly, whether such a 'mixed' system is legitimate and, secondly, what risks are attached to it.

1. Mixed systems within the same territory.

The adoption of a mixed system within the same territory would lead to a conflict of interest between the exclusive distributor, which would have the right to be protected from active sales within its territory, and the selective distributor, which would have the right to make active and passive sales within the exclusive territory, pursuant to Article 4(c) of the Regulation.

The Commission questioned the legitimacy of a mixed system and clarified through the Guidelines that such a combination is not admissible "within the territory in which the supplier operates selective distribution [...] as it would make it a restriction of active or passive sales by resellers". incompatible with Article 4(c).[9]

2. Mixed systems in different EU territories.

Given that the Guidelines' prohibition on applying a mixed system refers only to the circumstance that it is developed within the same territory, it is implicitly inferred that the right antitrust does not prohibit the producer to create a mixed system within the different Member States.

This does not detract from the fact that this choice, although legitimate, may nevertheless create problems of no small importance, consisting mainly of the producer's inability to control:

  • sales from the exclusive territory to the selective territory;
  • sales from the selective territory, directed to the exclusive territory.

The individual cases are briefly analysed below.


a) Sales from the exclusive territory, directed to the selective territory.

The fact that the exclusive distributor may not be prevented from making passive sales outside the territory, and thus also within a selective distribution system that the manufacturer has reserved for another territory, is rather self-evident.

More controversial (and commercially impactful) is the
question of whether the exclusive distributor can also sales
active within the selective territory
and, therefore, also carry out
real commercial campaigns within that territory. From a reading
Strictly speaking, Article 4(b)(i) of the Regulation prohibits the
exclusive distributors to make active sales "in the territory
exclusive customers reserved for the supplier or by the supplier
attributed to another buyer'
and does not extend this prohibition to the
distribution system.

To date, there are no case law precedents that have clarified this question, which remains open. In any event, it is believed that a contractual clause requiring the exclusive distributor to make active sales in the selective system, which, due to the manner in which they are presented to the public, may be legitimate, do not harm the image luxury and prestige of the manufacturer's products (on this point see also Online sales by unauthorised distributors. The Amazon, L'Oréal and Sisley cases.).


b) Sales from the selective territory to the exclusive territory.

The problems for the exclusive producer, should the producer create
a mixed market, are essentially related to the fact that:

  • in the first place, formerly Article 4(c) of
    Regulation, the manufacturer may not prohibit authorised retailers from
    making passive and active sales within the EU. The question arises whether
    these should also include the sales within the
    exclusive territory
    or if the distributor's exclusivity protects him from
    such sales actions;
  • secondly, the manufacturer may prohibit, formerly
    Art. 4(b)(iii), sales of members of the selective system to resellers
    unauthorised within the territory that the producer has
    reserved for that system. It follows from a restrictive reading of the rule,
    this prohibition would not seem to be able to be extended to the sales that the
    selected distributors outside the distribution system
    selective
    If this interpretation were to be followed, authorised distributors could
    sell freely within a different territory recognised in
    exclusive to a distributor appointed by the manufacturer.

With reference to the above points, it should be noted that the
Guidelines state that "to retailers in a distribution system
selective [...] no restrictions can be imposed except to protect a
exclusive distribution system operated elsewhere.
"[10]

There is a serious uncertainty of interpretation,
given that a reading of the statutory text inclines towards the view that the
holder of an exclusive right does not have the right to be protected from 'invasion
zone' by selective distributors, whereas the Guidelines would make
leaning in the opposite direction.[11]

The only thing that is certain is that the risks to create a mixed system are very high and that if such a distribution strategy is adopted by the manufacturer, in the medium to long term it would lead to great difficulties in the management, especially of the parallel sales and reciprocal and continuous area invasions.


[1] Article 4(a) provides, in fact, that the taxation
of fixed prices, it cannot take place even indirectly, as a result of
pressure exerted or inducements offered by one of the parties. The Orientations,
No. 48 list numerous examples of such measures and, in particular, "agreements
setting the distributor's margin, or the maximum level of discounts that
the distributor may charge from a prescribed price level; the
the granting of discounts or reimbursement of promotional costs by the
supplier to respect a given price level; the price linkage
resale prices imposed on competitors' resale prices; threats,
intimidation, warnings, penalties, postponement or suspension of deliveries or
termination of contracts in relation to compliance with a given level of
price
"In case law, the Commission's decision is referred to, Yamaha Case, 16.7.2003in which I was recognised as an imposition
indirect pricing the following clause: premiums/bonus "will be
granted only to retailers who have applied, in their actions
advertising, normal margins' and that "publicity actions and
promotions involving discounts in excess of 15% would not be
considered normal."

[2] Importantly, the Guidelines, No. 225
justify this choice of the European legislator, considering that ''imposition
of resale prices may [...] reduce dynamism and innovation to the level
distribution [and thus] prevent more efficient retailers from entering the
market and/or to acquire sufficient size at low prices."
Other
song, it is also acknowledged that "Sometimes the imposition of
resale prices not only has the effect of restricting competition but can
lead, in particular if determined by the supplier, to increases in
efficiency, which will be assessed pursuant to Article 101(1).
3 [...].
Resale price maintenance plus avoidance of free-riding
[...].  
According to the Best Doctrine
(Pappalardo, 356, op. cit.) pending decisions to verify
with this openness of the Commission, certainly the basis of the approach
open and positive of the Commission, it is preferable to consider it as the
confirmation of the absence of prohibitions in EU competition law
automatic.

[3] Cf.
Orientations, no. 51.

[4] On this point, see also Guidelines, no. 55.

[5] Cf. Guidelines, no. 51.

[6] Cf. Pappalardo, Competition Law
of the European Union
p. 363, 2018, UTET.

[7] On this point, the Guidelines, no. 58, state that '[...]
an agreement or concerted practice may not have as its direct or
indirectly to prevent or limit the active or passive sales of the
contractual products between the selected distributors, who must remain
free to purchase these products from other designated distributors in the network,
operating at the same or a different level of the business chain
. "

[8]

[9] N. 57.

[10] Orientations,
n. 56.

[11] On
Point cf. Pappalardo, op. cit., 364.


geoblocking, diritto antitrust

Selling online abroad: applicable law, geoblocking and antitrust law.

The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with ideas for structuring an online sales strategy aimed at foreign markets, taking into account the EU regulations on geoblockingregulations of the countries to which one intends to export and, last but not least, antitrust law.

1. Geoblocking: what is it and when does it apply?

Firstly, one must
analysing the recent European discipline, introduced with Reg.
28 February 2018, No 302/2018
in force since 3 September 2018, containing
measures to prevent unjustified geographical blockades (also known as
as "geoblocking").

The geoblocking was introduced by the EU with
to ensure that it is also correctly applied to the market
one of the founding principles of the European Union: free movement
of goods.

The new Regulation, si
therefore proposes to prevent unjustified geographical blockades or other forms of
discrimination based, directly or indirectly, on nationality, place
of residence or establishment of customers.

Article 3 of that regulation states
in fact that:

"A professional [i.e. an entrepreneur/company].
cannot block or restrict through the use of technological tools or
otherwise, a customer's access to its online interface for
reasons related to nationality, place of residence or place of establishment
of the customer."

This article continues:

"A professional
cannot for nationality reasons
place of residence, or to the
place of establishment of a customer, redirect that client to a version
of its online interface other than the one the customer wanted
log in initially
because of the structure of the language used or of
other features that make it specifically intended for customers with
a particular nationality, place of residence or place of establishment, a
unless the customer has explicitly consented thereto
. "

From a concrete point of view, the
Rules prohibits the practice whereby a user is prevented, to
French example, to buy a product on an Italian site, as it is redirected
automatically to another site designated to handle French customers.

Warning, this does not mean
intends that the professional may not use different versions of its
interface onlinein order to address customers from
Different Member States[1]
(e.g. the German language version, for the German market, the
French for France, etc.), but requires that the different versions designed for the
different markets, be accessible from all EU countries (a
French, you can see the Italian site and the conditions of sale there).

On this point, Art. 3(2),
point 2 of the Regulation makes it clear that:

"in case of redirection with the explicit
consent of the client, the practitioner's version of the online interface
which the customer initially wished to access must remain easily accessible
to the customer in question."

As a result, the professional will not only be free to use different versions of their interface online to address customers from different Member States, but also to automatically redirect the customer to a certain version of the interface if the user has given his or her explicit consent[2] and provided that the user is still free to access all other versions of the same interface.


2. Does geoblocking mean that I have to sell everywhere?

One point must be clarified: the new Regulation
clears the block, but does not oblige you to sell outside your country.

The geoblocking does not limit the possibility of deciding
to market their products online in certain countries, but prohibits
that if the site only provides for delivery to certain countries (for
simplify, in Italy), the customer from another EU country (Germany) is prevented
to buy online that product if you accept delivery in Italy.[3]

Furthermore, if marketing is envisaged
price differentiation is allowed in several countries to take into account, for example,
of the different costs to be incurred for the delivery of the goods, as long as the choice
does not take place in a discriminatory manner.

In fact, Art. 4(1) of the Regulation
provides that the geoblocking:

"does not prevent traders from offering general terms and conditions, including net selling prices, that differ between or within Member States and that are offered to customers in a specific territory or to specific groups of customers on non-discriminatory basis. "


3. Who do I sell to?

Given that the proposal of
sale entered online on its website implies that it is visible
by all users of the network, in the absence of clarification, it is
would apply the general rule that if the professional directs
its sales activity in a given foreign country, implicitly makes
assume that the sale is also aimed at customers domiciled in that particular
Country.

It follows that if the site is
translated into German it is implied that the sale is directed against Germany,
Austria, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg, as well as if it is translated into English, that the
same is promoted to (almost) the whole world.

Although the choice of 'maximum
opening' may seem very commercially viable, we invite you to evaluate it
prudently, as it has considerable legal repercussions (mainly
related to the law applicable to individual sales contracts and the
violation of any foreign rules), tax (in particular with
reference to the transaction being subject to VAT in the purchaser's country of domicile)
and customs (in the case of non-EU sales).

Therefore, for the avoidance of doubt, once you have assessed which countries you actually intend to sell to, it is advisable to state this directly on the site and in the general terms and conditions of sale.


4. By what law is the sale regulated?

If sales are only aimed at
to a market (e.g., to simplify, Italy), with delivery of the goods
in the territory of that country and the purchaser is a consumer domiciled in a different
country (e.g. Germany), which requires the delivery of the goods to take place in
Italy, such a sale will be governed by Italian law, without the need to worry about
to provide in the general terms and conditions of sale for compliance with any regulations
imperative provided by Germany. [4]

A different matter, however, if the order originates in Germany and the delivery of the goods takes place on German territory, in which case the law applicable to the contract of sale will be German law and, if the end user is a consumer, this may not be derogated from, even with the written consent of the parties.[5]


5. Violation of information obligations and foreign regulations.

If the site provides for the sale
also in countries other than Italy, it will be necessary to organise it by ensuring
that:

  • the general sales conditions respect the obligations of
    consumer information, as referred to in Art. 6, para. 1 of the Directive
    2011/83/EU;[6]
  • the general terms and conditions of sale comply with any mandatory regulations
    of the countries to which they intend to export, different and/or additional to those
    provided for by Italian law;
  • commercial information required by the
    State of export.

With reference to the above
disclosure obligations, it should be noted that:

  • the restriction on delivery of the goods must be clearly stated
    since the beginning of theprocedure leading to the conclusion of the contract, formerly Art. 8(3) of the
    Directive 2011/83/EU;[7]
  • must be in the language of the consumer (Art. 8 para. 1 of the Directive
    provides for the obligation to 'inform the consumer in plain and intelligible language').[8]

The penalty in case of
breach of consumer information obligations consists in the extension of
of the right of withdrawal from fourteen days to twelve months and fourteen
days.[9]

In addition to the risk of such a sanction, in some European countries there is also the risk of being subject to a warning and, in the most serious cases, an injunction action before the competent court: German law, for example, provides that in the case of ineffective clauses in the general terms and conditions of sale and violation of consumer protection rules, the warning and/or injunction action may be brought not only by the consumer, but even by a competitor, i.e. a consumer protection association.[10]


6. Can distributors and retailers sell online?

In the event that the manufacturer also makes use of third-party distributors and resellers to market its products, it is worth briefly recalling what are the powers of control over these entities, referring, for further details, to the section antitrust of this blog.

The Vertical Sales Regulation 330/2010 and recent judgments of the European Court of Justice[11] provided that a manufacturer may not prohibit its distributor/reseller from sell purchased products through their own websitenor market through the digital platforms of third parties.

The only way to limit this possibility by third parties is (for high-end, luxury and technically developed products) to create a selective distribution networkin which the distributors and resellers undertake to sell the contract goods only to distributors selected on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature established indiscriminately and non-discriminatorily for all persons belonging to the network.

In that case, according to the most recent case law of the Court of Justice,[12]a manufacturer is authorised to impose a clause on its distributor allowing it to sell products via internet, but on condition that such sales activity online is realised through an 'electronic shop window' of the authorised shop and that the aura of luxury and exclusivity of these products is thereby preserved (on this point, see the Amazon Case e The mixed system: when the manufacturer chooses to adopt both exclusive and selective distribution).


[1] Compare recital 20
of the Regulation on geoblocking.

[2] Consent, once given, may be considered valid
even for subsequent visits by the same customer to the same interface
online, provided that the customer is given the opportunity to revoke it when he or she considers
appropriate. On this point, see recital 20 of the Geoblocking Regulation.

[3] On this point, see Stefano
Dindo, E-Wine, Legal-economic aspects of wine communication and distribution
online, G. Giappichelli Editore, p. 41, 2018.

[4] According to Art. 6(1),
(a) and (b) of Regulation 593/2008.

[5] See previous footnote.

[6] Directive 2011/83/EU of
european parliament and the council of 25 october 2011 on the rights of
consumers. Importantly, since this is a Directive (and not a Regulation), the
it must be transposed by national laws, while leaving the
Member countries free to choose the most appropriate regulatory path to achieve the
objectives set therein; it follows that each country is free to insert
information obligations in addition to those set out in the directive itself.

[7] Art. 3 Directive 2011/83/EU:
"E-commerce sites shall indicate clearly and legibly, at the most
late at the beginning of the ordering process, if restrictions apply
delivery and which means of payment are accepted."

[8] Attention! These parameters
language must also be complied with for the application of the provisions
of the GDPR. On this point, see Recital 20 of that Regulation.

[9] Art. 10 para. 1 of Directive 2011/83.

[10] Cf. Robert Budde, E-Wine,
Legal-economic aspects of online wine communication and distribution, G.
Giappichelli Editore, p. 51 ff., 2018.

[11] See judgment of the Court of
Justice in the Pierre Fabre case C-439/09.

[12] Judgment of 6 December 2017, C-230/16 Coty Germany GmbH.


esaurimento del marchio e vendite parallele

Parallel sales and the principle of trade mark exhaustion.

Can unauthorised distributors make parallel sales? When can the principle of trademark exhaustion be invoked? The Amazon, Sisley and L'Oréal cases.

Like
has already been explained (cf. La
selective distribution. A brief overview: risks and benefits
), the
selective distribution has the function of protecting the marketing of
products which, depending on their characteristics, require a
resale more selected and cared for than consumer products.

In
such cases, the producer is inclined not so much to focus on the breadth and
capillarity of its sales network, as much as to favour a limitation of
commercial channels
preferring to entrust their products to a small
number of specialised dealers, chosen according to certain criteria
objective dictated by the nature of the products: professional competence (for
as far as would-be distributors are concerned),[1] quality
of the service offered, i.e. prestige and care of the premises in which the
retailers will have to carry out their activities.[2]

This system, regulated by the EU Regulation 330/2010 on Vertical Agreements,[3] complies with Art. 101 § 3 of the Treaty (and therefore does not fall under general prohibition laid down in § 1 of that Article), essentially if:

  • "the choice of dealers is made according to objective criteria of a qualitative nature, concerning the professional qualification of the dealer, his staff and his facilities'.,
  • which "these requirements are required indiscriminately for all potential resellers".,
  • and that "are assessed in a non-discriminatory manner".[4]

With
reference to the type of products for which it may be
justified the use of a selective system, even though the Regulation
330/2010 makes no mention of this, as it merely gives a definition
of this system, it is considered that it is only reserved for products of
luxury, high quality and technologically developed.[5]

One
of the essential elements linked to selective distribution, it is certainly
related to the fact that, in such a system, the producer can impose the obligation of
not sell to parties (other than end users) not belonging to
to the network (formerly Article 4 (b) (iii)).[6]

According to
advantage is related to the limits that can be imposed on members of the system
selective, regarding the possibility of selling products online. On
point, European case law has stated that, while a
manufacturer of a non-selective system, it cannot prevent its distributors
to sell online
,[7]
in a selective system, the producer is authorised to impose on its
distributor a clause allowing products to be sold through interneta
provided that such sales activity online
 is
realised through an 'electronic shop window' of the authorised shop and that
thus preserving the aura of luxury and exclusivity of these
products
.[8]

Moreover, case law[9] considered legitimate a contractual clause that prohibits authorised distributors of a selective distribution system to make recognisable use of third-party platforms for the Internet sale of contractual products, provided that this is aimed at safeguarding the image of those products and that it is established indiscriminately and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.


1. Parallel distribution by unauthorised distributors.

In any case, it is highly common in practice that, even if the manufacturer creates a selective system, parallel distributions develop within the market itself. This may be due to the fact that very often manufacturers only distribute 'selectively' in the most important markets, while reserving a 'classic' system (i.e. through an exclusive, non-selective importer) for the other areas, thus allowing (and facilitating) the 'classic' distributors to sell products also to parallel distributors within a selective market.[10]

Read also Parallel Sales in the EU. When and to what extent can a manufacturer control them? e Selective and exclusive distribution: the mixed system selective.

What
therefore happens if the manufacturing company takes over the unauthorised sale of
their products on a platform e-commerceby a
distributor/intermediary outside the selective distribution network?

È
clear, in fact, that in such a situation the relationship between producer and third party is
of a non-contractual nature and one must therefore understand what (and if any) instruments
legal provisions enabling the manufacturer to defend itself against such extraneous sales
to the selective system.

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to take a brief step back.


2. The principle of Community exhaustion.

As is well known, the European legal system guarantees the (fundamental) freedom of movement of goods; the child of this freedom is the principle of Community exhaustionintroduced with European Directive 2008/95/EC in Article 7 and transposed into Italian law by thearticle 5 c.p.i.[11]

According to
this principle, once the holder of one or more property rights
industry enters directly or with its own consent[12]
(e.g. by the licensee) to market a good in the territory of the Union
the European Union, the latter loses its exclusive rights.

The exclusive
is therefore limited to the first act of marketingwhile none
exclusivity may subsequently be claimed by the holder of the design,
on the circulation of the product bearing the mark.

The
principle of exhaustion, however, has an important exception: the second
paragraph of Article 5 c.p.i. contains, in fact, a safeguard rule that, with
reference to the trade mark, allows the proprietor, even when he has placed the
product on the market and, therefore, 'exhausted' the right, of prevent the
patent suffers a decrease in attractiveness and value
.

At
in order to circumvent the fact that the trade mark proprietor may arbitrarily restrict the
free movement on the Community market, the derogation from the principle
of trade mark exhaustion is limited to the occurrence of conditions that
make it necessary to safeguard the rights that are the specific subject of the
property: the second paragraph of Art. 5 of the IPC provides that they must
exist

"reasons
legitimate
for the holder himself to object to the further
marketing of products, particularly when the state of these is
modified or altered after being placed on the market
".

La
community case law[13]
confirmed that the existence of a selective distribution network can be
included among the 'legitimate reasons' preventing exhaustion, provided that
the marketed product is a luxury or prestige item that
justifies the decision to adopt a selective distribution system.

It will be up to
at national judgetherefore, called upon to judge whether
there are 'legitimate reasons' for the trade mark proprietor to oppose it
further marketing of its products and, therefore, check whether the
selective distribution contracts comply with the law antitrust
European.[14] This
is (to simplify, but far from trivialising) to ascertain:

  • the lawfulness of the
    products, assessing their nature (i.e. whether they are luxury goods or,
    high quality or technologically developed products);
  • that the third party respects the standard which
    the manufacturer requires from its authorised distributors.

In
If not, then if the marketing methods used of the
third do not respect the standard required and are damaging to the trade mark
of the producer, this activity will be exempt from the principle of exhaustion.

In order to give some practical examples and thus try to make this issue as clear as possible for the reader, three recent (and very interesting) judgments of the Court of Milan are given below.


The case of Landoll s.r.l. v MECS s.r.l.

In the
2018 the Court was called upon to decide the following question: Landoll,
company leader in research, development and commercialisation
of professional cosmetics and owner of several brands, provided
selective distribution of their products, based on standard qualitative
selected, aimed at protecting the image of luxury and prestige. The applicant
detected the unauthorised offer for sale of its products on a
platform e-commerceattributable to the defendant. The applicant has therefore
sought an injunction against the respondent to continue its activity
of sale.

The
Court recognised that the infringement of the
appellant on its registered trade marks, it was inferred from the

 "assessment of the existence of a
effective harm to their image of luxury and prestige that follows
from examination of the how products are presented to the public [...] is
on an e-commerce platform, which on its website
manifested in the
their presentation to be plainly assimilated to any generic product of the
even lower quality sectors."[15]

Ha
therefore prevented the respondent from further advertising,
marketing, offer for sale of the plaintiff's products.  


Case Sisley Italia s.r.l. v. Amazon Europe Core s.a.r.l.

In
this dispute,[16] Sisley
Italia s.r.l., a company also leader in the cosmetics sector and
organised through a selective distribution system, brought an action for
the Court of Milan prevented Amazon from marketing in the territory
Italian products bearing the Sisley trademarks, considering that the manner in which they are placed
commercially used by the defendant violated the standard required
by Sisley to its authorised distributors. The device states that on the
Amazon portal

"Sisley products
are displayed and offered mixed with other items, such as products for the
household and cleaning products, which are however low-profile and of little value
economic. Also in the 'Luxory Beauty' section [...] the Sisley brand is
approached to low-end brands of very high quality, reputation and price
inferior or far less prestigious."

La
judgment continues:

"Where you
consider that, in its contracts, Sisley explicitly requires that the
their products are sold in luxury perfumeries or in departments
specialising in perfumery and cosmetics in department stores, with staff
qualified, in a given urban context, undoubtedly appears
inadequate, compared to the required standards, the sale of products
in question next to microwave containers, cleaning products for the
floors and for pets,'

The Court of Milan therefore recognised that the marketing and promotion of such products on the same internet page as products of other brands - even of lower market segments - was "detrimental to the prestige and image of the Sisley brand. "


But what happens if products are imported from a non-EU country? The L'Oréal Case.

Like
condition because the exhaustion formerly article 5 c.p.i.
takes place is that the first marketing was carried out by the
holder (or with his consent) and that such entry is made
within the single market.

Different
the situation where the first entry into the single market is made by
Unauthorised third parties: the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice since 1982
decided that if the marketing of the protected good is carried out by the
holder outside the Community, the latter may assert his right
to oppose importation into the Union by a distributor
non-EU.[17]

Applying
these principles the Court of Milan[18]
prohibited IDS International Drugstore Italia s.p.a. from offering for sale
and marketing, in any manner or form, including the use of internet
and of social mediaof products L'Oréal. These products
had indeed been purchased by IDS from a non-EU distributor,
who had bought them directly from the manufacturer.

Place
that the first marketing within the EU had not been
carried out by the owner (or with his consent), he continued to
hold, pursuant to arts. 5 and 20 c.p.i., the right to oppose importation
parallel from non-EU countries without his consent.

Different
issue would be where the trade mark proprietor consents to the marketing
on the market in a given EEA Member State, in which case he exhausts
its intellectual property rights and, therefore, can no longer prohibit the importation
in a different Member State.


[1] Consider the
decision Grundig approved in 1985 by the Commission, in which
presence was required "of qualified personnel and an external service
with the technical expertise to assist and advise customers',
as well as 'the technical organisation necessary for the storage and
timely supply of buyers'; 'present and display products
Grundig in a representative manner in special rooms, separate from other
departments, and whose appearance reflects Grundig's market image'.

[2] On this point cf.
PAPPALARDO, The Competition Law of the European Union, p. 409, UTET,
2018.

[3] defining distribution
selective as: "a distribution system in which the supplier
undertakes to sell the goods or services covered by the contract, either directly or
indirectly, only to distributors selected on the basis of criteria
specified and in which these distributors undertake not to sell such
goods or services to unauthorised resellers in the territory that the supplier has
reserved for such a system."

[4] Metro Judgment I,
25.10.1977 and Case C-31/80, L'Oréal v PVBA. This orientation was confirmed
also from the Commission's Guidelines at No. 175, which state that "In
gender, it is considered that selective distribution based on purely
quality does not fall under Article 101(1) because
does not lead to anti-competitive effects, provided three
conditions. Firstly, the nature of the product in question must make
selective distribution system in the sense that such a system
must be a legitimate requirement in view of the
characteristics of the product in question, to preserve its quality and
ensure their proper use. Secondly, the choice of dealers
must take place according to objective criteria of a qualitative nature established
indiscriminately and made available to all potential resellers and
applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Thirdly, the criteria established do not
must go beyond what is necessary."

[5] In any case, an answer can be found in the Commission's Guidelines, where in No. 176, it is stated that: "if the characteristics of the product do not require selective distribution [...], such a distribution system does not generally lead to efficiencies that outweigh a significant reduction in intra-brand competition. If appreciable anti-competitive effects occur, the benefit of the Block Exemption is likely to be withdrawn". See also, n. 25, case Coty Germany, judgment of 6.12.2017, which provides:

[6] In this regard, one
recalls what the Court of Justice stated in the case Metro-Saba
I
Judgment of 25.10.1977, at para. 27 ".Any sales system
based on the selection of distribution points inevitably implies -
otherwise it would make no sense - the obligation for wholesalers who are part of the
network, to supply only authorised dealers'.

[7] Case Pierre Fabre, judgment of 13.10.2011.

[8] Case Coty Germany, judgment of 6.12.2017.

[9] Cf.
previous note.

[10] In that case, the
manufacturer may not impose a ban on passive sales, in the
resellers in areas where the system does not exist
selective, but only prohibit it, pursuant to Art. 4(b)(i), from selling
active.

[11] Art. 5,
paragraph 1, c.p.i. (Exhaustion), "The exclusive faculties conferred by this
code to the holder of an industrial property right are exhausted one
once products protected by an industrial property right are
put on the market by the holder or with his consent in the territory
State or in the territory of a Member State of the European Community or of the
European Economic Area.'

[12] The practice
decision-making and European case law have made it clear that one has the consent
when the marketing was carried out by a controlled undertaking
by the intellectual property right holder or an enterprise, as a rule
a licensee, authorised to do so by the holder. Exhaustion occurs
when the protected product has been placed on the market by the holder of the
right "with his consent or by a person bound to him by ties of dependence
legal or economic'
(sent. Keurkoop, cit., no. 25). On this point Cf. Pappalardo, The right
European Union competition
, p. 875, 2018, UTET.

[13] Case Copad SA, judgment of 23 April 2009, "Where the marketing of luxury goods by the licensee in breach of a clause in the licensing contract is nevertheless to be regarded as having taken place with the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, the latter may rely on that clause to oppose a resale of those goods on the basis of Article 7(2) of Directive 89/104, as amended by the Agreement on the European Economic Area, only if it is established, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that such resale damages the reputation of the trade mark. "

[14] On this point, cf. Fratti, Selective distribution of luxury cosmetics: the Court of Milan clarifies the prerequisites for the exclusion of the principle of trade mark exhaustion.

[15]
Court of Milan, Order of 18.12.2018. See previous footnote.

[16] Court of Milan, order of 3.7.2018

[17] Cf. Pappalardo,
op. cit., p. 878.

[18]
Court of Milan, Order of 19.11.2018, see footnote 12.